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## AVRUPA’NIN KİMLİK OLUŞUMUNDA “ÖTEKİ” ETKİSİ: NEREDEN BAKINCA BATI?

Ayça Nur DURSUN<sup>1</sup>

### Özet

“Avrupa” kavramının coğrafi olarak kullanımının ötesinde politize olmuş bir kavram olduğunu söylemek mümkündür. Avrupa’nın “Batılılaşmış” bir kavram olarak ortaya çıkmasının bir meşruiyet zemini vardır ve bu zemin Avrupa’nın ötekisinden kaynaklanmaktadır. Avrupa’nın ötekisi olan Doğu (Orient) ve Avrupa’nın kendisi Batı (Occident) arasındaki ikiliğin sonucudur. Bu ikilik Roma İmparatorluğu’nun bölünmesinden sinyallerini vererek İstanbul’un fethi ile tam manasıyla gerçekleşmiştir. Roma İmparatorluğu’nun çöküşündeki Doğu etkisi ile Batı ve Doğu arasında bir ayrışma baş göstermiştir. Nihayetinde İstanbul’un fethi sonrası Batı ve Avrupa eş anlamlı hale gelmiştir. Bu nedenle 1453 tarihsel olarak bir dönüm noktası olarak kabul edilebilir. Avrupa kimliğini ve aidiyet hissiyatını Avrupa’ya kazandırmada İslam istilaları önemli bir yer tutmaktadır. İslam tarafından oluşturulan düşmanlık imajı Avrupa’nın tek ve yüksek bir kültürü elde etmesini sağlamıştır. Dışarıdan düşman fikri içeride bütünleşme etkisi göstermiştir. Francis Bacon “Biz Avrupalılar” söylemini 1600’lerde ifade etmiştir. Yani Avrupa kimliği kendi bilinci ile oluşmamıştır ve önceden belirlenmiş bir şey değildir. Elbette Avrupa kimliği homojen bir görünümde değildir ve bu durumun Avrupa içi gerilimlerle doğrudan ilişkisi vardır. Avrupalı insanların ulusal kimlikleri de Avrupalı kimlikleri de vardır. Yani ulusal kimlikleri hala varlığını korumaktadır. Avrupa kimliği diye bahsettiğimiz olgunun varlığının süreç içerisinde oluşumu bilinçli bir proje değil, ötekinin etkisi ile olduğunu söylemek mümkündür. Avrupa kimliği diğer uygarlıklarla karşılaşmanın sonucunda oluşmuş ve kimliğini küresel karşıtıtlıklardan elde etmiştir. Böylece siyasi, kültürel ve evrensel bir etik haline gelen bir Avrupa fikri oluşmuştur. Birçok ulusun var olduğu Avrupa’da ortak bir Avrupa kimliğinin oluşturulması gerekliliktir. Çünkü Avrupa küresel bir güç olarak var olmak istiyorsa bunu sağlamalıdır. Bu kimliğin homojenleşmesini tehdit eden birçok unsur vardır. Ancak yine de şu an Avrupalı ve Batılı kavramları iç içe geçmiş görünmektedir. Bu içiçelik durumu kasıtlı bir şekilde tarihsel bağlam içerisinde gerçekleşmiştir. Sonuç olarak Batı olarak Avrupa, Doğu’dan bakıldığında Batı’dır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Doğu, Batı, Avrupa, Kimlik, Öteki

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**THE IMPACT OF THE “OTHER” ON EUROPE’S IDENTITY FORMATION:  
FROM WHERE THE WEST?**

**Abstract**

It is possible to say that the concept of “Europe” is a politicized concept beyond its geographical use. The emergence of Europe as a “Westernized” concept has a ground of legitimacy, and this ground originates from the other of Europe. Europe’s other, the East (Orient), and Europe itself is the result of the dichotomy between the West (Occident). This duality was fully realized with the conquest of Istanbul, signaling the division of the Roman Empire. With the Eastern influence in the collapse of the Roman Empire, a separation between the West and the East emerged. After the conquest of Istanbul, West and Europe became synonymous. Therefore, 1453 can be considered as a historical turning point. Islamic invasions have an important place in bringing the European identity and sense of belonging to Europe. The image of hostility created by Islam enabled Europe to achieve a single and high culture. The idea of an enemy from the outside had the effect of integration inside. Francis Bacon coined the phrase “We Europeans” in the 1600s. In other words, the European identity was not formed by its own consciousness and is not something predetermined. Of course, European identity is not homogeneous and this situation has a direct relationship with intra-European tensions. European people have national identities as well as European identities. In other words, their national identity still preserves its existence. It is possible to say that the existence of the phenomenon we refer to as European identity is not a conscious project, but the influence of the other. European identity was formed as a result of encounters with other civilizations and derived its identity from global oppositions. Thus, the idea of a Europe that became a political, cultural and universal ethic was formed. It is necessary to create a common European identity in Europe where there are many nations. Because if Europe wants to exist as a global power, it must provide it. There are many factors that threaten the homogenization of this identity. However, at the moment, the European and Western concepts seem to be intertwined. This intertwining situation has been deliberately realized within the historical context. As a result, Europe as the West is the West when viewed from the East.

**Keywords:** East, West, Europe, Identity, Other

## I. Giriş

“Avrupa” kavramı geniş manada Avrupa kıtasını ifade etmektedir. Ancak coğrafi olarak ifade ettiğimiz bu basitleştirmenin ötesinde Avrupa çeşitli anlamlar içermektedir. Bir anlamıyla Avrupa, bir kültürel mirası ifade etmektedir. Yani Antik Yunan, Roma İmparatorluğu, Hristiyanlık, Hümanizm, Aydınlanmacılık gibi Avrupalıların ortak mirasına dayanan bir kavramı ifade etmektedir. Ancak bu kültürel miras meselesi, bahsedilen unsurlarla sınırlı kalması ve Avrupa’ya ait olumsuz vakaları göz ardı etmesi bakımından tartışmalı bir konudur. Avrupa kavramı diğer bir yönüyle, içerisindeki ulusların ulusal kültürlerinin bütünlüğünü ifade etmektedir. Yani içerisindeki ulusların kendi ulusal kimlikleri ile Avrupa kimliğinin kültürel olarak zenginleştirmelerini ifade etmektedir. Ancak bu mesele de ulusal kimliklere Avrupalılık atfeden konunun ne olduğu sorunsalı ile eleştirilmektedir. Son olarak Avrupa için daha modern bir anlamlandırma da söz konusudur. “Oluşmakta olan modern bir kültür olarak” ifade edilen Avrupa kendi kültürünün, ekonomisinin ve sosyo-kültürel yapısının değişimleri ile anlamlandırılır. Buradaki Avrupa anlayışında daha çok Avrupalıların ortak kültür, temsil ve sembollerine değinilmektedir (Berting, 2016:78-82).

Çalışmanın Avrupa’ya bakışı bir kültürel miras olarak ifade edilen Avrupa anlayışı bakış açısı ile yapılacaktır. Bu bağlamdan yola çıkılarak ilk önce Avrupa’nın tarihsel olarak bu mirası nasıl elde ettiğine ve bunu nasıl bilinçli olarak kimikleştirdiklerine değinilecektir. Yani Avrupa’nın kendisinden farklı olan ile etkileşim kurarak kurduğu kimlikten bahsedilecektir. Bu bağlamda oluşturucu “öteki”nin yani Doğu’nun bu kimliğe olan etkisine ve Avrupa anlayışının ve kimliğinin olumlanmasına dikkat çekilecektir. Bu oluşturucu ötekinin etkisi Edward Said ve Samir Amin isimleri ve çalışmaları özelinde ele alınacaktır.

Said’in Oryantalizm hakkındaki bakış açısı çerçevesinde Avrupa kimlik oluşumu değerlendirmeleri ele alınacaktır. Oryantalizm konusunda çalışmaları ile döneminin ünlü yazarlarından olan ve bu bakımdan çalışmamız için önem arz eden Said’in kavramsallaştırması “Oryantalizm” adlı eseri üzerinden ele alınacaktır. Ardından Samir Amin’in Avrupa kimlik algısı ve “Avrupa merkezilik” eleştirilerine yer verilecektir. Amin, Avrupa merkezilik ile ilişkilendirilen önemli isimlerden olması sebebi ile çalışma için önem arz etmektedir. Onun görüşlerinin dayanağı olarak “Avrupa merkezilik” adlı eseri merkeze alınacaktır. Araştırma yöntemi olarak nitel araştırma yönteminin kullanılacağı çalışmamızda metin analizi yapılacaktır.

Çalışmanın olarak ilk kısmında Avrupa kimliğinin tarihsel süreçte Antik Yunan’dan Roma İmparatorluğu’na ve oradan da Hristiyanlığa dek geçen süreç içerisinde nasıl kurgulandığına yer verilecektir. Sonrasında Said’in Oryantalizm kavramsallaştırması ve Avrupa kimliğini nasıl ele aldığına yer verilecektir. Son kısımda ise Amin’in Avrupa merkezci düşünce hakkında eleştirilerine yer verilecek ve Doğu-Batı ikiliğinin Avrupa kimliği üzerindeki oluşturucu öteki rolünün etkisi analiz edilecektir. Çalışmanın araştırma soruları “Avrupa kimliğinin tarihsel kurgusu nasıl gerçekleşmiştir?”;



“Edward Said’e göre Doğu, Oryantalizm ile nasıl kurgulanmıştır?”; “Samir Amin’e göre Avrupa merkezilik kurgusu nasıl yapılmıştır?” ve “Avrupa kimliğinin oluşumunda Doğu’nun etkisi nedir?” şeklinde kurgulanmış ve bu sorulara cevap aranmıştır.

Çalışmada Avrupa’yı oluşturan ülkeler özelinde bir değerlendirme yapılmaksızın, genel anlamda bir Avrupa kimliğinin oluşturulma çabasından söz edilecektir. Bu kimliğin oluşumunun başarılı olup olmadığı meselesi ile sonlandırılacak olan çalışma, alana Samir Amin ve Edward Said özelinde bir katkı yapması bakımından önem taşımaktadır.

## II. Kimlik ve Tarihsel Bir Kurgu Olarak “Avrupa Kimliği”

Ben kimim sorusunu yanıtlamak ve ben tanımlı yapabilmek için kimliğe ihtiyaç vardır. Kimliğin bireysel, sosyal ve kolektif kimlik gibi yönleri vardır. Bunlar için önce öz-bilinç oluşturmak ve bu yolla kimlik tanımlı yapmak mümkündür. Bu doğrultuda Antik Dönem’de Avrupa’nın kimlik ifade eden bir anlam taşımadığını söylemek mümkündür. “Europe”un Yunan mitolojisinde mitsel bir kavram olarak tasviri söz konusudur ancak bu tasvir Avrupa kimliğinin Doğu temelinde değil de Antik zamanlara uzandığının ispatı için yapılmıştır ve kurgusal niteliktedir (Delanty, 2014). Antik dönemdeki Yunan kültürü vatandaşlık kavramının oluşması bakımından önemlidir. En nihayetinde Antik Yunan, basit bir düzeyde de olsa demokrasinin deneyimlendiği ve insanların “polis” adlı şehir devletlerinde yaşadığı bir medeniyeti ifade eder. Yalnızca belirli vatandaşların doğrudan demokrasi yöntemi ile oy kullanabildiği Yunan kültür ve medeniyetlerinde siyasete katılmak saygın bir meseledir. Yabancı şehir devletlerinden gelenler, kadınlar, köleler ve tüccarlar vatandaş olamamakta ve dolayısıyla bu hakkın sahibi de olamamaktadır. Yunan kültürü yetiştirdiği düşünürler bakımından önem taşımaktadır. Platon, Sokrates, Aristoteles, Pisagor ve Öklid gibi büyük düşünürler bu medeniyette yetişmiştir (İnaç, 2014; İnaç, 2016; Delanty, 2014: 45).

Antik dönemde Avrupa kelimesi neredeyse hiç kullanılmamıştır. Platon “Devlet” adlı eserinde Yunan-barbar düalizmine açıkça yer vermiştir ancak Avrupa önem verilen bir yer olarak açıkça belirtilmemiştir. Aristo’nun yazılarında ise Yunanlılar, Asyalılar ve Avrupalılar olarak bir ayırım vardır. Yunan üstün olarak görülürken Asyalılar ve Avrupalılar “barbar” olarak değerlendirilmektedir. Yine dönemin düşünürlerinden Herodot’un İran ve Yunan arası çatışmaların uygarlık çatışmasına neden olduğu yorumu doğrudan Avrupa ve Asya ayırımı yapmasa da önemlidir. İsokrat ise M.Ö. 4. Yüzyılda kimliklendirme yaparak Asya’yı İran’la, Avrupa’yı da Yunanistan’la doğrudan ilişkilendirmiştir. Yani Antik dönemde Avrupa ancak coğrafi olarak bir anlam ifade etmektedir. Antik Yunan kültürün doğduğu yer olarak görülmektedir ve geriye kalan her şey de barbar olarak nitelendirilmektedir (Delanty, 2014: 86).

Ancak Roma İmparatorluğu’nun kuruluşu ile bu coğrafya yakılmış ve değerlerinin kaybolması tehdidi ile karşı karşıya kalmıştır. Roma İmparatorluğu eski bir inanışıyla hareket ederek fethettiği yerleri ateşe vermiş ve külleri de tehlikeden korunmak için dağıtmıştır (İnaç, 2020). Yine de Yunan

kültürüne ve Platon, Sokrat ve Aristo gibi miraslarına bugüne erişebilmiştir ancak bunlar Avrupa kimliğine temel oluşturan değerler değildir çünkü Yunanlılar kendilerini hiçbir zaman bir kimlik olarak Avrupalı diye tanımlamamıştır. Yunan coğrafyasından daha kapsamlı bir Avrupa fikri ise, Roma İmparatorluğu'nun kurulması ile Yunan merkezinin Anadolu'ya kayması sonucu oluşmuştur. Yunan kelimesi bir halkın değil de dinin ifadesi olarak kullanılmaya başlanmıştır. Yunan üstünlüğüne olan inanç ve geri kalanların barbar olduğuna yönelik kavramsallaştırmalar da değişime uğramıştır. Geniş bir Avrupa tanımı yapılmış, Yunanlılar ve Roma İmparatorluğu ile birlikte ifade edilen Avrupa kavramı coğrafi bir tanım olarak ifade edilmiştir. Ancak bu dönemde de güçlü bir Avrupa kimliği yoktur çünkü Roma İmparatorluğu'nun bir kısmı Avrupa'nın dışındadır ve yine imparatorluğun merkezi de Doğu Akdeniz'de bulunmaktadır. İçerisinde yaşayan halkların da çok çeşitli olduğu bu imparatorluk “sözde Batılı”dır. Bu dönemde zaten Avrupa da Batılaşmamıştır ve bu kimliği sağlayacak bir öteki olan Doğu da “Doğululaşmamıştır” (Delanty, 2014: 88-89).

Gerard Delanty'e göre Antik dönem Avrupa fikri “karanlığın ya da batan akşam güneşinin vatanı anlamındaki “Occident (Batı)”ı ifade etmektedir. Bu fikri dahi birleştirici bir kimlik olarak görmeyen Delanty, Avrupa'nın kelime olarak varlığına ama kimlikel bir ifadeyi içermediğine vurgu yapmaktadır (2014: 91). Yani Avrupa kimliği sonradan icat edilen bir olgudur ve bir yönüyle çeşitli kültür miraslarının sahiplenilmesi sonucu oluşmuştur. Oluşumundaki diğer önemli unsur ise oluşturuca “öteki”nin rolüdür ve Doğu'ya atfettiği roller Avrupa kimlik oluşumu için kritiktir. Occident olarak Batı ve “Orient” olarak Doğu kavramsallaştırılmasının başlangıcı ise Roma İmparatorluğu'nun Doğu ve Batı olarak ikiye ayrılmasının kavramsallaştırmasını yapmak için kullanılmıştır. Batı olarak Occident -Avrupa kimliğinin ifadesi- Hristiyanlık ile birlikte anlamlandırılmaya başlamıştır. Varlığı ile Occident'i anlamlı hale getiren Orient ise İran'a ek Küçük Asya'yı da kapsayacak şekilde geniş anlama gelmeye başlamıştır. Böylece süreç içerisinde gelişen ve ortak mirasa dayalı görülen Avrupa kimliği kültürel olarak şekillenmeye başlamıştır (Delanty, 2014: 93). Hristiyanlık ve İslamın çatışması Avrupa-merkezli (Eurocentric) bir dünya görüşünün oluşmasına neden olmuştur. Bu görüş Avrupayı değerleri ile Batı yapan ve kimlik oluşumunu sağlayan mühim bir konudur. Avrupa merkezci görüşün odağında Avrupa ve Avrupa'nın kültür değerleri vardır. Avrupa kültürü ve değerleri üstün görülür. Avrupa'nın yanısıra dünya da bu görüşe göre kurgulanmaktadır (Amin, 2007).

Ortaçağ Avrupa düşünce yapısına göre bir olan, birlikte olan ve birbirine benzeyen “iyi” olarak nitelendirilmektedir. Bunun karşısı olarak da farklı olan ve çeşitlilik içeren “kötü” olarak algılanmaktadır. İşte bu feodal dönem Avrupasında yaşayan Avrupalı Hristiyanlar, Hristiyan olmayanları “öteki” olarak görmektedir. Bu bakış kurgusal olarak yüksek mevkili Hristiyan din adamlarının bütüncül bir Avrupa kimliği yaratabilmek adına oluşturduğu bir durumdur. Çünkü dönemin Avrupalıları bütüncül bir kimliği ifade etmemektedir. Coğrafi olarak aynı yerde bulunup aynı dini paylaşırlar da sınıfsal olarak parçalı bir toplum yapısı içerisindeyler. Köylüler, soylular,

hükümdarlar ve din adamları gibi sınıfların oluşturduğu bu toplumu bütüncül bir kimliğe kavuşturmak için öteki olarak İslam dinini oluşturan toplulukları seçmek uygundur. Böylece Avrupa kimliği, Hristiyanlığa tehdit olarak İslam'ı algılamış, Müslümanlara “kafir” yakıştırmaları yapmıştır. Bunun sonucunda da Müslümanlarla savaşmak ilahi olarak önem arz eden bir durum olarak algılanmıştır (Yüksel, 2014).

### III. Oluşturucu “Öteki”

Aidiyet duygusu oluşturmak yoluyla oluşturulan kimlik için “biz”i tanımlamak gerekmektedir. Ortak bir gruba dahil olmak ve biz olmak için içerdekilere ve dışardakilere ihtiyaç vardır. Biz olan olumlu özelliklere sahip olan ve bizden olanken, öteki ise olumsuz özellikler atfedilen ve dışarda bırakılanlardır. Kendimizi bu şekilde var edebilmemiz ve ortak kimlik oluşturmak yoluyla biz olabilmemiz için bir ötekiye ihtiyaç vardır. Stuart Hall’a göre ben ötekinin bakışında yazılmıştır (Stuart, 1999). Yani aslında kimlik ötekinin bakışında yazılmıştır. Ben’e ihtiyaç duyan bir öteki söz konusudur. Dolayısıyla benim var olabilmemin koşulu ötekinin var olmasıdır. Örneğin Türk olduğumuzu söylemek yoluyla bir kolektif kimlikten söz ettiğimizde diğer kimlikleri reddetmiş olmaktayız (Türkbağ, 2003). Ötekinin beni oluşturan bu yönü aslında “biz”i nasıl oluşturduğuna işaret etmektedir. Çünkü kişi bir bireydir ve bu birey topluma aittir. Bu yüzden öteki, kolektif kimliğin kendisini keşfetmesini sağlamaktadır (Bostancı, 1999). Kolektif kimlik ise muhtemel bir çatışma ve tehdit potansiyeli taşımaktadır. Öyle ki dünyayı biz ve öteki diye ayırarak ötekiye negatif anlamlar yüklemek ve kimlik oluşturma tarihi Antik Yunan’a kadar gitmektedir (Özbey, 2006). Nihayetinde birey kendisini ötekiyle tanımlayarak kimlik oluşturur. Bu kimlik iyi olanı, pozitif olanı ve biz olanı tanımlamaktadır. Ötekiye bizden olmayan, negatif olan ve kötü olandır. Yani kimlik inşası kurgusal bir nitelik taşımaktadır. Batı ve Doğu ikiliği de bu karşıtlık üzerinden temellendirilmiş kimliklerdir.

### IV. Edward Said ve Oryantalizm

Oryantalizme karşı eleştirileri ile bilinen Edward Said bir kültür teorisyeni ve eleştirmenidir. 1935 yılında Kudüs’te doğmuştur. Hristiyan bir Araptır. 1978 yılında yayımlanan “Orientalism (Oryantalizm)” adlı kitabında Doğu’nun söylemsel olarak nasıl kurulduğuna işaret edilmektedir. Ona göre Aydınlanma sonrası dönemde Batı kültürü, “öteki” rolü ile tanımladığı “Doğu” olarak nitelendirdiği kimliğe karşı kendi kimliğini kurmuştur. Bu kimliğin kurgulanması durumu Batı’nın Doğu’yu sömürmesini meşrulaştıran bir olgu olmuştur.

Oryantalizm, Doğu ile (Avrupalının Batılıca deneyiminde onun işgal ettiği özel yer göz önünde tutularak) varılmış olan bir uzlaşmadır. Doğu sadece Avrupa’ya bitişik değildir; o, ayrıca Avrupa’nın en büyük, en zengin ve en eski sömürgelerinin bulunduğu yerdir, kurduğu medeniyetlerin ve konuştuğu dillerin membaıdır, kültürel uzanımdır ve onun en derin ve en ziyade tekerrür eden “öteki” (Benden başkası) imgelerinden biridir. İlâveten Doğu, Avrupa’nın (yahut Batı’nın) “karşıt imgesi”, (mefhumu, şahsiyeti, tecrübesi) olarak onun kendi kendini tesisine de yardımcı olmuştur. Ama bu Doğu’nun, hiçbir yanı hayâl mahsulü değildir: Şark, Batı’nın “maddi” medeniyet ve kültürünün ayrılmaz bir parçasıdır. İşte Oryantalizm, kültürel ve hatta ideolojik bir açıdan, arkasında müesseseler, kelimeler (ilim, tasvirler, öğretiler, hatta

müstemleke bürokrasileri ve müstemleke usulleri) kavramlar olan bir muhakeme biçimini ifade ve temsil eder (Said, 1998).

Yani Said'e göre Doğu, tüm gerçekliğiyle Avrupa kültürünün ayrılmaz bir parçasıdır ve Avrupa'nın oluşturduğu kültür ve medeniyetinin asıl kaynağıdır. Avrupa Doğu'yu "öteki" olarak imgelemiştir ve kendisinden başkası olarak görerek kendisini oluşturmaya neden olmuştur. Oryantalizm ise öğreti, doktrinler ve sömürge biçimleri ile kültürel ve ideolojik olarak bir yargıyı temsil etmektedir. Said'in anlayışına göre imgeleşen İslam aslında İslamın temsili amacıyla değildir. Bu imge Avrupa kimliğinin oluşması için feodal dönem Avrupa'nın Hristiyanlarını temsil etmektedir.

...Oryantalizm, diğer ikisinden ziyade "tarihi ve maddi" biçimde tanımlanmıştır. Onsekizinci yüzyıl sonlarını kabaca belirlenmiş bir başlangıç noktası kabul edersek, Oryantalizm Şark ile uğraşan toplu müessesedir; yani Şark hakkında hükümlerde bulunur, Şark hakkındaki kanaatleri onayından geçirir, Şark'ı tasvir eder, tedris eder, iskân eder, yönetir; kısacası "Doğu'ya hakim olmak, onu yeniden kurmak ve onun amiri olmak için" Batı'nın bulduğu bir yoldur (Said, 1998).

Oryantalizm, Batı ürünü bir kavramsallaştırmadır ve bu şekilde Doğu üzerinde bir üstünlük kurmak hedeflenmektedir. Oryantalizm ile Doğu'yu tanımlama ve kurgulama söz konusu olur. Bunu yapabilme kudreti ise doğal olarak hakimiyet sahibi ve üstün olanın sahip olacağı bir olgudur. Yani Oryantalizm kurgusu ile Batı'nın patronluğunda Doğu kurgusu yapılarak Batı'nın meşruiyeti, üstünlüğü ve kudreti ifade edilmektedir. Oryantalizm ile Doğu'nun sabir bir kalıp halinde tanımlanması durumu söz konusudur (Keyman, 1996). Said, Oryantalist bakış açısına göre yapılan çeşitli Doğu tanımlarını şu şekilde ifade etmiştir:

Oryantalizm'in belli başlı dogmaları en katıksız halleri ile mevcuttur. Bunları bir hatırlayalım: (1) Akla dayalı, gelişik, insancıl, üstün Batı ile kuralsız, geri kalmış, zelim Doğu arasındaki sistematik ve mutlak fark meselesi, (2) Doğu hakkındaki soyutlamalar, özellikle kaynak "klâsik" Doğu uygarlığını anlatan metinler olursa, her zaman çağdaş Doğu realitelerinden çıkarılan delillere şâyân-ı tercihtirler. (3) Doğu ezeldir, tek-biçimlidir ve kendini tarihten acizdir; onun için Doğu'yu Batı bakımından anlatacak son derece genelliği haiz ve sistematik bir dil hem kaçınılmazdır hem de ilmen "objektiftir", (4) Temelde, Şark ya korku duyulacak (Sarı Tehlike, Moğol Sürüleri, esmer müstemlekeler) ya da (susturma yolu ile, araştırma-geliştirmeyle, mümkün ise doğrudan işgal suretiyle) kontrol altında bulundurulacak bir şeydir (Said, 1998).

Said'in oryantalizmi Doğu-Batı ikiliğini, içerdeki ve dışardaki karşıtlığını doğrudan gözler önüne sermektedir. Kontrol altına alınması gereken, tehdit oluşturan ve negatif anlamla tarif edilen bir öteki olarak Doğu tarif edilmektedir. Onun karşıtı olarak kontrol etme kudretine haiz, kontrol etme görevini taşıyacak erdem ve üstünlüğe de sahip olan bir Batı kimliği kurgulanmıştır. Bu yolla Batı merkezilik ve üstün bir kimlik kurgusu gerçekleştirilmiştir. Doğu üzerinde egemen olmak, Doğu karşısında güçlü olmak ve Doğu'yu tahrip etmek için yapılmıştır (Clifford, 2007).

## V. Samir Amin'in Avrupa merkezilik Analizi

Fransız-Mısır eleştirmen ve ekonomist olan Samir Amin "Avrupa merkezilik" adlı kitabında Avrupa merkeziliğin kültürel vurgularla nasıl Avrupa ve dünya tarihinin yeniden kurgulandığını ele almıştır.

Bunu Antik Çağdan başlayarak tarihsel bir anlatımla yapmıştır.

Modern Avrupa'nın beşiği durumuna getirmek üzere Yunan düşüncesini, Yunanistan'ı dışta bırakacak bir "Doğu" düşüncesiyle karşılaştırmak mümkün değildir. Yunanistan=Batı /Mısır, Mezopotamya, İran= Doğu karşıtlığı Avrupa-merkezciliğin daha sonra uyduracağı sahte bir karşıtlıktır. Çünkü o dönemde sınır, bölgenin bütününe göre daha geri olan Batı'nın coğrafi olarak Avrupa ve Kuzey Afrika'yı kapsayan kesimi ile, daha ileri olan Doğu arasındadır; ve Avrupa, Afrika ve Asya'yı meydana getiren coğrafi bütünlerin uygarlık tarihi açısından hiçbir sürekliliği yoktur. Oysa Avrupa merkezilik geçmişi, Akdeniz'i uzunlamasına kateden modern bölünmeye göre tasarlamaktadır (Amin, 1993: 44).

Bu dönemde sınırların kesin olmayışının ve Doğu ya da Batı diyebilmek için bir Avrupa kimliğinin söz konusu olmadığını açıkça ifade eder. Uygarlık tarihi olarak Avrupa diye bahsedilecek bir süreklilik içinde bir coğrafyadan söz edilememektedir. Ayrıca tarihsel bağlamda Yunan fikri tarihsel olarak Doğu fikrinin kapsamdan atılabilecek ve Batı'ya eş tutulabilecek bir kültür değildir.

Ortaçağ'ı metafiziğin üstünlüğü ve tüm dengelim yöntemin kabul edildiği dönem olarak açıklayan Amin, bu dönemi "haraçlı aşama"nın üretim tarzının gerçek ideolojisi olarak görmektedir. Avrupa'nın kapitalizmden hemen önceki aşaması için "haraçlı aşama" kavramını kullanmıştır. Ortaçağ'ın metafizik yönelimleri ve evreni açıklama arzusu bazı çıkmazlara ve doyumsuzluklara neden olmuştur. Bu durum da aklın önderliğine ve tümevarımsal yöntemlere kapı aralamıştır (Amin, 1993:51-52). Elbette aklın önderliğine geçişin tek gerekçesi bu doyumsuzluklar değildir ve Amin bunu Helenistik dönemden gelen bir temellendirme ile ifade etmiştir.

Hellenistik uygarlık, astronomi, hekimlik alanlarında önemli ilerlemeler kaydetmiş, Arap-İslam uygarlığı ise bu alanlarda olduğu gibi, matematik ve kimyada da daha ileriye gitmiştir. Sonuç olarak, tek tek bilimsel alanlardaki yönelişler metafizikçilerin üstünlüğünden pek etkilenmemiş, hatta bilimsel buluşlarla metafiziği zenginleştirebilecekleri düşünülmektedir (Amin, 1993:49).

Yani aklın önderliği için temel olan bilimsel birikim metafizik yönelim öncesinde de metafizik yönelimle beraber de söz konusudur. Hatta Ortaçağ'daki metafizik yönelimlerle paralel olarak Arap-İslam dünyasında daha büyük bir bilimsel birikim söz konusu olmuştur. Çünkü o dönemde bilimsel yenilikler metafiziğe katkı sağlayacak ve pekiştirecek bir nitelikte algılanmaktadır. Bu algı ve bilimin ilerleyişi aklın önderliği olan döneme geçişin özünde bulunan dinamiklerdir. Amin, kapitalizm öncesindeki dönem olarak haraçlı dönemi kültür devriminin oluşmasını sağlayan ön kapitalist dönem olarak görmektedir.

Amin'e göre insanların düşünme çabalarının sonucu olarak, Hristiyan ve İslam dinlerindeki evrenselci vurgu sayesinde hümanizmin kucaklanabilmesi ile hümanizmin yükselişi ve insanların akli keşfi gerçekleşmiştir. Klasik Yunan'dan bu yana gelerek Helenistik, Hristiyan ve İslam metafiziğinin etkisi ile oluşmuş birikim Rönesansla beraber dünyaya şekil verecek hale gelmiştir. Avrupa'da kapitalist toplum yükselmiştir ve diğer halkları da egemenlik altına almıştır. Ancak Avrupa'nın kapitalist yönelimleriyle elde ettiği bir Avrupa üstünlüğü söz konusu değildir. Yani Avrupa

üstünlüğünün tek açıklaması kapitalizm değildir çünkü Amin'e göre Avrupa o zaman bunun farkında bile olmayabilir. Farkında oldukları üstünlükleri ise o zamanlar keşfini yapmaya başladıkları Yunanlıları ataları olarak görme eğilimleridir. Böylece ataları Antik Yunan'a dayanan ve Hristiyanlığa hayran olan bir mit olarak Avrupa merkeziliği kurgusal olarak o dönemde kurmaya başlamışlardır. Tarihsel olarak ise Avrupa'nın kapitalist toplum yapısıyla beraber "dünya bu toplum tarafından fethedilmiştir". Kurgulanan Avrupa merkeziliğe karşıt tez olarak da "yapay" bir Oryantalizm yerleştirilecektir (Amin, 1993:97-98). Böylece kurgusal olarak Avrupa kültür ve kimliğinin oluşurken oluşturucu etkisi olarak ötekinin yani Doğu'nun geri kalmışlığı yapay bir karşıt tez olarak vurgulanacaktır.

John M. Hobson'a göre Avrupa merkezilik dünyanın Doğu-Batı olarak ikili kutuplaştırılmasıyla söz konusu olmuştur. Bahsedilen durum Avrupalılarca gerçekleştirilmiştir yani kurgulanmıştır. Batı'nın Doğu'dan üstün olduğuna dayalı bu kurguda Batı erdemler ile ilişkilendirilmektedir. Doğu ise onun karşı tezi olarak açıklanmaktadır ve Batı'nın anlaşılması için Doğu'nun karşıtlıklarına ihtiyaç vardır. Aslında Oryantalistlerin sözünü ettiği gibi en başından beri üstün olan bir Batı söz konusu değildir. Avrupalıların üstün hale gelmesi ve Batı olarak üstün bir kimlik oluşturması ekonomik olarak da üstünlüğü ele geçirdiği 1800'lü yıllara rastlamaktadır. Daha evvel üstün olan Doğu'nun ekonomileridir. Sonuç olarak Hobson'a göre Avrupa kimliğini oluşturmanın yolu onun karşısına kurgulanacak "diğer bir kimliktir" (2008). İşte bu diğer kimlik oluşturucu öteki olarak Doğu olmuştur.

## VI. Sonuç

Sonuç olarak Avrupa kavramı üzerinde uzlaşılması bakımından tartışmalı bir kavramdır. Ancak Avrupa kimliğinin ortak mirasa dayalı bir kültür olarak tanımlanması için kurgulanması söz konusu olmuştur. Yani Avrupalıları bir grup olarak ifade edebilmek, ortaklıklarını vurgulamak ve aidiyetlerini gerçekleştirebilmek için ortak bir atadan geldiklerine ve bu atadan bu yana ortak bir ötekinin de varlığına inandırmak gerekmiştir. Bu yolla tarihsel bir kurgu olarak oluşturucu bir öteki tanımı yapılmıştır. Doğu olarak ifade edilen ve İslam ile ilişkilendirilen bu öteki Avrupa kimliğinin tanımlanmasını sağlayan unsur olmuştur. Negatif anlamlar atfedilen Doğu tanımı dolayısıyla Avrupa merkezci bir bakışa yol açacak Batı tanımı yapılmıştır. Pozitif anlamlarla ilişkilendirilerek yapılan biz tanımı ve oluşturulan aidiyet duygusu sayesinde Avrupa merkezci bir bakış açısı da mümkün olmuştur. Bütün bu süreçlerin kurgusal olduğu tespiti yapılabilir. Çünkü aslında Yunanlı atalardan gelen bir grup olarak Avrupa söz konusu değildir. Ancak bu kimliğin kurgusal nitelikte olması Avrupa'nın başarılı ve üstün olduğu yönlerini yalanlayacak bir gerekçe değildir. Avrupa kimlik kurgusunun var olması kapitalizmle beraber ekonomik anlamda yükselişe geçmesinin yalanlanması anlamına gelmemektedir. Nihayetinde Avrupa merkezilik ve Avrupa kimliği oluşturucu öteki olarak Doğu üzerinden sağlanmıştır tespitinde bulunulabilir. Bu olgunun ise tarihsel olarak yetersiz bulunması yoluyla aşılması mümkün değildir.

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## HUNGARY'S EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN POLICY IN GEO-ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE

Mustafa Burak ŞENER<sup>2</sup>

### Abstract

The Eastern Mediterranean region has been a crucial place geostrategically throughout history. With the discovery of rich hydrocarbon deposits in the Eastern Mediterranean at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the region became more critical for both coastal states and global/regional actors. With the discovery of hydrocarbon resources, the coastal states have been embroiled in several disputes over how to share their maritime jurisdiction. In particular, the European Union, where two states bordering the region are the members of, is trying to create some strategies on the region in order to diversify its energy needs. However, there is no consensus within the member states; some states take a stance against Türkiye through Greece and Greek Cypriot Administration, while others follow a more neutral policy. Among these, Hungary, which follows one of the most neutral policies and can evaluate the problem from both sides, is quite remarkable and worth researching. The fact that the right-wing governments rule both states and that populist regimes are more inclined to understand each other can be considered as a factor in Hungary's moderate policy towards Türkiye. In addition, Hungary, located in the center and heart of Europe, perceives this as an advantage to develop its economy with the countries to its east. Among these countries, Türkiye, which is a geo-strategic gateway to the east, has a central position. This study examines how important the geo-economic position is in making sense of Hungary's Eastern Mediterranean policies. As a method, it analyses discourses of politicians regarding Hungary's Eastern Mediterranean policy in line with geo-economic factors.

**Keywords:** Eastern Mediterranean, Geo-economics, European Union, Hungary, Türkiye

### Öz

Doğu Akdeniz bölgesi, tarih boyunca jeostratejik olarak çok önemli bir yer olmuştur. 21. yüzyılın başlarında Doğu Akdeniz'de zengin hidrokarbon yataklarının keşfedilmesiyle bölge, hem kıyı devletleri hem de küresel/bölgesel aktörler için daha kritik hale gelmiştir. Hidrokarbon kaynaklarının keşfiyle birlikte, kıyı devletleri deniz yetki alanlarını nasıl paylaşacakları konusunda çeşitli anlaşmazlıkların içine düşmüşlerdir. Özellikle bölgeye komşu iki devletin üyesi olduğu Avrupa Birliği, enerji ihtiyacını çeşitlendirmek için bölge üzerinde bazı stratejiler oluşturmaya çalışmaktadır. Ancak üye devletler arasında bir fikir birliği yoktur; bazı devletler Yunanistan ve Güney Kıbrıs Rum Kesimi üzerinden Türkiye'ye karşı tavır alırken, bazıları daha tarafsız bir politika izlemektedir. Bunlar

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arasında en tarafsız politikalardan birini izleyen ve sorunu her iki taraftan da değerlendirebilen Macaristan oldukça dikkat çekici ve araştırmaya değer bir ülkedir. Sağcı hükümetlerin her iki devleti de yönetmesi ve popülist rejimlerin birbirini anlamaya daha yatkın olması Macaristan'ın Türkiye'ye yönelik ılımlı politikasında bir etken olarak değerlendirilebilir. Ayrıca Avrupa'nın merkezinde ve kalbinde yer alan Macaristan, doğusundaki ülkelerle birlikte ekonomisini geliştirmek için bunu bir avantaj olarak görmektedir. Bu ülkeler arasında doğuya jeostratejik bir kapı olan Türkiye merkezi bir konuma sahiptir. Bu çalışma, Macaristan'ın Doğu Akdeniz politikalarını anlamlandırmada jeo-ekonomik konumun ne kadar önemli olduğunu incelemektedir. Yöntem olarak siyasilerin Macaristan'ın Doğu Akdeniz politikasına ilişkin söylemlerini jeo-ekonomik faktörler doğrultusunda analiz etmektedir.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Doğu Akdeniz, Jeoekonomi, Avrupa Birliği, Macaristan, Türkiye

## I. Introduction

Before starting the study, it would be suitable to analyze the concepts of geopolitics and geoeconomics. By definition, geopolitics can be defined as all factors that affect a state's policy based on geography (Sarikaya, 2019). The analysis of the effects of geography on politics and international relations forms the center of geopolitics. Geography is the determining factor in the history, politics, economy, sociology, culture, and security of a region, and accordingly, geopolitics has a critical role (Byrappa, 2018: 86, 96). Parallely, geoeconomics emphasizes economic means to achieve geopolitical goals or how geopolitical power is used for financial purposes. In general, geoeconomics can be thought of as a combination of international economics, geopolitics, and strategy (Sarikaya, 2019).

The Eastern Mediterranean has a crucial place both throughout history and today. Large hydrocarbon reserves, trade, and oil routes are factors that increase the geopolitical significance of the region (Güney, 2020: 8). Due to this importance, it has been one of the regions that the great empires wanted to control throughout history. Today, the region, neighboring many states, is causing disputes because of its strategic importance.

The geopolitical prominence of the Eastern Mediterranean has made it a significant region in terms of geopolitical theories (İstikbal, 2020: 55). According to the British philosopher Mackinder's heartland theory, the necessity of controlling heartland<sup>3</sup> is strongly defended. According to this theory, the Eastern Mediterranean is the focal point of the sea trade to the "heartland" (Tuğ, 2019: 78). According to Mahan, who put forward the sea domination theory, the Eastern Mediterranean is located

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<sup>3</sup> The region between the Volga in the west, Siberia in the east, the Himalayas in the south, and the Ice Sea in the north was expressed as the "heartland".

on the trade routes between east and west. In addition, it is the opening point of the Black Sea countries to the world and has a great weight in global trade (İstikbal, 2020: 55-56). As reported by the argument of Douchet, who founded the air domination theory, the Eastern Mediterranean is a region that allows air intervention to the southeastern flank of the central region, along with the Balkans, Middle East, and the Caucasus (İstikbal, 2020: 56). As stated in Spykman's Rimland theory, those who control Rimland control Eurasia, and those who control Eurasia control the fate of Earth. In this regard, Eastern Mediterranean, which has a direct connection with Greece and Türkiye, and an indirect connection with Iran and Iraq, controls an important part of rimland<sup>4</sup> that frames center territory (Kedikli and Çalağan, 2017: 126).

In addition to the importance of the region mentioned in the literature, the presence of strategic areas such as Cyprus, Kastellorizo and Crete in the Eastern Mediterranean region, as well as on the functioning maritime trade routes such as the Suez Canal, Strait of Gibraltar, and the Black Sea, have a significant impact on world trade (Güney, 2020: 9). Due to their experiences, states have realized the fact that it is not possible to dominate the Mediterranean without dominating the Eastern Mediterranean, and the world without dominating the Mediterranean, and throughout history, they have considered this region as a global intervention area. With the introduction of oil in our lives at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, among the issues that made the Eastern Mediterranean important, this time it was the transportation crossroads for oil roads. Afterward, at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, natural gas has been included among the factors that increased the importance of the region (Güney, 2020: 8).

As oil gained importance in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the Middle East region also obtained great importance (Akkaya, 2016). The importance is indicated by the fact that the Middle East is the world's largest oil-producing region, constituting 34% of world oil production, 45% of crude oil exports, and 48% of oil reserves (Tuğ, 2019: 83). Considering that 63% of the world oil trade is carried out by sea, the maritime routes that deliver Middle Eastern oil to the world come into prominence (Erdoğan, 2014). Accordingly, the Suez Canal, which is a route for petroleum in the Middle East, opens to the west through the Eastern Mediterranean, providing Caspian oil and natural gas to the world markets (Güney, 2020: 10; Tuğ, 2019: 83). This case has made the Eastern Mediterranean an important energy route in the oil trade (Tuğ, 2019: 83). Besides, today, the Eastern Mediterranean offers great advantages to coastal states in logistics and trade, while the presence of large hydrocarbon deposits increases the importance of the region (Tekin, 2019: 6). In order to better absorb the hydrocarbon reserves' importance in the Eastern Mediterranean, it would be appropriate to examine the numerical values.

It is evaluated by the US Geological Research Center that there are hydrocarbon deposits

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<sup>4</sup> The "rimland" region refers to the coastline of Eurasia which argues the main power potential is not only in the region called the "heartland" but also in the region surrounding it.

equivalent to 30 billion barrels of oil with a total value of 1.5 trillion dollars in the Eastern Mediterranean. It is estimated that there are approximately 1.8 billion barrels of oil, 6.3 trillion cubic meters (223 trillion cubic feet) of natural gas, and 6 billion barrels of liquid natural gas reserves in the Nile Delta Basin, and the approximate value of the oil reserves estimated at 8 billion barrels around Cyprus is around 400 billion dollars. In addition, it is forecasted that there is a total of 3.5 trillion cubic meters of natural gas, one 1.5 trillion cubic meters and the other 2 trillion cubic meters, in the area in the south and southeast of Crete called “Herodot” (BAU, NA). Considering the amount of consumption in 2010 it is understood that reserves of hydrocarbons in the Eastern Mediterranean are at the level to meet the natural gas needs of Türkiye for about 572 years and Europe for 30 years (BAU, NA). Nevertheless, it should be noted that promising deposits cannot be wholly exploited as technical and political difficulties significantly limit the size of exploitable quantities.

Developments occurring in the world are changing geopolitical paradigms. The constant increase in need for energy in today’s world is considered as the most important development. Although it has not been named yet, the energy domination theory, which can be expressed as “*Who dominates the energy basins and transmission channels, dominates the World*” is adopted by the states that act to become a global power, especially the USA (İstikbal, 2020: 56). The richness of hydrocarbon resources in the Eastern Mediterranean and the route on oil routes will continue to make the region geopolitically and geostrategically important today and in the upcoming period (İstikbal, 2020: 57).

In addition to the importance of the Eastern Mediterranean, Türkiye is a country of great geopolitical and geo-economic importance. The fact that it acts as a bridge between East and West, that seas surround its three sides, and above essential trade routes and pipelines make Türkiye a very strategic country (İnan, 2008: 120). In this context, for Hungary, both the Eastern Mediterranean and Türkiye have different importance from a geo-economic perspective.

In this direction, first Hungary’s policies, and the rhetoric of politicians will be analyzed. After that, from the point of view of Hungary the geo-economic significance of the Eastern Mediterranean region, and then of Türkiye, will be examined. Under the heading of the geo-economic importance of Türkiye, the effects of Hungary’s Eastern Opening Policy and its policy of preventing irregular migration flows on the geoeconomics and, therefore, Eastern Mediterranean policies will be discussed. In this regard, this study seeks to answer the question of what the importance of geo-economic factors in Hungary’s Eastern Mediterranean policy is. As a method, essentially political discourse analysis will be used to make sense of Hungary’s policies regarding the Eastern Mediterranean.

## II. Political Discourse Analysis: A Brief Overview

Initially, it would be correct to evaluate the discourses of politicians, which will form the content of this study, within the scope of political discourse analysis. Discourse analysis is a perspective on

social life consisting of methodological and conceptual elements and is characterized as a way of thinking about discourses and data. (Çelik and Sour, 2008: 99). For the development of discourse analysis, there is an essential contribution of the micro-sociological studies of sociologists such as H. Garfinkel and E. Goffman, which began in the 1940s in the discipline of sociology. The prominence of discourse in sociology, especially in the 1960s, is associated with the effectiveness of hermeneutical and understanding-interpretative understanding against the positivist tradition. Discourse has taken its place in sociological studies, accepting that it is not just a discourse; it builds social life, re-mentally constructs the world, contains ideology, and deciphers social relations between people (Bal, 2013: 258). Discourse analysis has developed as an academic field since the 1970s, which includes sociology and many disciplines such as philosophy, psychology, communication, history, and international relations (Potter and Wetherell, 1987).

Political discourse analysis is a sub-branch of discourse analysis (Schaffner, 1996). Political discourse analysis can be defined as the analysis of policy-related discourses of politicians (Van Dijk, 1997: 12). Political events include individuals, citizens, organizations, and voters. In this regard, all these individuals, citizens, or organizations include political discourse. Thus, by broad definition, political discourse encompasses all participants involved in the political process (Van Dijk, 1997: 13). On the other hand, according to Van Dijk, political situations do not just cause politicians to talk in certain ways. Instead, there is a context between situations and rhetoric (Van Dijk, 2006). Thus, it can be concluded that the rhetoric of politicians in connection with each other is not an instant and simple situation, it gives us important information about the current situation, planning and policy.

As stated above, political discourses provide essential information about the political situation. Because political decisions are made as a result of the integration of political texts, speeches, and statements. These political decisions can also be effective in making official decisions to achieve specific political goals and objectives (Van Dijk, 1997: 14). Geopolitics is one of the most critical elements for politicians to achieve these political goals and objectives (Özyüksel, 2021: 150).

### **III. Hungary's Eastern Mediterranean Policy in Geo-Economic Perspective**

Hungary's Eastern Mediterranean policy from a geo-economic point of view is bilateral. The first is the policies pursued by Hungary with the geo-economic importance of the Eastern Mediterranean. The second is Hungary's policy towards the Eastern Mediterranean issue due to Türkiye's geo-economic significance. The study will first examine Hungary's Eastern Mediterranean policy and then analyze Hungary's attitude towards the Eastern Mediterranean issue through Hungary-Türkiye relations.

As previously stated in the study, the Eastern Mediterranean is of critical geostrategic and geo-economic importance. Today, it also shapes the geo-economic policies of states due to the increasing importance of hydrocarbon reserves. In particular, it is of great importance to the European Union, which wants to diversify its hydrocarbon reserves (Kacziba, 2013: 81, 85). While some

member states take pro-Greece and pro-Greek Cypriots stances, states such as Germany, Spain, Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Malta take a more neutral stance (Akal, 2020). Among these states, Hungary is likely the most neutral country.

Considering the importance of large hydrocarbon reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean, Hungary believes that mutual dialogue is the most important solution. In this regard, Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó called for dialogue with his counterparts from Türkiye, Greece, and the Greek Cypriot Administration last year and offered solidarity for energy resources. Szijjártó stated this situation as *“I hope common sense will prevail, and dialogue will lead to a solution rather than mutual threats and sanctions”* (Hungary Today, 2020). Hungary frequently reiterates its offer of mediation to reduce tensions between Türkiye and Greece and states that it does not support unilateral sanctions against Türkiye (Euronews, 2020).

In addition, Hungary states that the Eastern Mediterranean problem needs a comprehensive solution, and that excluding Türkiye will not yield any results. Marton Gyöngyösi, the Hungarian Member of the European Parliament, stated that the problem was more profound, and that Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration followed a wrong policy with the following words: *“Many EU officials and European representatives fail to see the real problem in the Eastern Mediterranean and Greece and the Greek Cypriot side are waiting for solidarity from other EU members to exclude Türkiye”*. He also underlined that this policy could isolate Türkiye from the EU and would be a loss for the EU (Szucs, 2020). Again, Gyöngyösi noted historical problems in another speech, *“The divided island of Cyprus is at the heart of the problems in the Eastern Mediterranean. If the Cyprus issue is resolved, complicated problems such as maritime borders and gas resources sharing in the region can be resolved”* (Sugar, 2020).

Accordingly, Hungary favors dialogue on the Eastern Mediterranean issue. He advocates that the parties should be in mutual agreement. Looking at the speeches of Hungarian politicians, it is seen that the Eastern Mediterranean, which is of great importance in diversifying the need for hydrocarbon reserves of the EU and, therefore Hungary, will only benefit everyone in an environment where tensions are low, and a win-win policy is followed.

#### **IV. Türkiye-Hungary Relations in Geo-Economic Perspective**

Türkiye is a very critical country in terms of Hungary’s geo-economic policies. This situation is reflected in Hungary’s Eastern Mediterranean policy. The trading volume of the two countries, Hungary’s Opening to the East Policy, and its desire to prevent irregular migrant flows are factors that increase Türkiye’s geo-economic importance.

##### **A. Trade Volume**

First, when the trade volume of the two countries was examined in 2013, increasing the bilateral trade

volume to \$5 billion was adopted; this goal was increased to \$6 billion in 2018. The bilateral trade volume, which was \$1.8 billion in 2013, reached \$2.44 billion in 2019 (MFA Türkiye, n.d.). In 2019, Türkiye's ambassador to Budapest, Ahmet Akif Oktay, stated that, there was a potential that needs to be processed in different sectors in terms of trade, and they wanted to benefit from this opportunity. He noted the excellent relations between the two countries and the increased trade volume with the following words: *"It is not exaggerated to say that Turkish-Hungarian relations are experiencing maturity, even a golden age"* (Yılmaz, 2019).

In 2020, Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter Szijjarto explained Hungary's attitude towards Türkiye's position in the Eastern Mediterranean as follows:

*"We never interfere in the country's internal affairs, and Türkiye does not comment or take positions on our internal issues. We also have significant commercial relations. Major Turkish investors are making significant investments in Hungary. Our relationship is based on logic, respect, and non-interference in each other's internal affairs"* (Euronews, 2020).

Also, in his speech, Minister Szijjarto noted that Türkiye will soon become one of the ten most powerful economies in the world and urged that the EU should abandon its hypocritical attitude towards Türkiye regarding the Eastern Mediterranean issue (CNN, 2020). Similarly, in 2018, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán emphasized that Türkiye will be among the top ten economies of the world in the near future and that Europe needs Türkiye (Oktay, 2018).

In short, Türkiye's potential to become one of the top ten economies in the world and the high commercial capacity of the two countries are the factors affecting Hungary's policies on Türkiye and, thus, the Eastern Mediterranean. Hungary considers Türkiye as a critical partner belonging to the European continent, with a solid commercial capacity and a bridge with the East.

## **B. The Eastern Opening Policy**

In recent years, Hungary has made significant initiatives in its foreign policy. Budapest, whose problems with the EU have deepened, has started to seek a more independent foreign policy from the Union. In the context of the "Eastern Opening" project, it has turned to improve its economic and political relations with middle eastern and distant Asian countries, especially the Russian Federation, the People's Republic of China, and the Republic of Türkiye (Hazır, 2018). The Hungarian Government, which pursues an economic/commercial-oriented foreign policy, considers Türkiye one of the central countries of the "Eastern Opening" policy. In this context, in December 2013, the country opened a "Trading House" in Istanbul. In 2015, Hungarian Eximbank opened an office in Istanbul. Currently, there are Trading Houses in various cities of Türkiye (MFA, n.d.).

Despite the recent deterioration of Brussels' relations with Moscow and Ankara, Budapest has

not taken a stand against Türkiye and Russia. Even Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán was the only Western leader who attended President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's inauguration (Hazır, 2018). The following words of Orbán during his visit to Erdoğan confirm the importance of Türkiye in the project of the Eastern Opening:

*"Hungary should take into account the attitude of the three capitals; Berlin, Moscow, and Ankara when determining its foreign policy. Because these three great powers have held an important place in the fate of Hungary for centuries."*

Orbán also stressed: *"Hungary has always supported and will support Türkiye's EU membership because if the EU wants to become a global player, it must cooperate with Türkiye"* (Hungary Today, 2018).

Hungary desires to increase its influence on the Turkic World with this project. Hungary participated in the 6<sup>th</sup> Summit Meeting of the Turkic Council, attended by the heads of the Turkic States, for the first time in 2018 upon the invitation of Türkiye. In this context, Orbán's speech at the summit demonstrates that Hungary brought the element of identity and historical unity to the fore in its Eastern Opening project:

*"Hungarian is a unique language that has an affinity with Turkic languages. We migrated further West and adopted Christianity. We are a Christian people in the West, with Hun-Turk roots and descendants of Attila. We also support the development of cooperation with countries with a Turkish identity"* (Hungarian Prime Ministry, 2018).

Also, at the 7<sup>th</sup> Turkic Council summit in 2019, Orbán stated that the cooperation with Azerbaijan and Türkiye was developed, and Hungary's Eximbank opened a credit line with the Turkic Council countries (About Hungary, 2019). Finally, at the summit held in April last year, Orbán expressed his gratitude by drawing attention to Türkiye's mask and hand sanitizer support during the COVID-19 pandemic. He also stressed that it is necessary to ensure the continuity of good trade relations (Origo, 2020).

Furthermore, Budapest and Ankara have been two administrations with shared interests and a common perspective on energy. Within this project's scope, Hungary has a positive view of the Turkish Stream Project extending from Russia to Türkiye and wishes for the line to be extended further and pass over its borders (Hazır, 2018).

In sum, Türkiye, which has a strategic location in Budapest's Eastern Opening, is of great importance. For Budapest, Ankara plays a vital role in this project in terms of penetrating the Turkish world, developing commercial relations, cooperating in the field of energy, investing, and importing-exporting. All these are factors that increase the geo-economic importance of Türkiye through this

project.

### C. Irregular Migration Flows

One of the main objectives of Hungary's foreign policy is to prevent the flow of migrants. Hungary, which experienced 591,000 illegal border violations in 2015, has significantly toughened its measures to stop the flow of migrants after this date (About Hungary, 2021a). Although this number has declined since then, it has reached 81 thousand people in 2021, especially with the influx of Afghan refugees (About Hungary, 2021b). Hungary calls the irregular migrant flow one of the number one security problems and does not hesitate to resort to drastic measures (Verseck, 2021). Although Brussels criticizes Orbán's harsh policies towards migrants, he argues that he protects the borders of all of Europe with this policy (Hungary Today, 2021). According to Orbán, illegal migration harms the cultural and political identity of Hungary and even the whole of Europe (Euronews, 2015). In parallel, Orbán, who is reluctant to identify migrants as refugees, said of his view of refugees, "*We do not see these people as Muslim refugees. We see them as Muslim invaders.*" (Agerholm, 2018). Therewithal, Hungary also has economic concerns in the face of irregular migration flows.

The flow of migrants has quite adverse effects on the economy. If these are mentioned, the flow of migrants leads to increased demand for goods and services (Isaias, 1989: 226). Indeed, increased demand for goods and services and expenditures boosts the economy (İşcan and Çakır, 2019: 179). However, services such as medical, social, public, education, and nutrition are limited with the state's capacity. Therefore, in cases where the flow of migrants destabilizes the increase of the population, the institutions and economic systems of the state may not be able to meet these demands (Isaias, 1989: 226). In addition, since many immigrants are willing to work for low wages, unemployment can be caused by the current working citizens taking their jobs. This situation would also create a supernumerary of workers. Thus, the workers' wages would go down and negatively affect the economy by creating a deterioration in the existing balance (Isaias, 1989: 226, 227). Also, it pushes many immigrants to work illegally because they do not have a work permit or have the opportunity to work. This leads to an increase in workers working in the informal sector. Thus, the increase in the number of illegally unregistered workers negatively affects the national economy (Isaias, 1989: 226, 227).

Türkiye has a strategic position in stopping the flow of migrants that may occur to Europe. People from third world countries, especially Syria and Afghanistan, who want to immigrate to Europe illegally, aim to reach Greece through Türkiye and then into Europe via Albania, Serbia, and Hungary respectively (Demir and Soyupek, 2015: 20-21). This situation reveals the geopolitical importance of Türkiye in the context of the EU's migration policies (Mercan, 2016: 19). Besides, the number of Syrians under temporary protection registered in Türkiye is 3,710,497 (Refugees Association, 2021). Considering that many refugees are trying to immigrate to Europe illegally due to the provision of



more permanent rights to refugees in European countries, the importance of Türkiye in terms of Europe is increasing even more (Demir and Soyupek, 2015: 6). So much so that a 6-billion-euro financial aid agreement was concluded between Europe and Türkiye in 2016 to prevent irregular migration to Europe. With the end of this agreement, called the “March 18 Statement”, in 2021, a renegotiation was raised (Okutan, 2021). Thus, it is stated that Europe is considering extending the agreement and creating a 3.5-billion-euro fund for Türkiye to continue hosting Syrian migrants until 2024 (Bloomberg, 2021).

Considering that the influx of migrants will damage its economy as well as its cultural and political identity, Hungary is aware of the importance of Türkiye’s strategic position. Hungary, which perceives the migrant flow as a severe threat, is also shaping its Eastern Mediterranean policy in this direction. This is evident from the rhetoric of Hungarian politicians. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán stated in 2015 that Türkiye has done tremendous things for migrants and that Europeans should also do great things for Türkiye in order to stop the flow of migrants to Europe (Başay, 2015). Similarly, in his meeting with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in 2018, Orbán stated that Türkiye has great importance in stopping the illegal migrant flow to Hungary; the flow of illegal immigrants to Hungary and the stability of Türkiye is directly related to this issue (Hungary Today, 2018). Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter Szijjarto mentioned the importance of Türkiye in stopping the flow of migrants to Hungary in 2019 (Than and Tunai, 2019). Again, Szijjarto noted that in 2020, Türkiye hosted more than 4 million migrants, and therefore the security of Europe depends on Türkiye. In addition, in this speech, Szijjarto stated that they were trying to ensure dialogue between EU members and Türkiye regarding the tensions created by the Eastern Mediterranean crisis between the parties and noted that double standards and hypocrisy towards Türkiye should be decimated (Daily Sabah, 2020).

## **V. Conclusion**

The critical importance of the Eastern Mediterranean region shapes the policies of global actors. At this point, the EU is unable to develop a common consensus, and Hungary is one of the EU countries that follows the most neutral policy towards Türkiye within the EU.

Hungary’s geo-economic policy on the Eastern Mediterranean is seen as bilateral in the form of the geo-economic importance of the Eastern Mediterranean and Türkiye. It has been found that these factors directly shape Hungary’s Eastern Mediterranean policy.

First, the hydrocarbon potential in the Eastern Mediterranean is crucial to diversifying the energy needs of the EU and, therefore, Hungary. Although Hungary is a state that does not have a coast to the Eastern Mediterranean, it is close to the region. Hungary, which wants to take advantage of this potential of the Eastern Mediterranean, adopts the mutual win-win principle instead of confronting Türkiye. Hungary is aware that excluding Türkiye would harm the economic return of the Eastern Mediterranean and that excluding the coastal state would not offer a solution.

In addition to Türkiye's strategic importance in the Eastern Mediterranean, its geographical location is also important. Since Türkiye has a solid commercial capacity geographically close to Hungary, the two countries have a solid commercial relationship. When the rhetoric of Hungarian politicians is examined, this commercial capacity is significant in determining Hungary's relations with Türkiye. In the same way, Türkiye is the central country in the Eastern Opening project initiated by Hungary to improve its political and commercial ties with the eastern states due to its political and geopolitical importance. In such an important project, Türkiye has a leading role.

As can be seen, in order to prevent migrant flow to Hungary, Türkiye's geographical location is critical. As the rhetoric of Hungarian politicians shows, this is also a determinant of Hungary's geo-economic policy. In this context, Türkiye's strategic importance and its role as a buffer zone for migrants directly affect Hungary's Eastern Mediterranean policies.

Thus, in this study, it has been found that economic concerns, as well as cultural and political concerns, play an essential role in determining Hungary's policy towards the Eastern Mediterranean and Türkiye. By examining the discourses of Hungarian politicians and the political policies of Hungary, the study concluded that the geo-economic importance of Türkiye and the Eastern Mediterranean region directly shaped the Eastern Mediterranean policy of Hungary, and therefore pursuing a more moderate policy among the EU states.

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## POLITICAL COMMUNICATION AND POPULISM: THE CASE OF EUROPE

Büşra ÖZYÜKSEL<sup>5</sup>

### Abstract

Populism seems to lead both daily and political life in many countries nowadays. Even though the notion's roots are based in the 19th-20th century, today's political discourse utilises it more than ever. With the rise of populism, media and political communication have gained crucial importance for transmitting populist messages to the people. This study explains the relation between populism and political communication and how populist discourse uses communication. European parties and citizens constitute the case study of this work.

**Key words:** Political Communication, Populism, Europe, European Citizens

### Öz

Popülizm, günümüzde pek çok ülkede hem günlük hem de siyasi hayata yön veriyor gibi görünmektedir. Kavramın kökleri 19. – 20. yüzyıla dayansa da günümüzün siyasi söylemi onu her zamankinden daha fazla kullanmaktadır. Popülizmin yükselişiyle birlikte medya ve siyasal iletişim, popülist mesajların halka iletilmesinde hayati bir önem kazanmıştır. Bu çalışma, popülizm ve siyasal iletişim arasındaki ilişkiyi ve popülist söylemin iletişimi nasıl kullandığını açıklamaktadır. Avrupalı partiler ve vatandaşlar bu çalışmanın örnek olayını oluşturmaktadır.

**Anahtar kelimeler:** Siyasal İletişim, Popülizm, Avrupa, Avrupa Vatandaşları

## I. Introduction

Communication is not only an innate part of all political processes; successful communication is a precondition for all political success. As a part of social (political) communication, populism can be found anytime, anywhere. Sometimes it can appear and disappear like a ghost, but it never vanishes (Canovan, 1999; Taggart, 2004; Zúquete, 2009). This ghostly situation stems from the ability of populism to take on different forms depending on contextual conditions. Thanks to such a skill, populist discourse becomes widespread in the politics of contemporary Western democracies, and populist communicative strategies or tools are not only owned by new right-wing policies, but also used by new left and centre (technocratic) policies (Postill, 2018). This situation is called the popular spirit of the time (*zeitgeist*) by Mudde (2004: 562).

Populist communication has a significant impact on citizens' attitudes, emotions, and

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behaviours. Some academics even believe that the media's attention to populist leaders, as well as the media's actual adoption of populist ideas, is one of the primary factors of populism's political success. It is critical to analyse the congruence of populist messaging, the source, and the sensitivity of populist messages to contextual demand-side characteristics of the voter in order to comprehend the impacts of populist communication. This study focuses on the questions; what the importance of political communication for daily European politics is, is there any relation between political communication and populism, and what are the effects of political communication on European citizens. As the conclusion, populism has been rising through Europe despite existing and strong democracies. As a political communication mechanism, populism targets to reach the people. To do this, media is the most significant vehicle of populist leaders and news. People, on the other hand, got affected by populist messages according to many different variables.

## **II. Political Communication and Populism Relation**

Although the studies on populism are increasing day by day, there is still no universally accepted definition of the concept. This is obviously attributable to populism's character. Populism makes its critique of the existing order (anti-elite) through public appeal. In this respect, populism is not a concept developed against the same situation all over the world, as in ideologies such as liberalism, socialism or nationalism (Canovan, 1999). Instead, it develops against the existing system where it emerged and can be combined with other ideologies (Mudde, 2004). This nature of populism causes the concept to be shaped around three different definitions. Populist concept is defined as; political organization style, political communication style, or "thin-centred" ideology. These three definitions do not contradict each other in essence and accept "the people" and "elites" as the two basic elements of the concept (Bulut & Hacıoğlu, 2018: 190). The point that makes the definitions different is that there is no consensus on the main reason that makes populist parties and leaders populist, and that populist actors show different characteristics in different parts of the world, so definitions differ depending on this situation (Mudde, 2004). In this context, those who accept populism as a weak-centred ideology argue that populism focuses on the hostile relationship between the "people" and the "elites" and can be combined with different ideologies depending on where it emerges (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008; Hawkins, 2010; 2009; Mudde, 2007; 2004; Stanley, 2008). Those who define populism as a style of political organization argue that populism is a form of political organization shaped around a charismatic leader (Taggart, 1995).

Populism, according to the third description stated above, is a political communication style. By accepting populism as a communication phenomenon that can be functionalized by frequent or infrequent use of characteristic content and stylistic features, it becomes conceivable to decide the levels of populism (de Vreese, et al., 2019). Acceptance of populism as a political communication style adds measurability to populism (Canovan, 1999; Jagers & Walgrave, 2007; Rooduijn, 2009). In



this context, populist political actors criticize the current order by referring to concepts such as the people and the national will. Thus, populism is hidden in the language/discourse used by political actors (Bulut & Hacıoğlu, 2018). Populist political actors place the established institutions and existing elites in the “other” part of their populist discourse, claiming that the interests of the people are ignored by the corrupt elites and this situation disrupts the welfare order of the society (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008).

It would be wrong to argue that political actors with populist characteristics are a new phenomenon in world political history. However, especially with the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, it is seen that populism gained a new dimension and became prominent. As of the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, it is seen that populism is no longer seen as a radical situation in world political life and has become normal. In this context, Mudde (2004) argues that populist parties have now found a place in political life as a new party family and have become mainstream parties. While there may be concepts of “us” and “them” varying from country to country among this new party family, there are differences of opinion and discourse between the populist parties of any two countries.


In addition to the general populist trend throughout the world, it is necessary to mention about the situation in Europe. Labour migrations to Western Europe after 1960 formed a reason for the emergence of populist movements in the following years. In this context, the main arguments of populist parties and leaders in Europe consist of social, economic and political problems caused by immigrants. Populist parties in Europe argue that immigrants cannot adapt to European culture, so they damage the local culture by disrupting the social structure. The fact that immigrants are generally consisted of Muslim communities has caused populist discourses to gain harshness with the increasing islamophobia in Western society, especially after 9/11 (Kessel, 2011). Another argument of the European populist parties is that the population distribution of Europe will be negatively affected due to the fact that the population growth of immigrants is higher than that of the local people, and Europe will gradually move away from European culture. However, the fact that immigrants settle in European countries and their family members continue to live there negatively affects the employment opportunities of the locals (Lloyd, 2003). In line with all these reasons, populist parties in Europe form their perception of “us/the people” on the axis of indigenous people of Europe who speak the same language and share the same interests and shape the perception of “others” around the “dangerous others” who threaten this structure of the people. Along with these common points, it is seen that some populist parties carry out their populist rhetoric over anti-Semitism, ethnic and religious distinctions (Bulut & Hacıoğlu, 2018: 191).

Although there are important differences between them, one of the common points of populist movements and leaders is their skilful use of mass media. Today, when politics is a spectacle, a “populist as an anti-hero” has become the most important character of the show. According to some,

media performance is more important than any other element for today's populist movements, which can be called neo-populist (Özçetin, n.d.). However, the relationship between populism and media points to much more than the skilful use of the media by populist actors. What is more important is that the logic of media and mediatization overlaps with the logic of populist politics. Especially tabloid media has an extremely important place in legitimizing and polishing/marketing populist leaders and themes. For example, in Austria, "newsroom" populism has been instrumental in creating a very favourable climate of persuasion for the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ); the constant focus of tabloidized Sunday newspapers on identity and security news in Switzerland has facilitated the populist far-right movements (Özçetin, n.d.).

As a summary, the characteristic elements of populism, which can find movement especially in democratic fields, regardless of the current of thought (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007) are;

- Reference to the people (*horizontal dimension*); thin-populism
- Anti-elitism (*vertical dimension*)
- Anti-enlightened/intellectual (*vertical dimension*)
- Anti-establishment (*vertical dimension*)
- Distrust of politicians (*vertical dimension*)
- Religiosity, hostility to science and technology (*vertical dimension*)
- Longing for the past (homeland) (*vertical dimension*)



### III. Populist Political Communication in Europe

Following an explanation of the relationship between populism and political communication, this title will investigate populist political communication in Europe. Along with the emerging trend of populism, European democracies appear to be touched by the spirit of political populism as well, notwithstanding country variations (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008).

Two approaches toward populism can be elaborated here. First one is defining the identity of political populist actors and continue through discovering elements that may clarify their existence and influence the way they communicate. The other touch is to identify populist political communication's core characters later on explores the comprehension to which distinguished political actors utilise from populist communication strategies, tactics, styles and discourse. The first approach relies on populist political actors and draws inferences about populist communication strategies, tactics, styles, and rhetoric from the way these actors communicate. The second, on the other hand, concentrates on populist communication techniques, tactics, styles, and rhetoric. Based on the amount to which political players participate in populist communication, it makes inferences regarding the prevalence and pervasiveness of populist political communication, as well as which political actors are populist (Stanyer, et al., 2017).

Populist actors in Europe are often equated with the far right, anti-immigration behaviours and nationalism. Some examples consist the Austrian Freedom Party, Vlaams Belang (Belgium), Front National (France), the Progress Party (Norway), Wilders' Freedom Party (the Netherlands), National Renewal Party (Portugal), the Sweden Democrats, and Golden Dawn (Greece). Some of them are regionalist too, such as Lega Nord (Italy) and Platform for Catalonia (Spain). Despite the fact that these parties are clearly identifiable as populist in Europe, they are not the only political players that have been labelled as such. Various parties and movements, notably the Czech Republic's Action of Dissatisfied Citizens, Spain's Podemos, Italy's Five Star Movement, and Portugal's 12 March Movement, have profited on popular anger produced by corruption scandals and the adoption of unpopular policies. These parties and movements usually promise political process rejuvenation and more direct forms of democracy (Stanyer, et al., 2017: 356).

As a result, a clear, particular ideology is not a distinguishing trait of populist political players across Europe. Others are extreme right, some are far left, and some are in the middle of the political spectrum. Several populist actors combine right-wing and populist elements in their speeches and programs. There are also some, such as Podemos in Spain, who profess to be philosophically "empty", like an empty shell waiting to be filled with whatever the people's demands are (Stanyer, et al., 2017). Furthermore, some populist candidates have won European Parliament elections since the turn of the century. Examples include the Danish People's Party, France's Front National, and Spain's Podemos. The same is true for municipal elections, where Alternative for Germany and the Sweden Democrats are two instances. Voters in these elections are more inclined to support protest parties and candidates (Stanyer, et al., 2017).

Except for populist appeals, no one distinguishing trait could be identified as shared by all European populist political players. In essence, the populist title includes a wide range of ideas, including nationalism, regionalism, Euroscepticism, opposition to immigration, anti-multiculturalism, anti-establishmentarianism, anti-corruptionism, and anti-elitism, as well as calls for greater citizen participation and more direct forms of democracy (Stanyer, et al., 2017: 357).

Throughout Europe, a diverse range of populist political parties and personalities have established themselves as important political participants, despite the dynamics of both local and European politics. In some nations, they have formed coalition governments, while in others, they are an important element of legislative support for minority administrations. They continue to be a powerful opposition in most nations, requiring more established parties to find methods to both restrain them and address the issues that they have managed to raise among voters (Stanyer, et al., 2017: 362). As a result, based on the type of populism, the core of populist communication is appealing to the people, anti-elitism, and marginalization of various out-groups.

Here European media should be mentioned in terms of a vehicle to transmit the messages to

the people. In the previous several decades, European media networks have undergone significant changes, including expanded opportunity structures for the dissemination of populist themes. The loss of the traditional party press, greater media ownership concentration, reliance on advertising, and a stronger emphasis toward news values have all contributed to the rise of populist rhetoric. Because both strive for the rapid kick/click with a large audience, established internet media are viewed as having a strong affinity to populism's rhetorical persuasion (Esser et al., 2017). With the improvement of media and social media a new kind of populism appeared, media populism. The phrase "media populism" relates to three distinct points of view: populism by the media, populism via the media, and populist citizen journalism (Esser et al., 2017: 367). The first point of view is populism by the media, which refers to media companies actively engaged in their own form of populism. Populism fuelled by the media exists in several European countries. The emphasis on self-initiated opinion surveys demonstrates the tight relationship between the media and the people. The media employs the rhetorical method of the opinion poll to insert itself as ostensible public representatives into the political process.

The second point of view on media populism is populism through the media. According to Mazzoleni (2008), the media's major problem is not the spread of their own media-specific populism, but rather the reinforcement of politicians' populist rhetoric. Populist parties and movements, in his opinion, can depend on media support. When the media reports on these actors' slogans, arguments, and ideological points of view, they gain public attention and perceived legitimacy. According to Mazzoleni (2008), "the media have a role in transmitting it, either by simply putting it on a country's public agenda, or by spreading political mistrust and a climate of fatalistic withdrawal - all of which populist politicians may readily and rapidly exploit" (2008: 50). Populist citizen journalism is the third and the last form of populist journalistic logic. It happens when media companies open the door to populist messaging from their audiences, typically in the form of reader comments on their websites (Esser, 2017).

Populist political communication targets to "appeal to the people"; therefore, the next title will explain the populist political communication's effects on citizens.

#### **IV. Populist Political Communication and Citizens**

Grasp populism requires an understanding of communication mechanisms. Despite ongoing disagreements about the concept, there is a growing consensus that looking at populism through the lens of communication and media offers unique and important insights into how populism works, particularly in light of a rapidly changing high-choice media environment that may have transformed the very foundations of mainstream populist success (Van Aelst et al., 2017; de Vreese et al., 2018). References to, and a concentration on 'a homogeneous people' can be viewed as a crucial component of populist ideology and attitude (e.g., Canovan, 1999; Mudde, 2004; Taggart, 2004). This indicates

that the major distinguishing element of populism is the formation of an in-group of ‘the people’ or the appeal to citizens’ identification as members of ‘the people’. However, because ‘the people’ is a broad phrase, it has a variety of implications and hence multiple interpretations (e.g., the people as sovereign, class, ethnic group nation, ordinary people) (Reinemann, et al., 2019: 3). These meanings might be communicated openly or implicitly in populist messaging.

Populist communication has a significant impact on citizens’ attitudes, emotions, and behaviours. Some researchers even argue that media attention to populist leaders, as well as media embrace of populist ideals, is one of the key elements influencing populism’s political victories (Hameleers, et al, 2019). It is critical to analyse the congruence of populist messaging, the source, and the sensitivity of populist messages to contextual demand-side characteristics of the voter in order to comprehend the impacts of populist communication. Recent empirical study has looked at the impact of populist communication on a diverse group of individuals. For example, Matthes and Schmuck (2017) discovered that populist communication is more compelling to individuals with lower levels of education. According to Bos et al. (2013), populist appeals are especially successful among the politically sceptical. According to the empirical findings of Hameleers and Schmuck (2017), support of the source is also important in the adoption of populist messages: only citizens who feel connected to or support the source are favourably impacted by populist communication. Populist communication is most compelling to a select segment of people whose pre-existing convictions are consistent with the message, but it may even reverse on other citizens with incongruent views, priming their already poor judgments of populist perspectives. As a result of being exposed to populist rhetoric, polarization may be exacerbated (Hameleers et al., 2019).

People who have pre-existing beliefs that are compatible with populist communication are the only ones who choose populist messaging. According to theories of motivated reasoning and selective exposure, people are more likely to self-select into exposure when they agree with the message. Citizens who feel linked to the in-group of disadvantaged regular citizens, as well as those who feel far from elites and/or social out-groups, are more inclined to choose populist communication. This mechanism is a question of identity and congruence. People choose communications that accord with their worldviews to avoid cognitive dissonance (Hameleers et al., 2019; e.g., Festinger, 1957).

The real impression of selected populist messages is, once again, based on the message’s resonance with people’s past opinions. The impact of populist speech is heavily influenced by identification with the nation-state, Europe, and the poor. Populist message can generate a backlash among those who disagree with the populist discourse. Importantly, trait activation or schema theory may explain the process by which political views are influenced, either positively or negatively. Political conceptions, such as populist views, unfavourable stereotypes, or political involvement, are not generated by populist attitudes, but rather primed or triggered by communications that incorporate

populist arguments (Hameleers et al., 2019).

Another important factor to evaluate is the resonance of populist communication with actual opportunity structures. On a national level, this indicates that populist propaganda blaming economic elites may have the greatest impact on political assessments in countries that experienced the most severe impacts of the European economic crisis. Messages that blame immigrants for regular people's issues may have the greatest impact in nations that have recently dealt with a large inflow of immigrants, such as Germany. The popularity of populist political parties in various countries may also be used to explain resonance.

## V. Conclusion

Populism has been rising through Europe despite existing and strong democracies. As a political communication mechanism, populism targets to reach the people. To do this, media is the most significant vehicle of populist leaders and news. People, on the other hand, got affected by populist messages according to many different variables. As a result, individuals in nations where populist parties have a greater presence should be more familiar with populist speech. The populist message may elicit widely available populist framing schemata among these individuals.

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## POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF YEMEN IN ARAB SPRING

Ceyhun TUTAR<sup>6</sup>

### Abstract

Yemen is a geographically large and strategically important country in the Arabian Peninsula. Despite this importance, Yemen, which is quite underdeveloped, has faced many civil wars, military coups, and occupations throughout its history. The polarization experienced in the country, has an important effect on the basis of political instability. The unification between North and South Yemen in 1990 did not solve this instability, on the contrary, it paved the way for internal conflicts that would cause the cleavages between different political groups within the country until today. Within the framework of all these political instability and poverty, Yemen has been one of the countries where the Arab Spring protests were most severe. In 2011, the individual protest of a peddler named Mohammed Bouazizi in Tunisia turned into a mass revolutionary movement that spread to the Middle East, North Africa, and Arabian Peninsula countries in a very short time, and this movement was called the “Arab Spring.” Yemen, which already has political instability, also went through a very painful period of the “Arab Spring”. Bureaucratic corruption, economic troubles, and authoritarian persistence are the most important factors in the response of the Arab Spring in Yemen. However, due to the diverse political structure in Yemen, the conflicts between the groups in the country and regional terrorism, the instability continued. The aim of this study is to first examine the origins of Yemen’s political instability. Secondly, it is to explain the causes of the Arab Spring both in general and in Yemen, and then to examine the political dynamics in Yemen during the “Arab Spring” period. In line with this purpose, the focus has been on authoritarian permanence and corruption in the region. As a result, it has been reached that the revolution did not bring political stability to Yemen, as it did in other countries, and that Yemen, which could never be a nation-state due to all these political turmoils, became a failed state.

**Keywords:** Arab Spring, Middle East, Yemen, Ali Abdullah Saleh, Authoritarianism, Corruption

### Öz

Yemen, Arap Yarımadası’nda coğrafi olarak geniş ve stratejik olarak önemli bir ülkedir. Bu önemine rağmen oldukça az gelişmiş olan Yemen, tarihi boyunca birçok iç savaş, askeri darbe ve işgalle karşı karşıya kalmıştır. Ülkede meydana gelen kutuplaşma, siyasi istikrarsızlığın temelinde önemli bir etkiye sahiptir. 1990’da Kuzey ve Güney Yemen’in birleşmesi de bu istikrarsızlığı çözmemiş, tam aksine bugüne kadar ülke içindeki farklı siyasi gruplar arasında bölünmelere neden olacak iç çatışmaların önünü açmıştır. Tüm bu siyasi istikrarsızlık ve yoksulluk çerçevesinde Yemen, Arap Baharı protestolarının en şiddetli yaşandığı ülkelerden biri olmuştur. 2011 yılında, Tunus’ta Muhammed Bouazizi isimli bir seyyar satıcının bireysel protestosu çok kısa sürede Ortadoğu, Kuzey

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Afrika ve Arap Yarımadası ülkelerine yayılan kitlesel bir devrimci harekete dönüşmüş ve bu hareket “Arap Baharı” olarak adlandırılmıştır. Halihazırda siyasi istikrarsızlığa sahip olan Yemen de çok sancılı bir “Arap Baharı” dönemi yaşamıştır. Bürokratik yolsuzluk, ekonomik sıkıntılar ve otoriter kalıcılık, Yemen’de Arap Baharının karşılık bulduğu en önemli faktörlerdir. Ancak muhtelif siyasi yapı, ülkedeki gruplar arasındaki çatışmalar ve bölgesel terör nedeniyle Yemen’deki istikrarsızlık devam etmiştir. Bu çalışmanın amacı, öncelikle Yemen’deki siyasi istikrarsızlığın kökenlerini incelemektir. İkinci olarak hem genel olarak hem de Yemen’de Arap Baharının nedenlerini açıklamak ve ardından “Arap Baharı” döneminde Yemen’deki siyasi dinamikleri incelemektir. Bu amaç doğrultusunda bölgede otoriter kalıcılık ve yolsuzluk üzerinde durulmuştur. Sonuç olarak devrimin diğer ülkelerde olduğu gibi Yemen’e de siyasi istikrar getiremediği ve tüm bu siyasi çalkantılar nedeniyle hiçbir zaman ulus-devlet olamayacak olan Yemen’in başarısız bir devlet haline geldiğine ulaşılmıştır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Arap Baharı, Orta Doğu, Yemen, Ali Abdullah Salih, Otoriteriyenizm, Yolsuzluk

## I. Introduction

The Arab Spring is the name given to the mass protests that started after Tunisian Mohammed Bouazizi burned himself on December 17, 2010, and the uprisings that spread to North Africa and the Middle East and hosted a dramatic transformation in the Arab world. In the post-Cold War period, these actions, which took place as an expression of the bad and corrupt management created by authoritarian regimes in these geographies, especially by the youth, were carried out in countries such as Tunisia and Egypt, and it also had its effect in Algeria, Jordan, Yemen, Libya, Syria, Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Lebanon, and it caused the collapse of regimes and even civil wars. The Arab Spring protests that spread to Yemen shortly after Tunisia and Egypt, intergroup disagreements stemming from Yemen’s fragmented political structure, growing poverty, and political corruption, and the continuation of al-Qaeda’s actions put political instability into an inexhaustible situation.

In this study, firstly Yemen’s pre-Arab Spring history and political dynamics will be touched upon, and then the motivations and process behind the Arab Spring will be discussed. Finally, the authoritarian regime in Yemen and the corruption it created will be mentioned and the political dynamics of Yemen during the Arab Spring period will be explained in this context.

## II. Historical Background of Yemen and its Political Dynamics

From the past to the present, Yemen is a country that has gone through difficult conditions due to foreign interventions, civil wars, coups, and political instability throughout its history. North Yemen, which had been under Ottoman rule since 1848, was reinstated by the Imamate after the defeat and collapse of the Ottoman Empire in World War I in 1918, and this rulership controlled North Yemen

until the revolution in 1962. South Yemen on the other side, was under British colonization from 1839 to 1967 (Shamsan, 2020: 14).

The Imamate was overthrown in Northern Yemen in 1962 by a coup backed by Egypt and the “Yemen Arab Republic” was established. In 1964, opposition to the British colony grew in South Yemen, and in 1967 a semi-Marxist regime called the “People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen” was established. As a result, two independent states, almost completely different from each other, emerged in Yemen (Peterson, 2013: 307). South Yemen was ideologically close to the Soviet Union, but after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, it gave up its separatist existence, fearing that it would not survive both politically and economically, and in 1990, North and South Yemen united as the “Republic of Yemen” under the leadership of Northern Yemeni leader Ali Abdullah Saleh. Even this unification failed to make Yemen a true nation (Terrill, 2011: 6).

Ali Abdullah Saleh, who has been the head of Northern Yemen since 1978 and the Republic of Yemen since 1990, provided rent to different power groups, especially the Northern elites, and this situation caused the North to put pressure on the Southerners. Seeing the Northerners as occupation forces and bored with the oppression, the Southerners went to war with the Northerners in 1994 to separate again, and as a result, a civil war broke out. The war ended two months later with the victory of the Northerners, as northern forces captured the Southern capital of Aden. As a result of this victory of the Northerners, the ineffectiveness of financial management, the monopolization of the state bureaucracy, and the increasing marginalization of the Southerners increased the problems of legitimacy (Sharqieh, 2011: 222).

When the rebellions of the discontented Houthis, who were not satisfied with the policies of Ali Abdullah Saleh, started in 2004, and all these problems were added, an authority vacuum occurred in Yemen. This environment, in which there is no effective administration, has become a great playground for terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda as well as regional tribal groups. As a result of this political situation, even before the Arab Spring in 2011, most of the country was beyond the control of the government (Sharqieh, 2011: 223-224).

### **III. Political, Social, and Economic Status of Yemen Before the Arab Spring**

Yemen is a large and strategically important country in the Arabian Peninsula, although it is the poorest country in the Arab world. Yemen’s 2010 annual GDP is 30,907 million dollars and its GDP growth is 7.7%, as of 2011, the GDP is 32,726 million dollars and the growth is -12.7% (countryeconomy.com, n.d). The region, which consists of vast desert areas, and rugged mountains, has not been able to establish a national authority throughout history due to restless, well-armed, and powerful tribes. As of 2011, Yemen is the most populous country in the Gulf with a population of 23.5 million people. In the same year, it differs from other states in the region by being the only region without monarchies in the Arabian Peninsula (Terrill, 2011: 3-4). However, the absence of a monarchy

does not change the fact that the country is not democratic. Although Yemen is not an electoral democracy, the political system is dominated by the ruling GPC party. The judiciary is supposedly independent, in practice, it is open to the influence of the executive and there is no effective court functioning in the administration of the judiciary against tribal leaders and political leaders (Freedom House, 2010:726-727). According to the Freedom House (2010) annual report, Yemen's political rights status fell from 5 to 6 in 2009 and the status of freedom changed from Partially Free to Not Free (Freedom House, 2010: 725). Again, according to the Freedom House (2011) report, this situation did not change in 2010 and remained the same (Freedom House, 2011: 741).

#### **IV. The Period of Arab Spring**

In the Middle Eastern and North African countries, after the "Green Revolution" of Iran in 2009, similar actions have taken place. The most important and influential of these protests was the "Arab Spring", which started in Tunisia in December 2010 and brought about the most dramatic transformation in the Arab world that lasted until the beginning of 2012. Zeynel Abidin bin Ali in Tunisia in 2010 and Hosni Mubarak in Egypt in February 2011 had to leave power and even the country after the protests. As a result of the protests that ended the Assad family's rule in Syria in March 2011, the political unrest turned into a civil war. The protests in Libya, which resulted in the death of Muammar Gaddafi in October 2011, plunged the country into a civil war, just like in Syria. And finally, in Yemen, even though President Ali Abdullah Saleh resisted for a year, he left his 30-year power, and Yemen was dragged into a civil war. These protests in the Arab region created the expectation that authoritarian regimes would be overthrown, and a transformation would be made in which new democratic regimes would be built (Al-Shammari, 2017: 3).

##### **A. What happened in 2011?**

On December 17, 2010, a young street vendor named Muhammed Bouazizi set himself on fire in front of the local government building in Sidi Bouzid. The reason for this action was that on the same day a female police officer seized Bouazizi's property and insulted him. Complaining to the local authorities but not getting a solution, the young man was now out of patience, and this behavior was the last straw. Of course, the only reason for this suicidal act was not the event that happened that day but accumulated anger. After Bouazizi's action, the society, which was already angry with the government, started protests and on 27 December these protests reached the capital of Tunisia. President Zeynel Bin Abidin's promises of employment and elections to calm the protests did not work, and also after the military refused to intervene against the protesters, Ben Ali left the power and fled from the country on January 14. One and a half weeks after the events in Tunisia, young people in Egypt started to occupy Tahrir Square in the capital Cairo. Protests spread throughout Egypt, and on February 11, after the military took up the matter, Hosni Mubarak was dismissed and a new government was formed within the Armed Forces Supreme Council (Gelvin, 2015: 27-28).

In Libya, the protests of young people who embraced the uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia and the government's intervention led the country to civil war. On 20 October 2011, Muammar Gaddafi was killed by the National Transitional Council in the city of Sirte. Thus, the uprisings that started in Tunisia in October 2011 resulted in the overthrow of three presidents in North Africa. Similar events erupted elsewhere in the Arab world, and all same methods of strikes, demonstrations, marches, and rallies were used by thousands of civilians. In this process, social media had a very important role in organizing, communicating, raising awareness, and spreading the violence against protesters to the world. Following the success of the uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, unrest arose in Algeria, Jordan, and Yemen. Although leaders in these countries initially resisted, they eventually had to leave their current positions. The common slogan of the protesters in all countries was "The people want to bring down the regime." (Salih, 2013: 184-185).

### **B. Motivations and Roots of the Uprisings**

According to Kamal Eldin Osman Salih (2013), there is a consensus among political analysts that the main factors of the Arab uprisings that started in 2011 were economic degradation, government corruption, and the suppressing nature of Arab regimes on individual freedoms. Economic corruption of ruling elites and interest groups, rising taxes, rising food prices, and unemployment figures among the youth, who make up the majority of the population, peaked economic impoverishment. A social contrast emerged that made it clear that disappointed and poor youth would revolt against overly rich and corrupt elites, and the Structural Adjustment Program implemented by the IMF in the region further deepened this contrast (Salih, 2013: 186-187).

Arab regimes, with a few exceptions, are authoritarian regimes of a repressive nature and in which political power is monopolized by certain minorities. In these regimes where there is no majoritarianism and electoral democracy, illegal violence, torture, and even murder are routines to protect the power of the power. Regimes that do not refrain from implementing these actions against their citizens to protect their power put forward the idea that they are fighting terrorism to justify these crimes against humanity (Salih, 2013: 187).

In addition to all these, these regimes adopted policies supporting economic and social discrimination and paved the way for succession to consolidate absolute power. In addition to these two factors, mass violations of human rights imposed on basic individual freedoms such as freedom of expression, freedom of the press, and freedom of association have been another important factor that fueled the Arab uprisings. The political powers in this geography completely dominated the mass media and this monopolized media prevented anti-government views. The systematic harassment and unjust imprisonment of journalists, opposition politicians, and activists made the people of these authoritarian regimes very uncomfortable (Salih, 2013: 188).

On top of all these structural factors, events such as the suicide of Mohammed Bouazizi in

Tunisia and the torture and murder of Halid Said in Egypt were the events that triggered the riots spontaneously. According to political analysts, the flames, created by the combination of the sparks created by all these factors that constitute the origins and causes of the uprisings, engulfed the Arab world (Salih, 2013: 188).

## **V. Political Dynamics of Yemen in Arab Spring**

Political instability was nothing new for Yemen before the Arab Spring in 2011. Nearly seventy years of instability have led to the breakdown of confidence in public services and the rule of law, and the failure of the political system in Yemen (Shamsan, 2020: 59). The constitution of the modern Republic of Yemen, which was established after the unification in 1990, initiated a multi-party system where the independence of the judiciary was ensured, and all citizens were equal before the law. Ali Abdullah Saleh, who was the president of Yemen from 1990 when he took office until his resignation in 2012, dominated all institutional environments, and therefore, despite the presence of opposition parties or civil society in the country, the established power of the government could not be intervened (Durac, 2012: 164). On the other hand, during his tenure, Saleh had brought his relatives and family members to important positions of national security and thus wanted to maintain his power by creating a “family regime”. Saleh’s move was seen as a precaution against rented loyalty and volatile alliances in Yemen for years (Terrill, 2011: 9).

With this emerging political hegemony, the political elites did not have to be accountable and did not hesitate to apply this power when the demonstrations in Yemen began. In addition, Yemen became a battleground where different concepts of legitimacy competed when the demonstrations started. The basic institutions of the country, including the army, did not act as an instrument of the official state, and a large part of the country’s territory remained outside Saleh’s control. Wanting to keep all this fragmented political structure in balance, Abdullah Saleh pursued a series of unsuccessful domestic and foreign policies that caused the legitimacy of all institutions in the country, while leaving the country’s economy under the domination of a few small elite groups (Gün, 2012: 126).

All these policies, which made Yemen a country on the brink of collapse, created a socio-economically unmanageable situation. The young, unemployed, and dissatisfied population were quite high, as two-thirds of the population was under the age of 24. The unemployment rate among young people reached 50 percent. In addition to being excluded from the political side, this group was also disappointed by the lack of opportunities to develop themselves (Gün, 2012: 127). The country’s water resources were dwindling, oil reserves were running out, which accounted for three-quarters of the state’s income, and there was a population boom. All of this, combined with poor infrastructure, corruption in government services, and illiteracy, put the country at risk of collapse. With an unemployment level of over 40 percent, Yemen became the poorest country in the Arab world, making it impossible to recover economically (Juneau, 2013: 408-409).

Along with all this economic and political collapse, several political conflicts increased tensions and violence. There was a civil war in the north since 2004, with the Houthis revolt. In South Yemen, the presence of autonomist-oriented groups who were not satisfied with the unification in 1990 and wanted federalism increased the separatism and escalated tension in the country. In addition to these, increasing the presence of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula poses a great threat and sometimes causes the USA to intervene in the internal affairs of Yemen from time to time. These interventions increased the discontent of groups that were already in conflict with the state (Juneau, 2014: 375).

#### **A. Authoritarian Regime and Corruption in Yemen**

Authoritarianism in the Arab geography settled and institutionalized in the region with the end of the colonization period. Regimes that emerged with the support of citizens against colonial oligarchies developed a populist authoritarian system. These regimes, which gained legitimacy in the eyes of their people, especially thanks to their anti-US and anti-Israeli discourse and the redistribution of welfare, expanded and strengthened with the army and the state bureaucracy. What made these regimes powerful was their dominance over the ruling elite, giving patronage to loyalists, and developing methods of repression to dominate the system. In the early 2000s, as authoritarianism gained ground, anti-government protests began to increase when population growth, high unemployment, poverty, and corruption began to be observed in the countries in the region (Sika, 2012: 21).

Just like the rest of the Arab world, political corruption was a huge and widespread problem in Yemen. Although there is no legal guarantee against the conflicts of different interest groups in the country, the fact that the supervisory and investigation bodies are also under the influence of the executive authority made the country the 154th place among 180 countries in the 2009 Corruption Perception Index of Transparency International (Freedom House, 2010: 727).

Elham Manea (2014) referred to the “cunning state” term Shaini Randeria (2003) defines as “which capitalize on their perceived weakness to render themselves unaccountable both to their citizens and to international institutions”; and she redefined it for Yemen as “as a state-run by ethnic core elites, who exploit the seams of international structures and capitalize on the fear of the international community over its perceived failure to perpetuate its grip on power.” The Abdullah Saleh regime, which has been in power since 1978, has benefited from the tribalization within the country and exploited the interaction of ethnic groups with each other by taking the support of a certain ethnic group. This strategy is the most dominant characteristic of the cunning states. (Manea, 2014: 164-165). In addition, the Yemeni government has implemented a divide and conquer strategy, building customer-based relationships with core elites and ever-changing alliances to survive. The aim of this strategy was to weaken any political group that would rival the authority of the regime, with the support of a particular group that aspired to be part of the political system and gain its benefits. For

example, Saleh had links with the Zaydi Houthi movement in North Yemen and brought members of this tribe to important positions in the country (Manea, 2014: 164-165).

Another cunning state characteristic in Yemen is that they use two separate strategies alongside alliances to survive: political Islam and corruption. In the strategy of benefiting from political Islam, whose main purpose is political, core elites try to legitimize their regime with religious bases and to suppress other Islamist groups opposed to the authority by gathering especially political Islamist groups in their circles. In its corruption strategy, the Saleh regime bought out the core elites and other groups in the system to keep their loyalties under control and punished the unfaithful others (Manea, 2014: 166-167).

The third and final characteristic, the blackmail policy, is a strategy that the cunning states are constantly engaged in. Core elites implemented a policy of crisis to stay in control by exploiting the failure of the ruling regime, which they thought would fall soon. Yemen was important to the United States and its allies, with its promise to prevent chaos in domestic politics and to serve as a front against regional terrorism in foreign policy. So, Saleh was deliberately trying to increase instability and even let the imprisoned al-Qaeda members escape. Core elites, seeking more aid and support from Western states, implemented these strategies to the full, and even such blackmail methods worked when the Arab Spring protests erupted in 2011 (Manea, 2014: 167-168).

## **B. Before and During the Period of Arab Spring**

Following Tunisia and Egypt, the Arab Spring protests in Yemen were initiated by non-governmental organizations with the participation of young people and developed with the support of even different groups whose interests almost always contradict each other. In Yemen, the situation had come to a point where the Islamists and the left opposition would form a partnership against the increasing corruption and authoritarian government (Sika, 2012: 22). The protests initiated by the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP) and youth in the country, claiming that they have no future, the law and the economy have deteriorated, have evolved into protests that emphasize the end of corruption and the desire for Ali Abdullah Saleh to leave his power. On February 11, young people gathered in Sana'a town square and named it Tahir Square, just like in Egypt. After a short while, when the square was captured by the security forces, the young people returned to Sana'a University and camped there. This place became the center of the uprising with the participation of the protesters who came later (Gelvin, 2015: 98). The wick of the tension created by all the factors that have accumulated over the above-mentioned was ignited by the ruling party's announcement that they thought they would lift the term limitation for the presidency. With this step, it showed that Abdullah Saleh put aside the strategy of inclusiveness that he started to implement with the unification of Yemen in 1990 and adopted the strategy of exclusion to protect his power (Gün, 2012: 128-129).

Ali Abdullah Saleh held the power, which he ruled from 1990, until 2012. In the 1991



election, he was re-elected president with more than 91 percent of the vote, but the opponent was a weak candidate from his party. After this relatively free election, Saleh began to become authoritarian and show his true face, in contrast to the millennium. Although he did not intend to participate in the elections held in 2005, he changed the decision and won again (Gelvin, 2015: 87). An election was also held in 2006 and despite some periodic restrictions, the opposition was allowed to hold a rally, but these elections were criticized by the opposition for irregularities in voter registration, political corruption, and abuse of power, and protests were organized. Elections to be held in April in February 2009 were postponed for two years. During this period, many clashes took place with attempts such as arresting the opposition and the forced dispersal of opposition demonstrations for three months, and dozens of protesters and security forces died (Freedom House, 2010: 727). In 2010, after the government-controlled Yemen parliament announced that the presidential term would be lifted and the constitution would be changed, Saleh stepped back because of the reaction, and at the same time was preparing his son Ali Ahmed Saleh as his successor. Neither Ali Ahmed Saleh, the commander of the Republican Guard and Special Forces, nor his family members were the only individuals or groups to take advantage of the power of power. In order to ensure the security of power, 30 percent of the government revenues were spent on ensuring the loyalty of many interest groups such as relatives (Gelvin, 2015: 87).

These relatives outside the family were brought into positions in ministries, national airlines, and national oil companies; others sought enrichment through methods such as the tobacco trade and real estate speculation. In addition to Saleh's efforts to buy loyalty, Saudi Arabia's paying the leaders of the restless Yemeni tribes to remain silent was the support of Saudi, which is a powerful external factor in Yemen politics, to Saleh. The Ahmar family, for which the Saudis paid, was an important member of the Hashid tribal confederation. Because of their affinity with Saleh, family members hold positions such as president of parliament, vice president of parliament, and head of the ruling party. Billionaire Hamid al-Ahmar, a member of the family, bought a telecommunications company in Yemen and thus gained a huge advantage in domestic politics. Presenting himself as an alternative to Saleh's party, Hamid al-Ahmar played the role of "loyal opposition" for Saleh, despite his party's opposition to the idea of changing the constitution, thereby extending the time required for the overthrow of the regime (Gelvin, 2015: 88-89).

In mid-2011, significant changes took place during the protest. The Ahmar family sided with the protesters and the JMP. By the end of March, the capital city of Sana'a was almost divided between the regime and the regime's military units, the military units opposed the regime and its supporters (Gelvin, 2015: 99). Increasing violence and divisions drew the attention of the international community. In April 2011, an agreement was reached with the participation of the United States, Britain, the United Nations, and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), but this agreement has repeatedly failed at the signing stage. After a short while, a bomb exploded in the presidential palace

during the clashes, injuring Ali Abdullah Saleh. Saleh received treatment in Saudi Arabia and returned to his country and continued to resist despite the expectation that he would fall from power eventually the GCC agreement was signed on 23 November 2011. Saleh and his family were granted immunity from prosecution under the agreement, and it was decided that Saleh would remain in the power until the presidential elections in 2012. However, this agreement did not quench instability and protests, and the protests lasted until 2012 and deepened when Saleh returned to his country after treatment in the United States in 2012 (Durac, 2012: 167-168).

## **VI. Conclusion**

The Arab Spring, which started in the Middle East and North Africa in 2011, deeply affected both the Arab world and many countries around the world. When the origins of the riots are examined, it is seen that there are such as widespread corruption, economic deterioration, and crony capitalism stemming from authoritarian regimes and the rebellion of young people against these problems.

In the first stage of this study, the foundations of political instability in Yemen were examined. As a result of this analysis, it has been resolved that throughout its history, political instability in Yemen has continued due to foreign interventions, military coups, and civil wars. The unification of North and South Yemen in 1990 could not be a solution to this instability, and the ex-North Yemen leader Ali Abdullah Saleh's concessions to the northern elites led to a new civil war. This civil war, which resulted in the suppression of the Southerners by the Northerners, has made the instability, bureaucratic monopolization, failure of financial management, and mass segregation more visible in Yemen.

In the second part of the study, the factors that had an impact on the onset of the Arab Spring in Yemen were examined. The uprisings in Yemen also shared similar origins with other Arab countries. In specifically we think about Yemen, Ali Abdullah Saleh followed a succession of failed internal and foreign policies that undermined the credibility of all institutions in the country while allowing a few tiny elite groups to dominate the country's economy. The rebellion of the poor and angry youth who are desperate for the future has emerged against socio-economic problems such as high levels of corruption, economic deterioration, and unemployment. The complex and unstable political structure of Yemen throughout its history has exacerbated all these problems.

When the progress of the protests in Yemen during the Arab Spring period is analyzed, the authoritarian policy of Ali Abdullah Saleh, which was initiated years before the fire of the Arab Spring, reached its peak with the 2009 elections. Several skirmishes occurred during this time, with attempts such as detaining the opposition and forcibly dispersing opposition protests. In 2010, the government-controlled Yemeni parliament's announcement that the presidential term would be abolished, and the constitution would be amended caused a great deal of tension across the country and accelerated the process leading to protests.

As a result of this study, it can be seen that political stability, which plays an important role in the development of states, has never been established in Yemen, and the Arab Spring has not been a solution to this problem. Because, even during the Arab Spring period, the differences of opinion and purpose within the society and even among the political elites prevented the establishment of a stable government in Yemen and the fate of Yemen was again under the influence of foreign interventions. Yemen, which has never been a nation-state due to instability, internal conflicts, and occasional external interventions, has become a failed state. Just like other Arab countries, Yemenis, who embraced the Arab Spring, did not succeed in this process, and political instability continued throughout history.

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## RANTIYE DEVLET OLGUSU: ARAP BAHARI ÜZERİNDEN KÖRFEZ ÜLKELERİNDE SİYASAL MEŞRUIYET DEMOKRASİ ALGISI

Dilruba YILDIZ<sup>7</sup>

### Özet

“Rantiye Devlet” olgusu, gelirinin büyük kısmını doğal kaynaklarının ihracından elde eden devletler için, bilhassa Körfez ülkelerinin sosyoekonomik yapısını tanımlarken karşımıza çıkar. Bu devletler, ihraç gelirlerinden halka pay verdikleri için siyasal meşruiyetlerini de ekonomi üzerinden sağlamaya çalışırlar. Aralık 2010’da Tunus’ta başlayan Arap Baharı, Mağrip’ten Körfez’e kadar bütün Arap toplumlarını az ya da çok etkilemiştir. Tunus, Libya, Mısır ve Yemen’de uzun süredir koltukta olan hükümetler devrilmiş; Libya, Suriye ve Yemen iç savaşa sürüklenmiştir. Körfez ülkelerinde ise Arap Baharı, birkaç protesto ve küçük hükümet değişikliklerinden öteye gidememiştir. Çalışmada, rantiyeye devlet olan Körfez monarşilerinin Arap Baharı’ndan nasıl ve neden sıyrılabildiği ve halkın diğer Arap ülkelerindeki kadar ayaklanmadığıyla ilgili araştırma yapılacaktır. Rantiye devlet olmanın getirileri, bilhassa Arap Baharı’na giden yolda 2009-2010 yıllarında Ortadoğu ülkelerindeki nüfus, kişi başına düşen milli gelir, işsizlik, suç oranları, özgürlük seviyeleri gibi pek çok endeks üzerinden incelenecek ve bu incelemeler ile Körfez halklarının demokrasi talebiyle bağlantı kurulacaktır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Ortadoğu, Rantiye Devlet, Petrol, Körfez, Arap Baharı

### Abstract

The “Rentier State” is used for the states that procure their almost all national income by natural resource export. This term comes across especially when defining the socioeconomic structure of the Gulf countries. These states try to sustain their political legitimacy by giving a share from export revenues. Arab Uprising, beginning in December 2010 in Tunisia, has affected all Arabian people more or less, from Maghreb to Gulf. While the regimes were overthrown in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Yemen, civil wars have begun in Syria and Yemen. In the Gulf region, it could not go beyond a few protests and minor governmental changes. In the study, research will be conducted on how and why the Gulf monarchies, which are rentier states, were able to get rid of the Arab Spring and the people did not revolt as much as in other Arab countries. The benefits of being a rentier state will be examined, especially on the way to the Arab Spring, through many indices such as the population in the Middle East countries, per capita income, unemployment, crime rates, freedom levels in the years 2009-2010, and these analyzes will be linked with the demand for democracy of the people of the gulf.

**Keywords:** Middle East, Rentier State, Oil, Persian Gulf, Arab Spring

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## I. Giriş

Yeraltı kaynakları açısından zengin olan Orta Doğu, bilhassa petrol kaynaklarıyla pekçok gücün çekici odağı olmaktadır. Bu durum kimi zaman 1973 Petrol Krizi gibi siyasal bir silaha dönüşmüş kimi zaman da OPEC gibi oluşumlarla ülkelerarası birleştirici bir unsur olmuştur.

Birinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Osmanlı Devleti'nin kaybettiği toprakların önce İngiliz mandasına, ardından Arap ülkelerine evrilen bugünkü devlet yapılanmalarının çoğu, gelirlerinin yarısına yakını ya da yarıdan fazlasını petrolden sağlamaktadır. Özellikle Suudi Arabistan, Katar, Bahreyn, Kuveyt, Birleşik Arap Emirlikleri ve Umman'dan oluşan Körfez ülkeleri dünyada petrol ve doğal gaz rezervlerinin en fazla bulunduğu ülkelerdendir. Bilindiği üzere İran, Irak, Kuveyt, Katar Suudi Arabistan ve Birleşik Arap Emirlikleri gibi Körfez ülkeleri dünyadaki petrol rezervlerinin %65'ine sahiptir (Öztürk ve Işık, 2017:2).

**Tablo 1, Dünya Petrol Rezervleri Körfez Ülkeleri Sıralamaları**

2	Suudi Arabistan
5	Irak
6	Kuveyt
7	Birleşik Arap Emirlikleri
14	Katar
22	Umman

**Tablo 2, Dünya Doğal Gaz Rezervleri Körfez Ülkeleri Sıralamaları**

3	Katar
6	Suudi Arabistan
7	Birleşik Arap emirlikleri
12	Irak
20	Kuveyt
25	Umman

Kaynak: Enerji Atlası

## II. Körfez'in Rantiye Devletleri

Ortadoğu'nun en dikkat çekici ekonomik özelliği, bölgenin bazı ülkelerinin petrol açısından zenginliği ve bu zenginliğin Ortadoğu Arap toplumlarına ve devletlerine yansımalarıdır. Aslında petrolün önemi hem Ortadoğu ülkeleri açısından, hem de tüm dünya açısından 20. yüzyılın ikinci yarısından sonra ortaya çıkmıştır. 19. yüzyılda ve 20. yüzyılın başlarında Ortadoğu ekonomisi tarımsal ürünlere dayanmaktaydı. Bu durum 20. yüzyılın ikinci yarısında değişikliğe uğramış, petrol Ortadoğu ekonomisinin en belirleyici ögesi ve ana ihraç ürünü olmuştur. Birleşik Arap Emirlikleri (B.A.E.), Kuveyt ve Suudi Arabistan gibi ülkeler, gelir düzeyi oldukça yüksek, petrol zengini ülkelerdir. Bu ülkelerde nüfuslar görece az, tarım sektörü neredeyse hiç gelişmemiş ve petrole bağlı sektörler dışında sanayileşme olmamıştır. Ürdün ve Irak, Mısır, Yemen gibi ülkeler ise, daha kalabalıktır ve ilk sayılanlara oranla refah düzeyleri çok daha düşüktür. Petrol gelirleri arttığı sürece, bölgesel sorunlar yumuşatılabilmektedir (Erdem ve Erdem, 2013).

Doğal kaynak rantına sahip olmayan devletler, gelirlerini vergilerden sağlamak zorunda olduklarından, bu ülke yönetimlerinin hareket alanı daha dardır. Petrol ve doğalgaz ihraç eden Ortadoğu ve Kuzey Afrika ülkeleri içinde, ekonomisi daha çeşitlenmiş olan İran haricinde, geçmişten gelen girişimcilik ve geniş iş kolları bulunmamaktadır. Ülkelerin iktisadi planlarında iş kollarının artırılmasında ısrarcı olunmamıştır. Bu konuda çok ısrarcı olunmamasının en önemli nedeni de ülkelerin siyasi yapılarıdır. Çünkü yeni işkollarında birey gelirini emeğiyle kazandıkça daha çok serbestlik isteyecektir. Ancak şu an itibarıyla bu ülkelerde birer patronaj (Kral/Emir-Toplum) ilişkisi bulunduğundan, doğal kaynak ihraç eden ülkelerde elde edilen gelirin büyük kısmı kamu harcamalarıyla topluma (Körfez ülkeleri) ya da elitlere (Kuzey Afrika ülkeleri) aktarılmaktadır (Sözen, Uslu ve Öngel, 2011).

Körfez ülkeleri, başta petrol ve doğal gaz olmak üzere yeraltı kaynaklarından elde ettikleri gelirler sebebiyle, literatürde yeni yeni anılmaya başlayan “rantiye devlet” kavramını üstlerine giymektedirler. Bir nevi ‘siyah altın’ diyebileceğimiz petrol, sokaktan saraya kadar pek çok konuyu etkilemektedir. Luciani’nin “Allocation vs. Production State” ve Beblawi’nin “The Rentier State in the Arab World” adlı eserlerinde, rantiyeci devlet, gelirini diğer ülkelerden temin eder, şeklinde tanımlanmıştır. Çünkü Rantiyeci Devlet Teorisi’ne göre, devletin gelirlerinin büyük çoğunluğu yurtiçi kaynaklardan (vergi, v.b.) değil; sert taş, petrol, doğalgaz, ağaç gibi doğal kaynakların satışıyla yurtdışından elde edilmektedir. Ortadoğu ve Kuzey Afrika bölgesindeki ülkelerin doğal kaynaklarının tamamı devlete ait (Bahreyn ve Umman hariç) şirketler tarafından ihraç edilmektedir. Literatürde kabul edildiği üzere, milli petrol şirketlerinin gerçekleştirdikleri doğal kaynak ihracatının, toplam gelirdeki payının yüksekliği, ülkelerin rantiyeci ekonomi olduklarını göstermektedir (Sözen, Uslu ve Öngel, 2011).

Bütün devletler dağıtım faaliyeti yaparlar, ancak rantiyeye devletin dağıtım faaliyeti bu devletin kendi yerel ekonomisi ile yegâne ilişki tarzı olduğundan, onu dağıtıcı sıfatı ile nitelemek mümkündür (Sune ve Özdemir, 2012). Rantiye devletler dağıtım işini ana ekonomik akım olarak sürdürdükleri için halktan gelecek vergiye ya da herhangi bir ekonomik çeşitliliğe büyük oranda ihtiyaçları yoktur. Bu da aslında halk ile devlet arasında bir kopukluğa sebep olur zira bu devletlerde demokratik uygulamalara rastlansa bile demokrasi, üretim devletleri için önemlidir. Bu yüzden de rantiyeye devletlerde demokrasi üzerinden siyasi meşruiyet sağlanamayacaktır. Makalede, bu durum siyasal meşruiyeti ve demokrasi arzusunu ne ölçüde etkiler; Arap Baharı neden diktatörlük modeline, çekirdek olarak olmasa da dış kabuk itibarıyla çok benzeyen “monarşi”nin hâkim olduğu Körfez ülkelerinde bir ‘devrim’ nedeni olamadı ya da bu ülkeler meşruiyetlerini nasıl sağlıyor gibi soruların cevapları üzerinde durulacaktır.

Orta Doğu’nun rantiyeye devletleri, halktan gelecek olana tamah etmedikleri için vergiyi oldukça düşük tutmakta, çoğu vergi dahi almamaktadır. Ekonomik alanda petrol ihracatının getirdiği zenginliğin, Ortadoğu’da rantiyeci bir devlet modelinin gelişmesi için uygun bir zemin hazırlamak

suretiyle, dolaylı yoldan otoriter rejimlerin istikrarını desteklediği söylenebilir. Rantiye devletleri, petrol gelirlerinden elde ettikleri rantı halka dağıtırlar. Bu dağıtım işlevi sırasında vatandaşlık, ekonomik çıkarlarla ilişkilendirilir. Rantiyeci devlet, geliştirdiği bir ödül sistemi üzerinden meşruiyetini sağlama yoluna gider. Genellikle sahip olunan doğal kaynaklar üzerindeki hâkimiyet biçimi ve kaynaklardan elde edilen gelirin dağıtılma biçimi (ödül sistemi) bu rejimlerin istikrarında önemli bir noktayı oluşturur. Özellikle de petrol zengini olan Körfez ülkelerinde para ya doğrudan çıkarlar ya da sosyal refah sistemi aracılığıyla ‘vatandaş’ olarak tanımlananlara dağıtılmıştır (Erdem ve Erdem, 2013).

Başta petrol olmak üzere doğal kaynak gelirlerinin halka dağıtıldığı uygulamaları görmek de mümkündür. Hâl böyle olunca yönetimin elitlerin elinde bulunduğu bu tarz bir yönetimde, halk tarafından kabul ve destek görmeleri için demokrasiden başka bir güce ihtiyaçları vardır. Bu ihtiyacı da düşük vergiler, değerli para birimleri ve doğal kaynak gelirlerinin halka dağıtımıyla karşılamaktadırlar, bunun yolu da rantiye olmaktan geçmektedir. Dış kaynaklar vasıtasıyla gelir elde edilmesi sonucunda, rantiye devletler üzerindeki, vatandaşlarını vergilendirme yönündeki baskılar da azalmaktadır. Vergilendirme olmaması vatandaşların demokratik temsil konusundaki isteklerini azaltmaktadır. Ayrıca, rantiye devletlerde, görev başında olan hükümetlerin; vatandaşların mevcut rejime olan sadakatlerinin sağlanması noktasında da imkân ve kabiliyetleri artmaktadır. Bu amaç doğrultusunda, rantiye devletler vatandaşlarına refah hizmetleri ve sübvansiyonlar sunmaktadır ve devlet; nüfusun büyük bölümüne iş sağlamak suretiyle, ülkedeki en büyük işveren konumuna gelmektedir. Yukarıda sayılan bu olgular demokrasi hareketlerinin azalmasına ve emtia (örneğin; petrol) fiyatlarının azalma eğilimine girmesi ile birlikte olumsuz ve politik istikrarı bozucu sonuçlara yol açabilmektedir (Bilgen, 2010).

Şüphesiz ki sahip olunan zengin kaynaklar kendi kendine devlet yapısını şekillendirmemekte, iktidar yapıcılar tercihlerini bu yönde değerlendirmektedir. Sonuç olarak da uzun vadede sahip olunan bu politik, iktisadi ve sosyal yapı, kaynak zengini devleti dış etkilere karşı daha kırılgan hale getirmektedir. Yaşanan deneyimler baz alınarak petrol zengini ülkeler, üretim ve çeşitlenmeyi ikinci plana atarak petrol gelirlerine direkt olarak bağlı bir ekonomik yapı kurduklarından petrol fiyatlarındaki herhangi bir değişiklik veya talepte meydana gelen azalma tüm devlet ekonomisini direkt olarak etkilemektedir. Ekonomisi bozulan bir devlette halkın da alım gücü düşmekte ve sonuç olarak da doğru orantılı olarak da ekonomik sıkıntıların yanından sosyal sıkıntılar da baş göstermektedir. Diğer yandan, bazı teorisyenler tarafından iç dinamiklerden ziyade dış güçler kaynak zengini ülkelerin sivil savaş deneyimi yaşamasına yol açacağı vurgulanmıştır (Al ve Aslan, 2018).

### III. Arap Baharı ve Körfez

Tunuslu seyyar satıcı Muhammed Buazizi’nin Aralık 2010’da kendini yakmasıyla Yasemin Devrimi olarak başlayan dalga, Mısır’da Tahrir Devrimi ile siyasi bir kasırgaya dönüşerek bu iki ülkenin yanı sıra Libya ve Yemen’de de otoriter liderlerin sonunu getirmiştir. Kuveyt ve Ürdün’de hükümetler değişirken Umman, Suudi Arabistan ve Fas yönetimleri reformlar yaparak protestocuları teskin etmiştir.



Bahreyn'deki isyanlar Suudi Arabistan'ın doğrudan askeri müdahalesi ile bastırılırken Suriye'de Esed rejimi İran ve Rusya'nın desteğiyle ayakta kalmıştır. Devlet başkanları Tunus'ta Zeynelabidin bin Ali ve Mısır'da Hüsnü Mübarek protestolardan bir ay sonra iktidarı terk etmek zorunda kalmışlardır. Yemen'de Cumhurbaşkanı Ali Abdullah Salih bir yıl dirense de yerini yardımcısı Abdurabbu Mansur Hadi'ye bırakmıştır. Libya'da Başkan Muammer Kaddafi ise önce uluslararası bir askeri müdahale ile iktidarını, ardından muhaliflerin eline geçince de hayatını kaybetmiştir. Ancak Ağustos 2011'e gelindiğinde Bahreyn'deki gösteriler sert bir şekilde bastırılırken Suriye'deki durum bir iç savaşa dönüşmüştür. Sonrasında Fas ve Ürdün'de protestolar kısmi bir reform süreci ile karşılanırken mevcut siyasal yapı kendisini korumayı bilmiştir. Eski rejimin (özellikle ordu ve yargı) tasfiye edilmediği Mısır'da 2012 seçimlerinden bir yıl sonra ordu Mursi yönetimini darbe ile devirmiştir. 2013 yazına gelindiğinde Tunus haricinde Arap Baharı ülkelerinden hiçbirinde demokrasiye geçiş yaşanmayacağı netleşmiştir (Duran, 2021).


Arap Baharı'nın kökünde ekonomik problemler yatmıştır. Arap Baharı'nın başlamasında, bu ülkelerde enflasyon, işsizlik, zor yaşam koşulları, gıda sıkıntısı ile petrol fiyatlarındaki artış ve azalışlar bir şekilde belirleyici olmuştur (Buzkıran ve Kutbay, 2013). Halk giderek fakirleşirken, özel sektörün zayıf ve devlet patronajına dayalı olması, özellikle gençler arasında işsizliğin artmasına neden olmuştur. Söz konusu ülkelerin demografik yapısı da genç işsizliğin artmasına olanak vermektedir (Malik ve Awadallah, 2013). Genç işsizlik demek, sokağa çıkıp protestoları canlandıracak enerjinin başıboş kalması demektir.

#### IV. İndeksler

Arap Baharı'nın nedeni olan ekonomi, özgürlük ve meşruiyeti incelemek ve Körfez ülkelerinin Arap Baharı'ndan derinden etkilenen ülkelerle arasındaki farkları ve benzerlikleri görmek için indeksler kullanılacaktır.

##### A. İşsizlik

**Tablo 3.** Ortadoğu Ülkeleri İşsizlik Oranı Grafiği



Kaynak: Organization ve UNDP, 2012

Grafikte de görüldüğü üzere Körfez ülkelerinde işsizlik oranı yok denecek kadar az olduğu ve petrol gelirlerinden pay elde edildiği için, Arap Baharı'nın sıçradığı diğer ülkeler gibi Körfez'in toplumlari

“ekmek” talep etmemektedirler. Tunus’ta seyyar satıcılık yapan ve zabıta tarafından tezgâhı devrilen genç bilgisayar mühendisi Muhammed Buazizi’nin kendini yakmasının sebebi batık ekonomiydi. Mısır’da insanlar gösterilerde aç olduklarından, yöneticilerin yolsuzluklarından dem vurmaktaydılar. Ekonomik refahın sağlanamayışı koca bir dalga olmuş ve arkasına ifade özgürlüğünün olmayışı, diktatörlerin inatçılığı gibi etkenleri de alınca koca bir tsunamiye dönüşmüştü. Nitekim sloganları da belliydi: “*Ekmek, onur ve özgürlük*”. Halk demokratik anlamda da ekonomik anlamda da sıkışınca patlıyordu, hele ki Orta Doğu gibi hassas bir bölgede. Ne Tunus’ta Zeynel Abidin bin Ali ne Mısır’da Hüsnü Mübarek ne Libya’da Muammer Kaddafi... Bu liderler onlarca yıldır ülkedeydiler. Ne özgürlük vad ediyorlardı ne de ekonomik refah. Yalnız Kaddafi, politik hedeflerine erişme yolunda muhalefet istemediği için petrol gelirlerini halka dağıtmış; karşılığında da özgürlüklerini almıştı. Ülke gelirin %70’inin petrolden sağlandığı Yemen’in ilk ve devrik başkanı olan Ali Abdullah Salih’te de benzer bir hikâye vardı. Yolsuzluk ve hak ihlallerinin yanı sıra Salih’in otoritesi, ülkedeki petrol rezervleri kurumaya başlayınca azaldı. Ülkedeki petrol geliri 2001 yılında zirvedeydi fakat sonrasında düşüş yaşadı. Salih’in, petrol gelirlerini aşiretlere eskisi kadar dağıtamaması da ayaklanmaların bir nedeni olarak gösterildi ki zaten Yemen’deki Arap Baharı’nın en önemli aktörleri, hâlâ zaman zaman çatışmaya devam eden aşiretlerdi.

Kaynak gelirlerinin petrol ülkelerinde meşruiyet üzerinde etkili olduğu örneklerle de sabittir. Aslında halkın demokrasi arayışının altında çoğu zaman ekonomik güç vardır. Hükümete bağlılıkları da bu güce bağlıdır. Körfez ülkelerinde vergi oranı 2021’e kadar %0’dı ve dünyanın en değerli para birimlerine sahiptiler; başı da sırasıyla Kuveyt Dinarı, Bahreyn Dinarı ve Umman Riyali çekmekteydi (Akittv, 2021).

Tablo 4.

Ülke	Kişi başına GSYİH (2010) \$
Katar*	67.403
Kuveyt*	38.577
BAE*	33.893
Bahreyn*	20.722
Suudi Arabistan*	19.262
Umman*	18.712
Libya	12.064
Lübnan	7.761
Cezayir	4.480
Tunus	4.141
Suriye	4.058
Ürdün	3.736
Fas	2.839
Mısır	2.645

Kaynak: The World Bank, <https://124.im/xGmd>

## B. Din

İslam’da, kamunun devlet üzerinde hakları vardır. Devlet, kamu yararını gözeterek petrolü çıkarmak ve

gereğini yapmak zorundadır. Makalenin devamında bunun dayandığı temeller görülecektir.

Yedi asır önce yaşayan İbn-i Haldun, rantı; ganimetin paylaşılması olarak tanımlamıştır. İbn-i Haldun'a göre zenginlik, insanın kendi gayreti yerine elde edilen ganimetin topluma dağıtılmasıyla oluşur. İbn-i Haldun, Arap toplumlarında zenginliğin ülke dışından (rant, ganimet, savaş vb.) alınarak içerideki bireylere dağıtıldığını söylemiştir. Çünkü tarım ve üretim alanlarında çalışmak Arap kabileci anlayışında küçük görülmiştir. Bu anlamda, devlet, rant gelirlerinin dağıtım görevini üstlenmektedir. Toplam GSYİH içerisinde rant gelirlerinin önemli bir paya sahip olması ve bu gelirlerin doğrudan ülkeye hâkim olan iktidara akması nedenleriyle, politik otoritenin iktisadi ve siyasi alanlardaki nüfuzu da artmaktadır (Çoğalmış, 2015). Aslında bu kabileci anlayış ve petrol üzerinden yapılan dini ve milli uygulamalar da halk üzerindeki 'adalet' ve 'birleştirici güç' olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır.

El-Mevdudi, egemenlik ile ilgili olarak Kur'an'ın konumunun açıkça şu şekilde olduğunu ileri sürer: "İslam Devleti, dünyanın diğer devletlerine karşı bu terimin gerçek anlamıyla egemen bir devlettir, ancak eğer Allah'ın ve elçisinin emri karşısında egemenliğini iddia etmeye çalışırsa, bu onun İslami karakterinin açık bir şekilde inkârı anlamına gelir". Yani, İslam özel mülkiyeti kabul etse de herhangi bir doğal kaynak, devletin izniyle nitelikli kişilerin ortak kamu yararı için kullanılmasına izin verilen her türlü doğal kaynak devletin malı olarak kabul edilmelidir. Devlet, adalet ve adalet kriterlerine göre zekât ve/veya vergi uygular. Devletin çıkarlarını korumak elbette hükümdarın birincil görevidir. Ancak bu konuda daima onun dışında değil, İslam hukuku çerçevesinde hareket etmelidir. Siyasa veya devlet politikası doktrini altında, hükümdarın kamu çıkarını güvence altına almak için geniş takdir yetkisine sahip olduğu doğrudur. Farklı mezhepler, doğal kaynakların mülkiyetine ilişkin anlayışta küçük farklılıklara sahiptir. Ancak çoğunluğa göre, tüm toplumun iyiliği için doğal kaynaklar devlete aittir. Devlet, belirli bir ödeme karşılığında, özel yatırımcılara veya müteahhitlere bu doğal kaynaklardan yararlanma hakkı verebilir. Madenlerin devlet mülkiyeti ilkesi, çoğunluğu İslam olan ve halkın devlet eylemlerinin İslami ilkelere uymasını talep ettiği çeşitli ülkelerin anayasalarına yansımıştır (Demir, 2017).

Sadece ekonomik kararlarda değil aynı zamanda toplumun her kesimini ilgilendiren sosyal ve idari düzenlemelerde de Şeriatın emir ve yasaklarını dikkate alan ve bunları öncelikle kendi nefsinde tatbik eden yetkililer İslami bir yönetim anlayışının benimsenmesinde ciddi etkiye sahiptirler. Örneğin "adaleti tesis eden amirler ahiret gününde şehitler ve evliyalar ile birlikte olacaklardır" "Halkın işlerini üstlenip de onlara güçlük çıkarana lanet olsun!" "kolaylaştırın zorlaştırmayın" şeklindeki hadisler İslam'ın temel değerlerinin her birey tarafından kendi nefsinden başlayarak etki ettiği her alanda cari olmasını ve insanların hayatlarını kolaylaştırmaya çalışmayı teşvik etmektedir (Efe, 2018).

İslâm hukukunda devletin hâkimiyetinden ziyade Allah'ın iradesinin hâkim olduğu anlayışı

kabul edilmiştir. Bu hâkimiyete işaret eden çeşitli ayetler vardır.<sup>8</sup> Halifenin ya da devlet başkanının hâkimiyeti ise Allah'ın iradesine uygun olarak devlet işlerini idare etmesine bağlıdır. Devlet başkanı bunu yaptığı müddetçe halk ona itaate mecburdur (Köse, 2017).

Dolayısıyla devlet, halkı üzerindeki sorumluluğu petrol aracılığı ile gerçekleştirerek dini hükümlere uymasıyla adaletli ve sorumluluk sahibi olduğunu göstererek meşruiyetini güçlendirebilir.

### C. Petrol Milliyetçiliği

Benzer bir olay petrol milliyetçiliği üzerinden de gerçekleşmektedir. Geniş petrol rezervine, endüstriyel enerji tüketimi görece düşük ve nüfusu yüksek olduğu için petrol gelirlerinin rantıye devlet uygulamaları için yeterli olmadığı ve dolayısıyla ekonomisi büyük oranda enerji ihracına bağımlı olan ülkelerde petrol ve milliyetçi akımların yükselişi arasında ciddi bir korelasyon ortaya çıkabilmektedir. Bu duruma “petrol milliyetçiliği” adını vermekteyiz. Petrol milliyetçiliği geniş petrol rezervine sahip, nüfusu yüksek ama enerji tüketimi düşük ve dolayısıyla ekonomisi büyük oranda enerji ihracına bağımlı olan ülkelerde tüketici ve hegemon ülke karşıtlığı üzerinden yapılanan milliyetçilik anlayışına verilen addır. Petrol milliyetçiliğinin baskın ideolojiye dönüştüğü ülkelerde arz-talep dengesine dayalı ekonomik rasyonalite anlayışı rafa kalkar; devlet ve halk milliyetçi motiflerle petrole dayalı çıkarları korumaya yönelir, petrol ulusal kimliğin önemli bir motifi haline gelir (Özev, n.a.).

Halk, yabancı şirketlerin kaynak çıkarmasını milliyetçilik sebebiyle istemezken; devletse bunu, yabancı şirketler üzerinden kârdan daha az pay alacağı için istememektedir. Dolayısıyla bu durum halk ve yönetim arasında birleştirici bir güç olmaktadır. Ayrıca Körfez'in nüfusunun az olması ve çoğunluğunu petrol için gelen göçmen işçilerin oluşturması sebebiyle petrol ihraç geliri paylaşımı kendi vatandaşlarıyla rahatlıkla paylaşılmaktadır. Ayrıca petrol işçilerinin oluşturduğu kasabalarda demokrasi talebi olmadığı için devletin, halkın çoğunluğunu oluşturan bu nüfusa yönelik herhangi bir meşruiyet kaygısı bulunmamaktadır.

**Tablo 5.** Ortadoğu Ülkeleri Nüfus ve Göçmen Oranı Verileri

<b>BAE</b>	<b>8,264,070</b>	<b>87.8</b>
<b>Katar</b>	1,699,435	82.5
<b>Kuveyt</b>	3,566,437	61.2
<b>Bahreyn</b>	1,234,571	52.2
<b>Ürdün</b>	6,113,000	41.8
<b>Suudi Arabistan</b>	27,136,977	30.0
<b>Umman</b>	2,773,479	27.7
<b>Libya</b>	6,545,619	10.9
<b>Suriye</b>	20,619,000	8.0
<b>Cezayir</b>	35,978,000	0.7
<b>Mısır</b>	78,728,000	0.4
<b>Tunus</b>	10,547,100	0.4

Kaynak: The World Bank, <https://124.im/SeEgf>

<sup>8</sup> Âl-i İmrân, 3/189; A'râf, 7/3, 54; Hûd, 11/107; Yûsuf, 12/40; Kasas, 28/70

Arap Baharı, Körfez ülkelerinde de bazı protestolara sebep olmuştur, hatta kimisi Bahreyn'deki gibi uzun süreli (3 yıl) ve şiddetlidir (93 ölü, 2900'den fazla yaralı) fakat bu protestolar devrimlerin gerçekleştiği ülkelerdeki kadar ateşli olmamıştır ve bastırılabilmiştir. Ayrıca bunun en büyük nedeni de Suriye'dekine benzer olarak iktidar ve halkın çoğunluğunun mezhebinin farklı olmasıdır. Bilindiği gibi Bahreyn'in yakın siyasi tarihini belirleyen temel sorun olarak, ülke yönetimine hâkim Sünnilerle çoğunluğu oluşturan Şiiler arasındaki gerilim, 2000'li yılların başından itibaren tırmanmış ve 2011 yılı başında Arap Baharı olaylarının verdiği cesaret ve ivmeyle bir Şii ayaklanmasına dönüşmüştür. Bu ayaklanma hükümetin başta Suudi Arabistan olmak üzere bazı Körfez ülkelerin yardımıyla da kısa sürede bastırılmıştır (Öztürk A. , 2013).

Suudi Arabistan da petrol gelirlerinden halkı paydaş eden ülkelere biri ve ufak tefek yapılan ayaklanmaları polisle bastırmıştır. Suudi Arabistan'ın zengin petrol yataklarına sahip Doğu bölgesi 200-400 bin kadar Şii mezhebinden olan işçi grubuna sahiptir. Bu durum ayrıca Sünni Vahhabi temelinde şekillenmiş Suudi Arabistan'ı bölgede Şiilere karşı istikrarın sağlanması amacıyla ilave güvenlik önlemleri almaya itmektedir. Şiiler, İran İslam devrimi sonrasında Suudi Arabistan'daki sistem için potansiyel muhalefet anlamına gelmektedir. 2011 halk ayaklanmalarında Şii göstericiler, sosyal medya üzerinden örgütlenseler de gizli güvenlik güçlerinin tedbirleri genel bir protestoyu engellemiştir (Gökçe, 2016).

2015'te Suudi Arabistan'da göreve gelen Kral Salman bin Abdulaziz ilk çalışmalarından biri olarak, âdeta bir hükümdarlık alametiymişçesine, halka 32 milyar dolar dağıtmıştır. Birleşik Arap Emirlikleri'nde şahıstan sahip olduğu hiçbir şey için vergi alınmamaktadır. Kurumsal alanda ise sadece yabancı bankacılık, petrol ve gaz endüstrileri gelir vergisi ödemektedir. 7 emirliğin oluşturduğu bu federasyon, Arap Baharı'ndan olumsuz etkilenmemiş hatta aksine, kaostan kaçan önemli bir sermayenin sığındığı limanlardan olmuştur. Aynı zamanda tıpkı Katar gibi, nüfus bakımından kalabalık olmadığından, kişi başına yıllık geliri de bir hayli yüksektir. Ayrıca Kuveyt Emiri Sabah'ın da Arap Baharı başladıktan bir süre sonra, tam da kendi ülkesinde protestoların başladığı günlerde "Kuveyt'in işgalci Irak güçlerinden kurtuluşunun 20. yıldönümü" bahanesiyle her Kuveyt vatandaşına 1.000 dinar (4000\$) ve bir yıl boyunca ücretsiz yemek yardımı vermesi (Schramm, 2011) de Rantiye devletlerin parayla her şeyin çözülebileceğine olan inancını ortaya koymaktadır.

Kaynak gelirlerinin rantıye devlet uygulamalarıyla halka dağıtılması sonucu, rejimler halka hesap verme zorunluluğu olmadan varlıklarını kalıcı hâle getirebilmekte ve aslında kendi meşruiyetini kendi sağlamaktadır. Değerli para birimleri ve GSYİH'nin de uygun olması sebebiyle işçi göçü de çokça almaktadır, bu tabakanın demokrasi beklentisi olmadığından demokratik talep de azalmaktadır. Çünkü zaten aldığı maaştan, yaşadığı ekonomik ortamdan memnun olan işçinin isyan edebileceği aşırı ağır şartlar bulunmamaktadır. Rantiye devletin bu tutumu, çoğu zaman olumlu sonuç verir gibi görünmektedir. Nitekim Körfez'in rantıye devletlerinin Arap Baharı'nı sağ salim atlatmasında bunların payının büyük olduğu da görülmektedir çünkü diğer Arap ülkeleri gibi milyonlarca insan sokağa dökülmemiştir.

#### D. Özgürlük ve Refah

Dünya petrol rezervlerinde dokuzuncu sırada yer alan Libya/Kaddafi örneğine bakıldığında “rantiye devlet” olmanın, yukarıdaki örneklere bakınca kısmen kurtarıcı gibi görünse de öyle olmama ihtimali olduğunu da görmekteyiz. Libya’da Muammer Kaddafi’nin 1986’da Libya Devrimi’ni yapmasından önce I. İdris döneminde petrol gelirleri halka yansımamış ve bu durum, halk üzerinde rahatsızlık yaratmıştır. Muammer Kaddafi ve arkadaşlarının bir askeri darbe yaparak yönetimi ele geçirmesinden sonra Kaddafi’nin ilk dönemlerinde petrol gelirlerinden dolayı halkın refah seviyesi kısmen de olsa yükselmiştir. Kaddafi, Zawara Beyanı’ndan<sup>9</sup> sonra ideolojisini uygulamak için Yeşil Kitap’ı yayınlamış ve halk, refah seviyesi yükselmiş de olsa özgürlükten mahrum kalmıştır. Kaddafi’nin 42 yıllık yönetimi süresince uluslararası terörizme verdiği destek, takip ettiği dış politika ve belki de en önemlisi kendi insanlarına karşı uyguladığı zorbaca yönetim anlayışı, ona tüm kapıları kapatmıştır (Doğan ve Durgun, 2012). Bu yüzden de Libya’da hükümete tepkiler artmış ve çatışmalar şiddetlenmiştir. Arap Baharı’nda “özgürlük” nidaları atılmadan çok az önce, 2010 yılı dünya özgürlük verilerine bir göz atmakta fayda vardır.

**Tablo 6. Dünyada Özgürlük Dağılımı 2010**

Ülke	Nüfus	İnsan Hakları	Politik Haklar	Özgürlük Düzeyi
Lübnan	3,876,000	3	5	Yarı Özgür
Kuveyt	2,985,000	4	4	Yarı Özgür
Fas	31,495,000	4	5	Yarı Özgür
Mısır	78,629,000	5	6	Özgür Değil
Cezayir	35,370,000	5	6	Özgür Değil
Bahreyn	1,217,000	5	6	Özgür Değil
Umman	3,108,000	5	6	Özgür Değil
Katar	1,409,000	5	6	Özgür Değil
BAE	5,066,000	5	6	Özgür Değil
Yemen	22,880,000	5	6	Özgür Değil
Ürdün	5,915,000	5	6	Özgür Değil
Irak	30,047,000	6	5	Özgür Değil
Tunus	10,429,000	5	7	Özgür Değil
İran	73,244,000	6	6	Özgür Değil
Suudi Arabistan	28,687,000	6	7	Özgür Değil
Suriye	21,906,000	6	7	Özgür Değil
Libya	6,283,000	7	7	Özgür Değil

**Özgür: 1.0-2.5**

**Yarı Özgür: 3.0-5.0**

**Özgür Değil: 5.5-7.0**

Kaynak: House, 2010

<sup>9</sup> Zawara Beyanı: Libya devlet başkanı Muammer Kaddafi’nin, 15 Nisan 1973’te yaptığı açıklama. Bu açıklama ile “Üçüncü Evrensel Teori” olarak adlandırdığı Sosyalizm ve İslam’ın birleşimi bir ideolojiyi duyurdu.

Nitekim, zenginliğin huzur ve halk memnuniyeti için yeterli olmadığı bu örnekte de dünya mutluluk endeksinde de görülebilmektedir.

**Tablo 7. Mutluluk Endeksi 2010-2012**

Küresel Sıralama	Ülke (156)	Mutluluk Puanı (max 7693)
14	BAE	7.144
23	Umman	6.853
27	Katar	6.666
32	Kuveyt	6.515
33	Suudi Arabistan	6.480
73	Cezayir	5.422
74	Ürdün	5.414
78	Libya	5.340
79	Bahreyn	5.312
97	Lübnan	4.931
99	Fas	4.885
104	Tunus	4.826
115	İran	4.643
130	Mısır	4.273
142	Yemen	4.040
148	Suriye	3.892

Kaynak: Photius, 2014

Tabloda da görüldüğü üzere; özgürlükler kısıtlı olmasına rağmen, ekonomik refahın olduğu toplumlarda mutluluk endeksinin diğerlerine oranla çok daha iyi olduğunu aşikârdır. Aslında rantiye devletler, halklarına özgürlüğü bile kısmi olarak satın alabilecek gücü vermektedir. Ülkelerindeki yaşamdan sıkılan ve daha liberal bir ortam isteyen vatandaşlar rahatlıkla başka ülkelere seyahat edebilmektedir, kendi ülkelerindeki şeri hukukun kısıtlamalarından para sayesinde kurtulabilmekte ve başka ülkelerin özgürlüğüne istediği müddetçe sığınabilmektedir. Bu insanlar zaten zengin olduklarından, gittikleri ülkelerde de özenle karşılanılmaktadırlar. Dolayısıyla Cidde sahillerinde rahatça dolaşamayan bir çift, istediği zaman ve istediği gibi Antalya sahillerinde dolaşabilmektedir.

Hayat memnuniyetine baktığımızda da benzer şeyi görebilmekteyiz. Kanada'nın 7.65 puanla zirvede olduğu Our World In Data platformunun aşağıda bulunan "Self-reported Life Satisfaction, 2010" listesinde de Bahreyn dışındaki Körfez rantiyelerinin gayet iyi seviyede olduğu aşikârdır.

Tablo 8.

Hayat Memnuniyeti	0-10
BAE	7.1
Katar	6.85
Kuveyt	6.8
Suudi Arabistan	6.31
Bahreyn	5.94
Libya (2011)	5.75
Ürdün	5.57
Cezayir	5.46
Tunus	5.13
Fas	4.38
Mısır	4.67
İran	4.77
Suriye	4.46
Fas	4.38
Yemen	4.35

Bahreyn'deki bu düşük puanın sebebiyse daha önce de belirttiğimiz gibi yönetimin Sünni, halkın çoğunluğunun Şii olmasından kaynaklanan rahatsızlıklardır. Nitekim Suriye'deki iç savaşın temeli de benzer bir olguya, halkın çoğunluğunun Sünni, yönetiminse Şii olmasına dayalı. Bugün Bahreyn'i diğer rantliye devletlerden daha aşağı konumda olarak görebiliriz fakat Bahreyn'in Suriye'ye dönüşmemesinin sebebi çok büyük oranda “rantliye” olmasına borçludur.

Rantliye devlet sadece halka para dağıtarak değil, aslında toplumda oluşturdıkları refahın etkilediği diğer pek çok etkenle de meşruiyetlerini sağlamlaştırmaktadırlar. Kişi başına düşen milli gelirleriyle ters orantılı olarak suç ve yolsuzluk endekslerinin olması bir tesadüf olmasa gerektir. Dünya Şeffaflık Örgütü'nün 2010'da yapmış olduğu “Yolsuzluk Algılamaları Endeksi” incelendiğinde (10 en temiz, 0 en kirli olacak şekilde), Körfez'in zengin ülkelerinin, Ortadoğu'nun ve bilhassa Arap Baharı'nı ağır atlatan diğer ülkelere oranla nispeten iyi seviyede olduğunu görebiliyoruz. Körfez'deki yolsuzluk büyük oranda monarşilerin gücünü sağlamlaştırmak için özel sektörü politik amaçlar uğruna kullanması veya muhalefeti bastırması için rüşvet kullanması üzerinde gelişir. Elbette iktidara yakın aile ve kabilelerin de ranttan nasiplenmesi bunda etkilidir. Fakat bu ülkelerin halkları da zengin olduğundan, bu durum diğer ülkelerdeki kadar aşırı olmamakla beraber göze batmamaktadır ve yolsuzluk halk tabakasına pek inmemektedir zira yoksulluğun olduğu yerde yolsuzluğun olduğundan, herkesin zengin olduğu bir yerde bu sık rastlanacak bir şey değildir.



Tablo 9. Yolsuzluk Algılamaları 2010


Küresel Sıralama	Ülke (178)	Puan (10-0)
19	Katar	7.7
28	BAE	6.3
44	Umman	5.3
50	Bahreyn	4.9
54	Suudi Arabistan	4.7
54	Ürdün	4.7
56	Kuveyt	4.5
66	Tunus	4.3
91	Fas	3.4
105	Mısır	3.1
110	Cezayir	2.9
134	Suriye	2.5
154	Yemen	2.2
154	Libya	2.2

Kaynak: International, 2011

Yolsuzluk ve yoksulluk arasındaki bağlantılar hem bireyi hem de işletmeleri etkiler ve her iki yönde de etkilidir: yoksulluk yolsuzluğa neden olurken, yolsuzluk yoksulluğu derinleştirir (Çakıroğlu, 2018). Yapılan çalışmalar fakir ülkelerin, genellikle daha yozlaşmış toplumlara sahip olduğunu göstermektedir. Yolsuzluğun ekonomik büyümeyi yavaşlattığı, bu nedenle de zaman içinde fakirliğin ortaya çıktığına ilişkin çalışmalar mevcuttur. Aynı zamanda, bizzat fakirlik de, yolsuzluklara sebep olabilmektedir (Meriç, 2004).

The Economist'in 2020 yılında yayınlamış olduğu bir yazıda, Arap gençlerine yaşamak istedikleri yer sorulduğunda önemli bir kısmı, “yolları asfaltlı”, “elektriği kesilmeyen” ve “polisi dürüst” Birleşik Arap Emirlikleri’ni tercih ettiğini belirtmiştir (Economist, 2020). Buradan da polise olan güvenin yine yolsuzluğun petrol aracılığı ile en aza indirgenmesinin bir sonucu olduğunu söyleyebiliriz. Bunun yanında, yine Arap gençlerinin ifadelerinden anlaşıldığı üzere altyapı faaliyetlerinin de halk üzerinde sağlanan meşruiyette etkili olduğunu söyleyebiliriz. Zira bugün birçok Ortadoğu ülkesinde trafik lambaları bile çalışmazken (bkz. Lübnan) ve temiz suya erişim zorlukla sağlanırken, Körfez rantiyelerinin ekonomisinin güçlü olması altyapı faaliyetlerinin kalitesinde ve sürekliliğinde büyük etki sahibidir. Dolayısıyla bu durum da yine meşruiyet açısından iktidarın elini güçlendirmektedir. Bir diğer sonuç ise suç oranlarında kendini gösterir.

Tablo 10. 2021-2022 Ortadoğu Ülkelerinin Suç Oranları



Kaynak: Review, 2022

137 ülke üzerinde yapılan suç araştırmalarında, rantiyeye devletlerin son sıralarda yer aldığını görmekteyiz. Bu da yine sadece bir tesadüf değildir. 2016'da literatürde yer alan suçun nedenlerinin, uygulayıcı ya da öğretici olarak hukukla ilişkisi olan bireyler tarafından nasıl algılandığını araştırmak üzere içerik analizi yapılacak olan nitel bir çalışma planlanmıştır. Bu amaçla polis, hâkim, savcı, avukat gibi ceza adalet sisteminin uygulayıcılarının ve ceza hukuku, kriminoloji, hukuk sosyolojisi ve felsefesi öğretim üyeleri gibi suçun nedenleri ve oluşma koşulları hakkında düşüncelerin öğrenilmesine odaklanan hukuk öğretisi ile uğraşan katılımcıların görüşlerine başvurulmuştur. Ekonominin pek çok yönü ya da ekonomi teorisinden pek çok kelime suç işleme nedeni olarak katılımcıların görüşlerinde ifade edilmektedir. Katılımcılar, örneğin gelir dağılımı, işsizlik veya nitelikli bir mesleğe sahip olmama ya da yoksulluk veya gelir yetersizliği gibi ekonomi bilimine dayalı kavramları, özellikle mal varlığına karşı suçlarda, temel suç işleme nedeni ya da ilk suç işleme nedeni olarak düşünmektedirler (Tepecik, 2016).

Ortadoğu'nun geri kalanında şiddetle görülen ekonomik yetersizlik ve onun getirdiği işsizlik, fırsat eşitsizliği gibi durumlar insanları suça sürüklemeye büyük rol oynadığından, halkı zengin olan rantiyeye devletlerin suç oranı da oldukça düşüktür. Dolayısıyla toplum içinde, petrol aracılığıyla bir huzur ve güven ortamı yaratılmaktadır.

## V. Sonuç

Doğal olarak, Arap Baharı'nın "Ekmek, onur ve özgürlük" mottosunun 'Ekmek' kısmı Körfez'le ilişkilendirilmese de 'onur' ve 'özgürlük' için yolsuzluğa ve hak ihlallerine karşı pek çok kişi sokağa çıktı. Körfez ülkelerinde ise insanların "ekmek" gibi bir derdi yok, "özgürlük" ise kısmi olarak satın alınabilirdi. Petrol sayesinde nüfusun çoğunun petrol işçisi olması ve işsizliğin neredeyse yok denecek kadar az olması, dolayısıyla sadece vatandaşlarla paylaşılan petrol gelirlerinin az bir kesimle paylaşılması ve bu paylaşımın sonucunda toplumun sadece maddi değil manevi refahının, huzur ve

güven ortamının sağlanması da Körfez'in Arap Baharı'ndan sıyrılmasında hayati bir etken olmuş durumda. Yani rantıye devlet olmak, şimdilik Körfez monarşilerini ayakta tutmakta. Fakat petrolle ilgili yaşanabilecek herhangi bir krizde, halk o zamana değin alıştığı zenginlik ve rahatlıktan ödün vermesi gerektiğinde, bunun bir ayaklanma ve protestoya kapı aralama ihtimali bulunmaktadır. Yukarıdaki tüm veriler göz önüne alındığında, Orta Doğu ülkelerindeki barış için Rantıye Devletler üzerindeki örneğiyle, en azından kısa vadede ekonomik refahın tek başına yeterli olabileceği öngörülmekte. Fakat uzun vadede bu çok mümkün olmayacaktır. Evet; iyi bir ekonomi, yüksek gelir ve düşük vergiler bir halkın sesini kısma yetebilir ama kesmeye yetememektedir. Körfez şimdilik Arap Baharı'nı atlattmış ve halkın sesini kısmış durumdadır.

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**MINORITY RIGHTS OF COMMUNIST BULGARIA DURING DIMITROV AND  
CHERENKOV RULE (1946-1954)**

**Eray MUTLU<sup>10</sup>**

**Abstract**

Turkish existence in Bulgaria can be tracked by early 14th century. With the occupation of Ottomans, various Turkic and Muslim groups settled and migrated the area and established villages around meadows, rivers and fertile lands. According to 1881 Bulgarian census, 527,284 Turks were living in Bulgarian Kingdom and they were consisting 26 percent of total population. Such an enormous minority wouldn't be accepted by newly established Bulgarian Political Elite therefore oppression and assimilation process begun. That assimilation process gained velocity with the Communist Bulgaria and reached its peak in 1984. 1984 incidents resulted 1989 migration and today there're only consisting 8.8 percent of the population of Bulgaria. So far, several researches about Turkish Minority in Bulgaria published; lot more articles, books and documentaries about 1984 incidents and 1989 migration had published. Lot of criticisms and inquisitions had been made. However, almost nobody focused on what was the situation of minorities at the beginning of the communist rule. That little research may lead to uncovering the mystery of Turkish Minority on transformation period of Bulgaria. Because of that, in this article I focused on Turkish minority in Communist Bulgaria before the Zhivkov rule.

In 1944, when the Socialist Fatherland Front gained power and seized the government, they were aware of the importance of gaining support from minorities as well as Bulgarians. Therefore, Fatherland Front Committee took several measurements for defending the interests of Turkish Minority in Bulgaria. These measurements were welcomed by the Turkish Minority and they showed their support for Fatherland Front, Turkish Schools were reopened, newspapers and magazines on Turkish Language printed and most importantly Turkish and Bulgarian Citizens became equal in front of the law. Dualism among Turkish and Bulgarians were concluded and construction of a Socialist Utopia commenced. However, old habits won't conclude so easily and nationalistic instincts did not fade away. After the establishment of a stable regime the general opinion about Turkish Minority in Bulgaria drastically changed; as they are the biggest minority in the country, they should be assimilated and integrated into Bulgarian Society. Obviously according to Bulgarian Communists this cause was solely based on Socialistic Solidarity. It did not have any further nationalistic purposes.

Despite many promises and endeavours in order to achieve socialism and equality among all ethnic entities among Bulgarian Soil, nationalist policies and dreams did not fade away and these nationalistic instincts led to first massive Turkish Migration towards Turkey from Communist

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Bulgaria which it occurred in 1950-51. So that, in October 7th 1950, Turkey and Bulgaria signed a migration treaty and accordingly to this treaty, approximately 154.000 Turkish Nationals migrated to Turkey.

**Keywords:** Bulgaria, Communism, Nationalism, Turkish Minority, Minority Rights

## Özet

Bulgaristan'daki Türk varlığı 14. yüzyılın başlarına kadar izlenebilmektedir. Osmanlıların işgali ile çeşitli Türk ve Müslüman gruplar bölgeye yerleşerek göç etmişler ve çayırlar, nehirler ve verimli topraklar çevresinde köyler kurmuşlardır. 1881 Bulgaristan nüfus sayımına göre Bulgaristan Krallığı'nda 527.284 Türk yaşıyordu ve toplam nüfusun yüzde 26'sını oluşturuyorlardı. Bu kadar büyük bir azınlığın yeni kurulan Bulgar Siyasi Eliti tarafından kabul edilmemesi üzerine baskı ve asimilasyon süreci başlamıştır. Bu asimilasyon süreci Komünist Bulgaristan ile hızlandı ve 1984'te zirveye ulaştı. 1984 olayları 1989 göçüyle sonuçlandı ve bugün Türkler Bulgaristan nüfusunun sadece yüzde 8,8'ini oluşturuyor. Şimdiye kadar Bulgaristan'daki Türk Azınlığı hakkında çeşitli araştırmalar yayımlandı; 1984 olayları ve 1989 göçü ile ilgili daha birçok makale, kitap ve belgesel de yayınlanmıştır. Birçok eleştiri ve araştırma yapıldı. Ancak neredeyse hiç kimse komünist yönetimin başlangıcında azınlıkların durumunun ne olduğuna odaklanmadı. Bu küçük araştırma, dönüşüm sürecindeki Bulgaristan'ın Türk Azınlığının gizemini ortaya çıkarmamıza yol açabilir. Bu nedenle bu makalede, Zhivkov döneminden önceki Komünist Bulgaristan'daki Türk azınlığı üzerinde durdum.

1944'te Sosyalist Anavatan Cephesi iktidara gelip hükümeti ele geçirdiğinde, Bulgarlar kadar azınlıklardan da destek almanın öneminin farkındaydılar. Bu nedenle Anavatan Cephesi Komitesi, Bulgaristan'daki Türk Azınlığının çıkarlarını savunmak için çeşitli önlemler aldı. Bu önlemler Türk Azınlığı tarafından memnuniyetle karşılandı ve Anavatan Cephesi'ne desteklerini gösterdiler, Türk Okulları açıldı, Türkçe gazete ve dergiler basıldı ve en önemlisi Türk ve Bulgar vatandaşları kanun önünde eşit hale geldi. Türkler ve Bulgarlar arasındaki ikilik sona erdi ve Sosyalist Ütopya'nın inşasına başlandı. Ancak eski alışkanlıklar o kadar kolay sona ermeyecekti ve milliyetçi içgüdüler kaybolmamıştı. İstikrarlı bir rejimin kurulmasından sonra Bulgaristan'daki Türk Azınlığı hakkındaki görüş büyük ölçüde değişti; ülkedeki en büyük azınlık oldukları için asimile edilmeli ve Bulgar toplumuna entegre edilmeliydiler. Bulgar Komünistlerine göre bu davanın tamamen Sosyalist Dayanışmaya dayandığı açıktır. Başka milliyetçi amaçları yoktu.

Bulgar Toprağındaki tüm etnik oluşumlar arasında sosyalizmi ve eşitliği sağlamak için birçok vaat ve çabaya rağmen, milliyetçi politikalar ve hayaller sönmedi ve bu milliyetçi içgüdüler 1950-51 yıllarında Komünist Bulgaristan'dan Türkiye'ye ilk kitlesel Türk Göçü'ne yol açtı. Öyle ki, 7 Ekim 1950'de Türkiye ve Bulgaristan arasında bir göç antlaşması imzalanmış ve bu antlaşmaya göre yaklaşık 154.000 Türk Vatandaşı Türkiye'ye göç etmiştir.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Bulgaristan, Komünizm, Milliyetçilik, Türk Azınlık, Azınlık Hakları

## I. Introduction

Turkish existence in Bulgaria can be tracked by early 14<sup>th</sup> century. With the occupation of Ottomans, various Turkic and Muslim groups settled and migrated the area and established villages around meadows, rivers and fertile lands. According to 1881 Bulgarian census, 527,284 Turks were living in Bulgarian Kingdom and they were consisting 26 percent of total population. Such an enormous minority wouldn't be accepted by newly established Bulgarian Political Elite therefore oppression and assimilation process begun. That assimilation process gained velocity with the Communist Bulgaria and reached its peak in 1984. 1984 incidents resulted 1989 migration and today there're only consisting 8.8 percent of the population of Bulgaria. How did this decline happen?

Obviously, we know that there have been several migrations flows towards Turkey. Since the Bulgarian independence, Turkish inhabitants of Bulgaria forced to migrate or they accepted their position as second-class citizens (Şimşir, 1988). Of course, the Bulgarian Kingdom's assimilation and expulsion policies are understandable. The kingdom was emerged upon nationalist principles after all. However, some of the biggest migration flows towards Turkey occurred during 1950's and 1980's. That's interesting because Bulgaria was a communist state between 1946-1989 and as we know that communist ideology doesn't concerning with the nationalist issues. At that period, Bulgarian State should be based on class struggle, not clash of nations and nationalisms. This dilemma is fascinating because it also creates a dualism between communist idealism and nationalist roots of Bulgaria.

So far, several researches about Turkish Minority in Bulgaria published; lot more articles, books and documentaries about 1984 incidents and 1989 migration had published. Lot of criticisms and inquisitions had been made. However, almost nobody focused on what was the situation of minorities at the beginning of the communist rule. That little research may lead to uncovering the mystery of Turkish Minority on transformation period of Bulgaria. Because of that, in this article we will focus on Turkish minority in Communist Bulgaria before the Zhivkov rule. In this paper I will answer on;

How was the educational status of Turkish Minority at the beginning of the Communist rule? How communists elaborated the minority rights in their first constitution? What was the social, economic and most importantly their legal status of the Turkish minority during the Cherenkov and Dimitrov period?

These questions are all important and almost untouched by academicians and researchers. Thus, with some archive and translation work, a great contribution on both minority rights and Bulgarian Communist literature will be made. For answering these questions I will look at the Communist Literature about Nationalism, 1946 Dimitrov Constitution, various speeches had been made by Dimitrov and Cherenkov and lastly, the official reports from the Bulgarian Communist Party and Government.



This research will include three chapters. First Chapter will be examining the nationalism theories and Communist perspective on nationalism. Second Chapter will be examining the Bulgarian Nationalism during the early years of Communist Rule and the last chapter will look at the Turkish Minorities rights and situations during these period.

In order to understanding and evaluating the Bulgarian Nationalism and Communist Bulgaria's attitudes towards Turkish Minority, we must define the term "nationalism". Therefore, firstly we must seek to Nationalism and Balkan Nationalisms. Thus, our research will gain a theoretical frame and background and further questions with their answers will be more understandable for everybody.

## **II. What is Nationalism?**

Even there is still an ongoing debate about its definition, we must find a way to define and limit our research's scope. Thus, we will obtain another useful tool for drawing the framework of our research.

We may define nationalism as a two-step phenomenon. Firstly, nationalism as a consciousness; On that definition, nationalism starts as a simple identification process. Who is whom and what is mine, what is yours? In that situation nationalisms begun to construct their nations. Of course, there are kinship ties between families and ethine's however that kinship ties weren't instituted as larger communities before.

Secondly, nationalism as recognition; On that step national consciousness had awake and now it demands political recognition from their state. If these recognition demands are satisfied, then there is no problem, multi-ethnic harmony continues. But if these demands are opposed and nation is repressed by government and majority, then a clash of nations begin and separatist movements, self-determination demands etc became inevitable.

Both of these steps were exceeded before by Balkan Nations. Firstly they found their identities and then they started to demand for recognition from Ottoman and Austrian Empires. Their demands were not satisfied enough both of them therefore nationalistic separatist movements emerged. However even after their independence, these nationalistic sentiments remained in their agenda and it embedded on Balkan Nation's minds and reflexes.

For beginning the inspecting Balkan Nationalisms, firstly we should look at the Ottoman Millet System and its perspective on minorities. Ottoman Millet System is a pre-nationalistic Turkish understanding on the minority ruling. Ottoman State was emerged on Islamic rules, thus their understanding on citizenship was based on religion rather than nationality. Therefore, each Muslim was considered as a member of a Muslim Millet and each Orthodox was considered as a member of Rum Millet, regardless of their nationality. Generally, there is three Millet in Ottoman State; Jews, Armenians and Greeks. The highest-ranking religious authority of each religion elected by his community was responsible for organizing the affairs of his group, carrying out and managing the

legal affairs. With a certificate issued by the state to the religious chief, the chief's legal and administrative powers over his congregation were determined. Apart from managing the property of the community, the religious chiefs were also charged with conducting religious services, religious affairs, and collecting certain taxes from their communities. However, after the Tanzimat and Islahat Reforms, Ottomans strived for establishing a new Ottoman identity which is based on citizenship rather than religion or nationality. However, this struggle did not end well, most of the non-Muslim minorities gained their independence until the First World War, thus state became more and more homogeneous and Turkish Nationalism began to rise. However further and deeper examination of Ottoman Millet System and roots of Turkish Nationalism is not our cause and is far beyond our topic.

**A. How does Communists see Nationalism as?**

Early Communist writers such as Karl Marx, Engels, V.I. Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg had broad debates and impressive opinions about Nationalism. However, this point shouldn't be left behind; all of these writers were mainly focusing on Eastern Question and Polish Question. Because at that time, these two main questions were dominating the political and nationalist movements field.

Eastern Question means the "Who or what will replace the Ottoman Empire's place in the Balkans and Asia Minor". During 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries, Ottoman power and influence were diminishing. That demise led to this question and two main frontier actors began to compete against each other on filling this gap. Communists were focusing on these competition because all three actors on these question (Russia, Ottoman State and Austro-Hungarian Empire) were multi-ethnic and archaic empires on the point of view on the Communists. Neither Ottomans nor Russians were "industrialized" therefore their populations were far from "class consciousness". A struggle for overthrowing the bourgeoisie can not be imaginable for these countries. Thus, the Eastern Question became a focal point for the Marx and Engels.

Polish Question became popular with the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries. During that period, an independent Polish state didn't exist and its population and land were distributed by Russia, Germany and Austro-Hungarian Empire. As a relatively industrialized and educated minority, Poles were demanding independence from all of these three states despite the fact that their main target and arch nemesis were Russian Empire. However, despite Marx and Engel's firm stand for Eastern Question, Luxemburg and Lenin were thinking differently. Luxemburg was a staunch supporter for self determination as a democratic right. She argued that, every

Also Lenin noted that, even self-determination was a democratic right; Polish nationalism is something unnecessary. Because Russian workers have class consciousness and a revolution was at the doorstep. So that Polish separatism will only divide the joint struggle against bourgeoisie and capitalism. But at the other hand Lenin believes that, every nation has right to determine its future. Other means; decolonization. He argued that Capitalism's victory over feudal relations were linked

with the nationalist movements (Lenin, 1914). There must be a complete victory of Capitalism for establishing communism. Hence, Lenin realized that, decolonization will help the improvement of capitalism and it also establishes new national worker classes. Thus, these newly-established worker classes will create new struggles, as Marx and Engels theorised that “Workers do not have nationalistic sentiments, workers are international-minded and their struggle can only be achievable with uniting against common enemy. Workers of the world, unite.” Lenin was also considering that the nationalist “estrangement” among the proletarians were only a part of the legacy of autocracy of Russia. (Lenin, 1903). However, for a better and broader understanding for communist perspective and behaviour against minorities; we shall look at the Soviet Union’s practices.

### **B. How Soviet Union Elaborated the Minority Question?**

Traditional Communist understanding divides society into two segments; Bourgeoisie and Proletariat. Therefore, there aren’t much space for nationalistic divisions and separation. According to Communists, nationalism has no space in a Socialist Union. Hence, they argued that nationalism were only a tool for tearing down the Feudalism and establishing Capitalism. Therefore, as next step on the history; Socialist Countries doesn’t concern with the minority questions. However, the reality were far different from that.

As everybody may easily recognize, Soviet Union wasn’t unitary nor nation state. It was a federal and multi-national state. As successor of Russian Empire, Soviet Union were also multi-ethnic and as Marx describe “A prison for nations”. In this chapter we will examine the Lenin Constitutions and Stalin Constitution.

1918 Constitution (also known as Lenin Constitution), were the first constitution of Soviet Union. It includes six chapters and it became a precious paper about the fundamentals of Soviet answer on minority question. In the second article, constitution declares;

*“The Russian Soviet Republic is organized on the basis of a free union of free nations, as a federation of soviet national republics.” (Declaration of Rights of the Laboring and Exploited People, 1918)*

The description “free union of free nations” is deserving a connotation. First Soviet Constitution were respecting and recognising the self-determination as a right. After serious debates among Kautsky, Luxemburg and Lenin over self determination which we connotated in the previous chapter, Lenin’s understanding became triumphant and became the official understanding of Soviet Union. Also, in the third chapter Soviet Constitution hails the independence of Finland and self-determination of Armenia. *(Declaration of Rights of the Laboring and Exploited People, 1918)*

The 5<sup>th</sup> Chapter of Constitution consists the General Provisions of the Constitution of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic and in its 22<sup>nd</sup> article, Constitution declares that;

*The Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, recognizing the equal rights of all citizens, irrespective of their racial or national connections, proclaims all privileges on this ground, as well as oppression of national minorities, to be contrary to the fundamental laws of the Republic. (Declaration of Rights of the Laboring and Exploited People, 1918)*

That article is crucial for our research. That article is important because of it shows how Soviets sees the civil, as well as the minority rights. Also in the same constitution, Soviet Constitution guaranteed that every working citizen above age 18 has right to vote and to be elected disrespepecting to their sexes, nationality and origin.

However, it must be kept in mind that 1918 Constitution approved in the middle of a civil war and foreign military intervention. Therefore, Soviets needed to everybody's support on their struggle. So that these declarations may have differences with the real practices. For a better and more accurate understanding, we shall examine the 1936 Constitution.

In 1936 Constitution, which also known as Stalin Constitution; is first Soviet Constitution after the Civil War. About the civilian rights, 1936 Constitution wasn't much different from the 1918 constitution. In 123<sup>rd</sup> article, constitution declared that;

*Equality of rights of citizens of the U.S.S.R., irrespective of their nationality or race, in all spheres of economic, state, cultural, social and political life, is an indefeasible law.*

*Any direct or indirect restriction of the rights of, or, conversely, any establishment of direct or indirect privileges for, citizens on account of their race or nationality, as well as any advocacy of racial or national exclusiveness or hatred and contempt, is punishable by law. (Fundamental Rights and Duties of Citizens, 1936)*

### **C. Role of Constitutions on Nationalism's**

Constitutions are naturally nationalistic documents. They are striving for unifying the nation under the same rules and same obligations. However that nationalism is not always ethno-centric or irredentist. They are mostly considering their inhabitants as a whole (citizen) and elaborates the nationality question via this. However that inclusivist understanding may be tricky. Nation-States sometimes accepts only one ethnic group as "natural inhabitants" thus, "true citizens". With this understanding, ethnic minorities are excluding from the bureaucracy followed by expulsion of their society. 1990 Croat Constitution is one of the most significant and recent example of this kind of "Constitutional Nationalism". In this constitution, Croatians assumed as sole rightful citizens of the newly formed Croatian State and constitution neglected Serbian minority, it must be underlined that Serbians were consisting %13 percent of the population of Croatia (Hayden, 1992). However, examination of nationalism in former Yugoslav republics are beyond this paper therefore I will continue with Bulgarian Nationalism.

About Bulgarian Constitutional Nationalism; Croatian kind of constitutional nationalism never implied by Bulgarian Governments. They always had to respect Turkish minority's rights and their existence. However its not deriving from the good will of Bulgarians or Turks; it was deriving from bilateral and multilateral treaties and the Turkish Minority's competitive population advantage. Thus Bulgarian government were mostly in favour of migration movements. Finally after the 1971, with the Zhivkov Constitution Bulgarians saw an opportunity to oppress the minorities and forcefully assimilate them. Until then; Turkish Minority in Bulgaria were enjoying the same rights as Bulgarians.

### III. Fundamental Documents About Turkish Minority in Bulgaria Until 1954

Turkish minority in Bulgaria became an issue with the establishment of independent Bulgaria in 1878. Thereof, in Berlin Peace Treaty, Bulgaria guaranteed the religious and political rights of all minorities including Turks (Kamil, 1989). With that promise, Turks gained the right of establishing their own religious organisations and continuing their connection with the Religious Authorities in Istanbul. In addition, an protocol was signed in Istanbul at 1909 to restating the obligations of both Ottoman and Bulgarian governments towards their minorities.

In 1918, with the end of First World War, Bulgaria signed the Neuilly Peace Treaty with the lose of Balkan Wars gains, Bulgaria also promised the freedom of minority schools, charity organisations, religious and social institutions which belongs to minorities (Kamil, 1989). Fourth section of the Treaty was specialised for minority and minority-related issues. In Article 50

*Bulgaria undertakes to assure full and complete protection of life and liberty to all inhabitants of Bulgaria without distinction of birth, nationality, language, race or religion. All inhabitants of Bulgaria shall be entitled to the free exercise, whether public or private of any creed, religion or belief, whose practices are not inconsistent with public order or public morals.* ("Treaty of Neuilly - World War I Document Archive", 1918)

Also in the Article 57,

*All Bulgarian nationals shall be equal before the law and shall enjoy the same civil and political rights without distinction as to race, language or religion. Difference of religion, creed or profession shall not prejudice any Bulgarian national in matters relating to the enjoyment of civil or political rights, as for instance admission to public employments, functions and honours, or the exercise of professions and industries. No restriction shall be imposed on the free use by any Bulgarian national of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, in religion, in the press or in publications of any kind, or at public meetings.*

With these articles, Bulgaria promised to give equal rights to minorities, also Neuilly Peace Treaty and its articles were on a higher priority over domestic law and regulations. Thus in post war Bulgaria minority rights were under protection of international law. However, Turkish minority's

rights were also set on table in 1925 Turkish-Bulgarian Friendship Treaty and in its protocol; section A, Bulgaria re-stated its obligations and promises about Turkish Minority's rights on Neuilly Peace Treaty while Turkey re-states its promises about minority rights, especially minority schools' issue in Lausanne Peace Treaty ("Treaty of Friendship Between Bulgaria and Turkey", 1925). Therewithal, Turkish Minority's rights also protected with 1879 Tirnova Constitution.

According to 1878 Berlin Treaty, a prince shall be elected by the citizens of Bulgaria immediately. Of course as the citizens of Bulgaria, all minorities had equal right to determine this prince and affect the election ("Treaty between Great Britain, Germany, Austria, France, Italy, Russia, and Turkey for the Settlement of Affairs in the East: Signed at Berlin, July 13, 1878", 1908). Therefore, after the election of Bulgarian Prince-King, Tirnova Constitution adopted. Minority rights of this constitution was just as Berlin Treaty's conditions. 40, 41, 57, 60, 65, 67, 73, 74, 75, 78, 83 and 86<sup>th</sup> articles of constitution were covering minority rights. As sum, these articles provided the same equal rights to all citizens of Bulgaria disregarding their religion or ethnicity. When the Soviet Red Army liberated the country, this constitution had to change. Following chapters will focus on the Socialist Era of Bulgaria and its constitution.

#### **A. Turkish Socio-Economic Life Under the Communism**

According to 1946 census, 938.418 Muslim were living in Bulgaria. 476.334 of them was male and 462.084 were female (*Prebroyavane na naselenieto na 31 dekmvri 1946* з, 1949). They were mostly agrarian people and they organised around villages. According the same census, 92,881 of Turks were lived in cities while 582,619 of them were living in rural areas. Turkic population was concentrated around South-eastern Bulgaria (Кърджали) and North-eastern Bulgaria (Лудогорие). When the communist regime established, new leaders of Bulgaria quickly understand the importance of public support from all aspects of citizens. Therefore, However, when the newly established socialist regime became really socialist, it became a problem to agrarian Turks. During 1951, the Law on Property was passed. Article 2 provides for two kinds of property: socialist property which belongs to the State, to the co-operatives or other social organizations, non-socialist property which may belong to private individuals; private ownership is allowed for some less important goods which are used by the owner as a means of production or as personal commodities (Dolapchiev, 1953). Accordingly with the establishment of farming collectives (TKZS), especially the farmers in Dobrudja region forced to gave up their lands and work in these collectives (Wachtel & Akkoyunlu, 2010).

#### **B. Educational and Religious Freedom of Turkish Minority Under the Communism**

Turkish Community's religious and literacy rights had always under the protection of bilateral and multilateral treaties between Bulgaria and other guarantor states. As I have already pointed out, even in 1878 Berlin Congress and its descendant Tirnova Constitution provided religious freedom and gave

“private school” status to Turkish Minority schools. However during the Tsar Boris and its personal dictatorship period, these schools were closed. When the Fatherland Front took the reign and established Communist Rule over the country, Turkish minority began to organise meetings and they demanded the restoration of their old educational and religious freedom which was taken by the Tsar Boris. they gave a special attention to rights of Turkish Minority.

Hence, on 27 and 28<sup>th</sup> of December 1944, Fatherland Front Committees of the Turks in Bulgaria held Turkish Minority Conference in Sofia and they demanded their old rights. 200 Turkish delegates attended this conference. Nabi İbrahimoglu was elected as chairman and İbrahim Muharremoglu and Mehmet Arifoğlu were elected as Assistant Chairmen in the conference. Muhittin Kadioğlu, Hüseyin Şakiroğlu and Ata Ömeroğlu served as secretaries (Şimşir, 1988). Most of these rights were suspended during 1930’s accordingly to rising of Turkish-Bulgarian antagonism (Barlas & Köksal, 2014). Their demands may be grouped in three sections:

1. Problems related to education
2. Problems related to pious foundations (endowments)
3. Religious issues

These demands listed as 28 articles and most comprehensive part of them was educational matters with 16 article. As summarising the Educational Matters, Turkish Minority demanded the compulsory education for both Turkish boys and girls; Lectures in mother tongue; Turkish directors for Turkish schools; retirement rights for Turkish teachers and school staff; Right to admit a higher educational institution; Turkish lectures in new Latin alphabet; one hour per week of religious education; opening new teacher’s training schools and most importantly, they demanded their old school buildings, school fields and all property which expropriated from Turkish minority during the Zveno Government and Tsar Boris’s reign (Şimşir, 1988).

When we look at the Demands About the Pious Foundations and Endowments this chapter included 6 article and they basically demanded return of the expropriated Vakf property and Muslim Gypsy’s exclusion from being elected for Muslim Community Administrations. They also demanded financial inspection to Muslim Community Administrations and corruption should be penalized on these foundations.

Last chapter on these demands are regarding Religious Problems. Just as suspension and violation of Educational Rights in Bulgarian Kingdom in 1930’s, Religious Freedom and Rights were also violated and suspended by Zveno Government. Turkish Minority’s Demands concerning the Religious Affairs are mostly related with the officials of Zveno Administration and Chief Mufti. They demanded the removal of current Chief Mufti as he was served as a tool for fascist administration. According to Turkish Minority, Chief Mufti must only deal with religious affairs and he must be

highly cultured and must enjoy the trust and love of the Muslim Community Dunavski Otechestven Front Newspaper 5.1.1945.

Educational matters of Turkish minority was a serious issue for newly established Socialist Regime. Turkish demands displayed that the sole path to gaining support and compliance from Turkish minority was passing from improving educational rights and situation of Turkish minority. Thence a massive literacy and schooling campaign commenced right after the nationalisation. This campaign was aiming the put an end to illiteracy among the Turkish Minority until the 1953. Accordingly to this goal, new Turkish Schools were opened, between 1944 and 1950; 775 schools were opened, student capacity rose up to 63,041 students and 2166 new teachers were hired (Şimşir, 1988).

#### IV. 1946 Dimitrov Constitution and Minority Rights

Accordingly to Turkish Minority's demands in 1944, a new constitution established in late 1946. 1946 Constitution was based on 1936 Stalin Constitution.

In the 6<sup>th</sup> Article, matter 56. Bulgarian Constitution provided equality on the court for all of its citizens. Also the 7<sup>th</sup> article regulates the rights and responsibilities of citizens of Bulgaria (*Osnovni prava i zadulzheniya na grazhdanite*, 1947). In this article, especially matters 71<sup>st</sup>, 72<sup>nd</sup>, 73<sup>rd</sup>, 75<sup>th</sup>, 76<sup>th</sup>, 77<sup>th</sup>, 78<sup>th</sup>, 79<sup>th</sup>, 80<sup>th</sup> and 81<sup>st</sup> are important for Turkish rights because they are directly concerning their minority rights under the cover of citizenship rights. As Bulgaria was a Socialist state at that time, there's no distinction among Bulgarian Citizens in the constitution. The following section will be examining most crucial matters of these important matters. 71<sup>st</sup> matter of Bulgarian Constitution declared that citizens of the People's Republic of Bulgaria are equal before the law. Therefore, no privileges based on nationality, origin, religion or property status are recognized. Also, any preaching of racial, national or religious hatred is punishable by law (*Osnovni prava i zadulzheniya na grazhdanite*, 1947).

78<sup>th</sup> matter of Bulgarian Constitution was guaranteeing the conscience and religious freedom as well as the freedom to perform religious rites. Also a special law regulates the legal situation, the issues of material support, as well as the right to self-regulation and self-government of the various religious communities.

Obviously the 78<sup>th</sup> matter was mentioning Muslim Minority by addressing "various religious communities". 79<sup>th</sup> matter of Bulgarian Constitution was concerning educational rights of Bulgarian Citizens. According to this article "Education is secular, democratic and progressive. National Minorities has right to get educated in their mother tongue and to develop their own culture and the study of Bulgarian Language is mandatory Primary education is compulsory and free. The schools are public. Only a law can allow the establishment of private schools, but in this case they are under state supervision. The right to education is ensured through schools, educational institutes, universities, as



well as through scholarships, dormitories for students, support and special incentives for those who have shown gifts.” (Osnovni prava i zadulzheniya na grazhdanite, 1947)

79<sup>th</sup> matter of the constitution was both supporting the cultural consciousness and minority integration to Bulgarian Society at the same time. Also, the minority school’s “Private Schools” status was revoked in 1946 in order to Nationalisation of Education. This nationalisation process encoded with the “Law Appended to the Bulgarian National Education Law”. According to this law, Turkish Schools will remain to be called “Minority Schools” and they remain to provide education for Turkish Students. However, from now, they are public schools; Turkish Minority doesn’t have right to open its own schools and existing ones were transferred to the state (Şimşir, 1988). Bulgarian Government claimed that nationalization of these old-fashioned minority schools will be beneficial for Turkish Minority, their infants and their teachers. In fact, this nationalism process is begun with the introducing new set of rules and regulations in 1945. According to these new set of rules; Turkish Schools are not equal to Bulgarian Schools, so that there should be an inequality among graduates from Turkish and Bulgarian Schools. In order to proving their equivalence, bearers of Turkish School diplomas should be examined in Bulgarian Schools and if they fail these exams, their diplomas will be revoked from them. According to Bulgarian government, nationalisation of these minority schools is the only way to achieve this equalisation (Bulgarian Official Gazette, 11 May 1945.).

Indeed, they had a point; Turkish Minority Schools were deprived, poorly-equipped and their schoolbooks were mostly incompatible with contemporary issues and Socialist Ideas (Şimşir, 1988). However, it must be remembered that “Private Schools” issue was also dwelled on in the 1909 Istanbul Protocol and 1918 Neuilly Peace Treaty. This nationalisation process was a direct violation of these treaties.

## **V. Conclusion**

The general opinion about Turkish Minority in Bulgaria was; as they are the biggest minority in the country, they should be assimilated and integrated into Bulgarian Society. Obviously according to Bulgarian Communists this cause was solely based on Socialistic Solidarity. It did not have any further nationalistic purposes (Çolak, 2013).

Despite many promises and endeavours in order to achieve socialism and equality among all ethnic entities among Bulgarian Soil, nationalist policies and dreams did not fade away and these nationalistic instincts led to first massive Turkish Migration towards Turkey from Communist Bulgaria which it occurred in 1950-51. So that, in October 7<sup>th</sup> 1950, Turkey and Bulgaria signed a migration treaty and accordingly to this treaty, approximately 154.000 Turkish Nationals migrated to Turkey. Émigré’s had to leave their lands, properties and farm animals in order to migrate Turkey (Kamil, 2016). These migrations recurred in 1970’s and 1980’s because after the Georgi Dimitrov reign, Bulgarian Government had a whole different attitude towards minorities. Unfortunately,

Zhivkov era is beyond our topic so that I shall conclude my paper with this famous quote; “Communists underestimated the influence of nation-based identities, nationalism is the historic failure of Socialism.

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## PRE-COLONIAL INFLUENCE ON INDONESIA'S POSTCOLONIAL HYBRID ISLAMIC ECONOMIC SYSTEM UNDER AUTHORITARIANISM

Arya W. WIRAYUDA<sup>11</sup>

### Abstract

In the last few decades, the history of Islamic economics in Indonesia has become the subject of a reasonably rapid study. Several works have examined the aspects and influence of Islamic economics on the Indonesian economy. However, several other elements are still being studied, mainly how systems other than those originating in the West also affect the postcolonial financial system under authoritarianism. This paper investigates the pre-colonial influences struggling with economic regulation that shaped the practice of hybrid Islamic economics under the authoritarian regime in modern Indonesia. In particular, the practice of Islamic economics was adapted among other economic models. This study uses historical methods with insights from economic and policy studies of hybrid economic systems. This article discusses the gaps in analyzing the contribution of pre-colonial economic practices to Indonesian authoritarianism. Through Indonesian terminology, instead of Arabic, the Islamic economic system was adapted to the old order government when looking for an economic system as a new country and the new order as a period of strengthening the Islamic economic system to accelerate economic growth.

**Keywords:** Pre-colonial influence, Islamic economy, Hybrid economy, Indonesian authoritarianism, Postcolonial regulation

### I. Introduction

Before colonialism entered Indonesia, the community had carried out economic activities based on tradition, both locally sourced and due to the influence of the entry of Hinduism, Buddhism, and Islam. The Hindu-Buddhist economic system that was implemented around the 4th-15th centuries centered on the king as God; all economic resources belong to the king (Tauchid, 2020: 23-30). As a result, several vital professions emerged: farmer, fisherman, potter, and miner (assistant for river crossing by boat). In addition, early trade routes outside the archipelago were introduced and developed. Economic activity began to be based on the exchange rate of coins, although the legacy of pre-Hindu-Buddhist barter transactions was still carried out. However, during the Islamic empire, the basic concept of economic activity changed with the note that several other kingdoms were still the same as the Hindu-Buddhist royal tradition of the concept of ownership in the world. In general, Islamic teachings modify the concept of the king as a representative of God, which causes the basic structure of economic activity to change in several ways (Setiawati, 2011: 10-14).

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The rich history and cultural diversity added references to develop Indonesia's economic practices until the post-independence period. Economic and financial practices integrated with religious, socio-cultural, and customary values dynamically develop in the economic sector, social finance, public finance, monetary economy, and international trade. The integration of value systems, state administration, and economic practices in postcolonial Indonesia has become a unique reality. The traditions and economic system of postcolonial Indonesia were chronologically influenced by pre-colonial culture and religion, such as local religion, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Islam. Indonesians have built dynamic narratives with diverse ideological interests, state administration, and economic structures. The conversion and domestication of Islamic teachings became one of the significant factors in developing economic practices (Abdullah and Djanuderadjat, 2015), both those that started with the Puritans and which were a product of a combination that was impossible in other Muslim countries. At the same time, much of the Indonesian system inherited colonial goods. Papers have been produced to explore how Indonesia's Islamic economy has developed (Ali, 2004; Hefner, 1996; Rahardjo, 1993; Tauchid, 2020; Wasino, 2010; Maula, 2021; Anwari, 2019; Buresh, 2002; Ryandono, 2018; Syarifuddin and Sakti, 2020). However, Indonesia's postcolonial hybrid Islamic economic system under authoritarianism from 1959 to 1998 has not been discussed.

Reconstruction and understanding of Indonesia's economic history ignore historical perspectives from within the locus of past events (Purwanto, 2010: 136), placing the Islamic economic system outside Indonesia's modern economic system. In fact, for a long time, Boeke's writing (1953) on economic dualism has also provided an opportunity to examine economic practices outside the government system. They are very likely loaded with cultural and Islamic values. This article examines chronologically Islamic economic activities in Indonesian society, which were influenced by pre-colonial culture and religion in the postcolonial period through historical methods with economic insights and policy studies. Separating pre-colonial and colonial heritage in the Indonesian economic system is challenging because some pre-colonial heritages have been mixed into colonial heritage in a new form. Therefore, the concept of heritage helps explain the form of habit in carrying out Islamic economic activities, both structurally and culturally.

## **I. Method**

Several papers have used hybrid economic analysis. However, the writing of Indonesia's economic history that takes this point of view has not been carried out, especially concerning policy studies of the authoritarian period. In this analysis, the central issue is the robustness of the hybrid economy that focuses on production and income sources. The state mainly supplies direct income, while the customary sector mainly provides calculated income. Markets are widely liberalized while the political and legal systems remain autocratic. The government has a dual role as an authority and a player in commercial activities, providing various policy support, capital, and network access. In a hybrid

economy, companies combine government support and private efficiency. To understand this complex question, looking at the mixed economies and possible development paths and seeing how it performs over time is the best solution (Chen, 2009). Although not an Islamic country, Indonesians have long practiced Islamic economics, with various and perhaps not meant to worship God only for centuries. Some of these are also internalized into conventional economics.

Therefore, a hybrid economic system is an inevitable reality in postcolonial Indonesia. In line with the habits of the Indonesian people, who mix and compromise many cultures, the hybrid economic system is one of the main routes for strengthening economic development. Traditional economic activities occur not only to meet the needs of individuals and groups but also for export purposes facilitated by the state. Communities continue traditional economic practices, which are then supported by the state through a series of regulations and policies.

Implementing Islamic economics is exciting to highlight under authoritarianism in the postcolonial era because it was a part of the search for national identity discourses. Moreover, Islamic groups contribute to economic policies in Indonesia, which tend to be hybrid. Thus, the ability to negotiate dynamically between ulama and politicians under the authoritarian regime of 1959-1998 colored economic regulation. In addition, the idea of a state based on Pancasila, which rejects the “obligation to apply Islamic law,” impacts the economic system.

## **II. Result**

### **A. The Economic System of the Islamic Empire in Indonesia**

Despite the lengthy debate, Islam began to enter Indonesia around the 7th century AD from the Middle East, India, and Turkey. From the 9th century to the 21st century, Islamic kingdoms emerged before and after colonialism. Most of these kingdoms implemented Islamic economics in various forms due to the interpretation and mixing of pre-Islamic and colonial influences. Therefore, for centuries, other influences of Islam began to change the habits of people who still adhere to Hinduism and Buddhism or were mixed with dynamism. It has been acculturated and has become one of the central community's economic cycles even up to the postcolonial period (Wirayuda, 2019; Laki, 2021).

Although some historical sources mention Islamic kingdoms in the archipelago that implemented an Islamic economy, there are only a few critical explanations of how the concept of Islamic economics applied before independence in 1945 influenced postcolonial Indonesia. The combination of local cultural elements and Hindu-Buddhist heritage in economic activities, especially religious rituals, such as celebrating marriage, birth, age, and death. At the level of the center of power, implementing Islamic economic activities also affects financial circulation, thereby affecting

social and public finance activities, the real sector economy, and public finance. Some areas that applied syncretic Islamic economic practices before the colonial period inspired the sustainability of society in the long term, such as the kingdom of Gowa, which continued to develop the teachings of Islamic law even though it still applied old habits. Likewise, the main points of Islamic teachings in the Kingdom of Bone, which until 1644, Islamic law had been firmly rooted. Even in the Wajo Kingdom, Islamic economics has banned usury<sup>12</sup> and *boto*,<sup>13</sup> as well as regulating the administration of zakat and the *Kenduri*<sup>14</sup> (Mattulada, 1996: 258). In addition, the Islamic kingdoms that still existed after Indonesia's independence in 1945, such as Yogyakarta, Surakarta, Cirebon, Kanoman, Ternate, and Deli, had different forms of application as a result of a compromise with the national economic system.

Although Muslims in Indonesia have inherited influences outside of their religion, Islam has been the source and energy of socio-economic change for centuries. Society has practiced Islamic economics even during the Western conquest. For example, Islamic family law includes the practice of muamalat. Some Muslims in Indonesia have made this practice part of their custom for centuries. The Acehnese, for example, understood that Islamic law and customary law could not be separated because they are closely related to the relationship between the substance and nature of an item or object. The Minangkabau community also understands that customary law and Islamic law are very close and mutually supportive because the existing adat<sup>15</sup> is sharia. In public finance activities, community activities were reflected in the practice of zakat, which was practiced during the kingdoms where the official royal institutions were managed. Income from zakat is then managed for various social purposes, especially handling the poor. In addition, foreign exchange income was obtained because the kingdom also conducts domestic and international commercial business (export-import). Taxes at the port (generally in the form of 'tohl' or trade excise) and commercial profits even were made by the kingdom (mustaghlat). In addition to the sources of income above, royal income comes from inheritance from people who have no heirs or from foreigners who died in the kingdom's territory. The kingdom also receives funds or gifts from the people. Furthermore, the Islamic kingdom, especially the ulama as muftis, accepted the use of currency that was not only made of precious metals (gold and silver) but also tin and copper, although several community groups also carried out barter (Syarifuddin and Sakti, 2020: xv-xvi).

Traditional economic practices influenced colonial and postcolonial policies, such as credit strengthening (Wasino, 2010: 251). People's credit through banks was one of the economic policies of the Dutch colonial government in the early twentieth century. Credit policies have significantly

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<sup>12</sup> Interest on receivables.

<sup>13</sup> Traditional gambling.

<sup>14</sup> The royal feast.

<sup>15</sup> Customary law.

changed the way people think. The practice of free market-based capitalistic bank “interest” is becoming popular. The promotion that state banks are cheaper to pay than traditional money lending has increased the lower middle class who feel they have fallen into the trap of borrowing from conventional public credit institutions. However, these bank loans run parallel to traditional credits, such as in the form of loan sharks.

## **B. Postcolonial Hybridization**

The application of Islamic economics in the early days of independence was problematic and continued formally and informally for decades afterward. Another colonial and pre-colonial legacy that has a place among politicians was the most crucial factor in the formation of Indonesia’s complex economic system. Most of Indonesia’s founders with Western educational backgrounds also dynamically encouraged the large-scale adoption of the colonial economic system. Colonial heritage, especially from the Netherlands, manifested in economic institutions, such as trading companies, plantation companies, mining systems, oil companies, banking systems, and processing industries, or those closely related to state institutions (Booth, 2016; Anwari, 2019; Maula, 2021). The colonial heritage of Britain and Japan was no more influential in this regard. Although most of the West was associated with colonialism, some Western values suggested otherwise. For example, the Indonesian Old Order, which was filled with pragmatic economists, also had to submit to the government’s general policies (Wie, 2005: xiiv). They were anti-colonial and anti-imperialist, all associated with the West while approaching the economic policies of Islamism, nationalism, and socialism. The problem was then dichotomized in two ways; on the one hand, political instability sustains economic uncertainty; on the other hand, economists or scholars also do not understand Islamic economics and apply it systematically in the state administration system. Several large Islamic organizations that existed long before Indonesia’s independence have been unable to convince massively, tend to issue personal opinions, and have weak cadres to strengthen Islamic economic thought.

Several proposals to implement an Islamic economy did not convince government officials how to implement an Islamic economic system. In this case, the flow of communication and knowledge transfer from Arab countries is also not a priority. In the early days of independence, Indonesia prioritized freedom in self-determination. Some critical Islamic figures have supported this, even if it had to be un-Islamic or if Muslims had to implement Islamic economics personally and locally. For example, KH. Mas Mansur, a Muhammadiyah figure, said an un-Islamic economic system could be implemented as quickly as in an emergency. However, several other figures, such as Yunus Anis, Chairman of PP Muhammadiyah, supported the implementation of Islamic economics in 1962 by emphasizing that the concept of the nation is related to the application of the concept of Islamic economics (Muhammadiyah, 2004). He emphasized that the fundamental vision of Islamic economics is a balance between the rich and the poor, a balance between the strong and the weak. At the



beginning of the new order, Muhammadiyah continued to apply Islamic economics. The Majelis Tarjih Muhammadiyah made decisions on banking law in 1968 and 1972, stipulating that usury is haram. The institution advised PP Muhammadiyah to realize the concept of an economic system, especially banking institutions, although it could not affect national significance. At its conference in 1969, Muhammadiyah identified interest as *mutasyabihat*, an unclear legal issue that needs to be examined more broadly regarding the banking system promoted by the New Order. Muhammadiyah recognizes that state banks (Bank Negara) have played an essential role in economic development, and Muslims cannot isolate themselves from the influence of banks. Meanwhile, Muhammadiyah allowed its members to transact with existing banks while urging them to build a more Islamic banking system (Muhammadijah, 1971: 308-312).

The diversity of viewpoints of Islamic figures in viewing Islamic economics is also interesting to observe. For example, Hatta, Indonesia's first vice president, saw Islam as moderated by Western values. Therefore, he proposed a cooperative economy. In addition, several figures who are members of the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia/ PKI) became the driving force for ratifying the 1960 Basic Agrarian Law. In real sector economic activities, traditional economic activities were reflected in agricultural activities that apply the principle of profit-sharing, the terms "maro"<sup>16</sup> and "mertelu"<sup>17</sup> (Syarifuddin and Sakti, 2020). In the late 1950s, the early days of Old Order authoritarianism, Islamic activists saw an opportunity to balance these concepts with Islamic economic values in the state system. Several figures had constructed discourse on strengthening the economic position of farmers in the eyes of the law. Their involvement was also a resistance to communist forces. Several legal products, such as the Agrarian Law (UU Principal Agraria/UPA) and profit-sharing laws, resulted from significant compromises of Islamic values, customary law, socialism, and communism (Wirayuda, 2011; Anggraini, 2016). The thought of Muhammad Natsir, one of the leading Muslim figures, referred to what was done by Caliph Umar bin Khattab RA. Natsir offered to build an outstanding economic concept to replace the colonial government's products loaded with capitalist values. However, Natsir's proposal is more practical than conceptual. The desire to internalize Islamic law into national land law in the 1960s was essentially the case. The plenary session that discussed the bill came from Muslim circles (Anggraini, 2016: 51-60).

The breath of Islam in the hybrid economic system during the New Order era was reflected in the empowerment or cooperation of economically vulnerable communities among community members, such as managing village rice barns (*Lumbung Padi*). For example, through village barns, rice barns will be used to help people in need, especially when hungry (Syarifuddin and Sakti, 2020: xv-xvi). Although several government policies, both during the colonial and postcolonial periods, influenced this economic practice, the tradition of accepting debt, known as loan sharks, continued

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<sup>16</sup> Profit sharing for two parties so that the results are half-half/50:50)

<sup>17</sup> Profit sharing for three parties

into the 1980s. Other practices due to the influence of animism, dynamism, Hinduism, and Buddhism, which became one of the axes of the community's economy informally even to the postcolonial period, were manifested in traditions and ceremonies. For example, Tahlilan and ceremonies were usually carried out to commemorate certain days, such as celebrating someone who has died (Abdullah and Adrisijanti, 2015). These facts are part of Islamic economics because they strengthen the trickle-down effect to force socio-culturally rich people and the government to maintain a series of activities. In addition, it allowed the relationship between philanthropy and Islamic economics to continue to take root and led to several Indonesian regulations better organizing these principles nationally. Other routine ceremonies related to the life cycle include birth, marriage, and death. They combine it with local customs.

As a more complex Islamic economic system, several mass organizations have also developed ideas about Islamic economics in the Indonesian context since the 1950s, including exerting a strong influence in several important decisions both on a national and regional scale (Dusky, 1956). In 1958, the government supported by providing a legal entity that examined and decided cases related to Islamic economics. Judges of the Religious Courts/Shari'ah Courts were advised to use several ancient books, most of which belong to the Shafi'i school. In addition, religious Court judges were advised to use the thirteen Yellow Books to guide decisions. Although it succeeded in reducing confusion in taking the legal basis, to strengthen the unity and certainty of interpretation, the idea emerged to compile a book that compiles the laws that apply in the Religious Courts, which can be used as guidelines by Religious Court judges.

The New Order government softened to the interests of Islam, who fought for economic values as long as they were not related to political interests. Bustanul Arifin then came up with the need to draft Compilation of Islamic Law (Kompilasi Hukum Islam/ KHI) in 1985. President Suharto played an essential role in designing the KHI, promoting it, providing private funding, and supporting the Islamic economy. This KHI is an agreement of scholars from various circles and was compiled through the study of 38 fiqh books from various schools by modern scholars and scholars from Aceh, Medan, Padang, Palembang, Bandung, Surakarta, Surabaya, Banjarmasin, Ujung Pandang, and Mataram. It was also produced through comparative studies in Morocco, Egypt, and Turkey. As a result, Indonesian Muslims have uniform fiqh guidelines, and it has become a profitable law that all Indonesian Muslims must obey. KHI is a positive Islamic law to implement the applicable laws and regulations. Consistency with higher legislation and used as a reference. KHI hierarchically refers to the Qur'an, Hadith, and applicable laws and regulations. In addition, the founders of KHI paid attention to global developments, the written Western legal order, and the customary law order that intersects with the Islamic legal order (Mughits, 2008; Himpunan Peraturan Perundangan-Undangan, 2011). At its peak, the influence of Islam in the postcolonial period grew with the establishment of Islamic banking. Another pre-colonial influence on the economy was also manifested in Islamic

boarding schools. Pesantren, in its name and concept, is referred to as a Hindu-Buddhist fusion. In the new order era, this educational institution implemented empowerment for students (santri) with assistance from several western countries and conditioned its management with clientelism, Kiai as patrons and santri as clients (Buresh, 2002).

### **C. Discussion**

The development of Indonesia's economic system in the postcolonial period under authoritarianism cannot be separated from the combination of various values and cultures in the pre-colonial period. The acceptance of most Islamic politicians, clerics, and government officials in the late 1950s and 1990s suggests that pre-colonial heritage can address the needs of the postcolonial economy and search for identity. Therefore, the hybrid Islamic economy represents monetary economic activity, social finance, public finance, and the real sector. The authoritarian government believes that the Islamic economic system is one of the supporters of stability in political and economic development, provided that the economic model must blend with other economic practices and support macroeconomic activities. Initially, the government facilitated and developed ideas through Indonesian terminology. However, at the end of the New Order era, the application of the Islamic economic model was more detailed, tended to use Arabic terminology, regulated nationally, and built a bank system. Several other studies are needed to deepen the Islamic hybrid economy in Indonesia. It would be significantly more specific fields such as agriculture, manufacturing, and several others, relating to how traditional economic activities based on Islamic values support the development of government exports.

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## IDEOLOGICAL WAR BEHIND THE DIVISION OF KOREA

Gizem GÜLER<sup>18</sup>

### Abstract

The Korean Peninsula was one of the most remarkable places of ideological power conflict between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the United States of America (USA), it was the first place that witnessed the hot war in the times of the Cold War. Also, there were no stable governments in the region since the Japanese invasion (1905) and the annexation of the Korean Peninsula (1910). In this research, I would like to look at the effects of the Cold War ideologies on the developments in the Korean Peninsula from a political geography standpoint. To be able to do my research first, I would like to describe the concepts and keywords related to the division of Korea. After describing the concepts, I would like to explain Cold War geopolitics in a broader sense, and then give some information about the historical events. Lastly, I will explain the link between the division of Korea and the ideological power conflict between the two superpowers; how the ideologies of communism and capitalism, which were the most powerful ideologies of its time, affected the fate of the Korean Peninsula in terms of political geography. I will refer to official archive materials, articles, and academic books about the subject in my study.

**Keywords:** Korea, Cold War, geopolitics, territory, power

### Öz

Kore Yarımadası, Sovyet Sosyalist Cumhuriyetler Birliği (SSCB) ve Amerika Birleşik Devletleri (ABD) arasındaki ideolojik güç çatışmasının en dikkat çekici yerlerinden biriydi, Soğuk Savaş zamanında sıcak bir savaşa tanıklık etmiş ilk mekândı. Ayrıca, Japon işgalinden (1905) ve Kore Yarımadası'nın ilhakından (1910) bu yana bölgede istikrarlı bir hükümet yoktu. Bu araştırmamda Soğuk Savaş ideolojilerinin Kore Yarımadası'ndaki gelişmelere etkilerine jeopolitik açıdan bakmak istiyorum. Araştırmamı yapabilmek için önce Kore'nin bölünmesiyle ilgili kavramları ve anahtar kelimeleri açıklamak istiyorum. Kavramları tanımladıktan sonra Soğuk Savaş jeopolitiğini daha geniş bir şekilde açıklamak ve ardından tarihi olaylar hakkında biraz bilgi vermek istiyorum. Son olarak, Kore'nin bölünmesi ve iki süpergüç arasındaki ideolojik güç çatışmasının arasındaki bağlantıyı; zamanının en güçlü ideolojileri olan komünizm ve kapitalizm ideolojilerinin siyasi coğrafya açısından Kore Yarımadası'nın kaderini nasıl etkilediğini açıklamaya çalışacağım. Çalışmamda konuyla ilgili resmi arşiv materyallerinden, makalelerden ve akademik kitaplardan yararlanacağım.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Kore, Soğuk Savaş, jeopolitik, bölge, güç

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## I. Definition of Concepts

First and foremost I need to describe the controversial concepts to be able to draw a framework for my analysis such as territory, boundary, power, ideology, and geopolitics. Some of the terms have been used for centuries, but some of them entered the dictionary with the nation-state building simultaneously. For example, the territory was defined as an area or land under the control of a specific ruling class and mostly included the same identity-people within it. Territory aroused from the cultural, and religious differentiation in the religious wars of Europe, and after the Peace of Augsburg (1555) “territory” gained importance as a primary rule of the sovereignty of a state. According to some scholars, the territory can only be a place where people gathered to be able to human-beings organizing their social life, some others say it is more than that, it represents the cultural and sociological sphere and power relations (Agnew, Mitchell and Toal, 2003). This research will focus on the latter.

Secondly, boundaries were used for describing the physical limits of a state, and the lines that enclose state territories (Agnew, Mitchell and Toal, 2003). So, again the term emerged with the nation-state era, so-called the Westphalian State. Before the formation of nation-states, boundaries were not that important and sometimes they were even not evident as in the Balkans. Boundaries represent identity; for this analysis, they represent ideology. Boundaries can be “natural” or “artificial”. For example, the Maritsa River is a natural border between Turkey and Greece; however, the 38th parallel in the Korean Peninsula is an artificial one because it is a strict line rather than a natural division such as a mountain or river (Johann Gottfried Herder).

Another term that is needed to be described is power. It means the capability of someone to do something. According to the description of Andrew Heywood (2013): “Power is the ability to achieve a desired outcome... In politics, power is usually thought of as a relationship; that is, as the ability to influence the behavior of others in a manner, not of their choosing...” (Heywood, 2013). First, power was in the hands of the clergy, after the Protestant Reformation, and later with the establishment of nation-states, power shifted from the hands of the clergy to the state authorities. This event created powerful sovereign states, and after World War II (WWII), it created a power struggle between the two biggest sides; capitalist America, and communist Soviets. According to my opinion, both wanted to become the hegemonic power, however, to be able to influence others they could not use religious differences, or ethnic differentiation as long as they want to influence the masses; they had one important feature to use as a connective of all different nations: Ideology.

This subject brings us to the definition of ideology. Again, according to Heywood (2013), ideology can be described as: “Coherent set of ideas that provides a basis for organized political action, whether this is intended to preserve, modify, or overthrow the existing system of power relations. All ideologies, therefore, offer an account of the existing order, usually in the form of a

‘world view’, provide a model of a desired future, a vision of the ‘good society’, and outline how political change can and should be brought about.” (Heywood, 2013). In this sense, it can be interpreted as the clash of ideologies in the Cold War as both of them have presented their way as the best; and to be able to show their ideologies’ supremacy they resorted to hard power from the end of WWII to the era of detente. The world was divided into two; small states which needed the help of one of the two hegemon powers had to approach one of them according to their national interests, even if they did not want to interiorize the ideology of that party they approached, eventually, they had to interiorize, if they desired to survive in the world order then.

Lastly, I will explain the concept of geopolitics. According to Harold James, it first came into vogue after the defeat of Germany in the First World War and has since come to be used as a rationalization for zero-sum conflicts (James, 2021). “Geopolitik” first came to life with Swedish politician Johan Rudolf Kjellen. He intended to construct an objective way to analyze the evolution of the power of states and to examine how this process affected interstate relations (Holdar, 1992). However, some German politicians used it for the aim of discrediting the Versailles Treaty which brought devastating conclusions to Germany. When Germany started to gain control in continental Europe in the pre-beginning of WWII with the invasions of Czechoslovakia and Poland, the phenomenon of “Geopolitik” raised up much interest in the media of the US, as it was deemed to be the secret behind the German success. However, geopolitics acquired a negative connotation because of expansionist Nazi Germany in WWII. So, it can be said that it had a close connection with ideology in the evolution of the term.

Geopolitics can be narrowly expressed with three subjects: Geopolitics is a type of analysis using data for specifying a country’s international position in light of its geographical features. Secondly, geopolitics is a set of rules applicable in conducting statecraft based on such analyses. Lastly, geopolitics is a discourse that describes a country’s position in the world, and the application of such rules. Geopolitics reflects the combination of geographic and political factors determining the condition of a state or a region and emphasizes the influence of geography and politics; says Zbigniew Brzezinski (1986).

## **II. Historical Background**

When it comes to the historical framework, it can be said that there are lots of maps, that include the Korean Peninsula, which were drawn by both Asians and Europeans; however, until 1950, none of the maps indicated Korea divided into two (Hayashi, 1785; Van Der AA, 1680; Buache and De L’isle, 1750; Menzies, 1815). Therefore, the division is not originated from social or cultural differences of the past. This brings us to the reasons for the “Division of Korea”.

The first Korean state was organized in 2,333 Before the Christian Era (Lew, 2000), and after the invasions of Moguls in the 13th century, Joseon Dynasty was established at the end of the 14th



century. Even in 1592 and in 1598 Japanese invasions weakened it, Joseon Dynasty ruled for roughly 500 years, till the 1905 Japan invasion. Until then, Korea was a unified country. Japan was fighting against Tsarist Russia in 1905 to be able to take over Manchuria and Korea. Because the Russian navy was weak and the railroad transportation was insufficient, Russia was defeated by Japan, and Japan took control of the place in 1905, both Manchuria and the Korean Peninsula. Then, annexed Korea entirely to its dominance with the Japan-Korea Annexation Treaty in 1910. Japan ruled in the region for 35 years (Lew, 2000).

When Japan was marching in the region during WWII, it was a threat to nearby countries, especially to the USA and the USSR. Japan held a successful operation over the American navy to prevent a possible American intervention in the Pacific in 1941. Later, on 6 and 9 August 1945, the USA dropped two bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Also in August 1945 the USSR attacked Japan for taking back Manchuria and won the battle. Despite Japan was a powerful country then, all these pressures both from the USA and the USSR were too heavy for it, and eventually Japan had to withdraw from the war, and from the Korean Peninsula (Lew, 2000).

After the defeat of Japan in WWII, Korea was divided into two from the 38th parallel. Because after Japan was disarmed, a lack of power occurred in the region, above the 38th parallel was taken over by the Soviets after the Japanese surrendered, and below the 38th parallel took over by the Americans. Both sides located in the peninsula right after Japan's withdrawal because they did not want to leave the whole country in the hands of the other side, to the other ideology. They wanted to remain in the region until a solution can be found. At the Cairo Conference in 1943, an agreement was reached by the participating powers, later adhered to by the Soviet Union, that Korea would become independent "in due course." (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947). After the war ended, in December 1945 Moscow Conference was held. First, a trusteeship plan was brought to the agenda, and when it was accepted by the USA, the USSR, China, and the United Kingdom it was a big disappointment for the Korean people who want independence immediately after the defeat of Japan. Later, a Joint Commission was constituted for deciding the fate of Korea. However, both sides were afraid of a unified Korea's joining the other camp, they did not want an independent or unified Korea, because they did not want to end their chance of dominating the region (Shin, 2008). Because of all these disagreements, a solution could not be achieved, and Korea remained divided.

### **III. Korean War and the Division of Korea**

The Korean War erupted while the Cold War was heating up. On June 25, 1950, the war officially began with the attack of North Korea on South Korea by passing the 38th parallel and capturing the capital, Seoul, to be able to militarily conquer South Korea and therefore unify Korea under the communist North Korean regime (Eisenhower Presidential Library, 2022). The war lasted for three years, and it had devastating consequences for both sides, especially for the people of Korea.

According to the viewpoints of the two sides, they could never be unified anymore, because they have been seeing each other as the enemy, or the hostile neighbor already.

After WWII, Korea was far away from the idea of establishing a unified nation-state, there were appointed governments by super-powers for controlling the region (Shin, 2008). North Korea's attack was not militarily supported by the Soviets, they did not send troops directly, however, they send material aid. On the other hand, Harry Truman thought that the USSR and China might have encouraged North Korea for this attack. That is why he immediately carried this issue to the United Nations (UN) to be able to attack back to Northern forces because he was nearly sure that South Korea could not survive without any military support externally. The UN Security Council passed an American resolution on the same day with nine affirmative and one abstain (Yugoslavia) votes. The veto mechanism did not work, because the Soviet representatives were protesting the lack of representation of the People's Republic of China (communist mainland China) in the UN, so the Soviets did not attend the meeting, because there were no veto votes, NATO, an international military alliance which was established on April 4, 1949, by the USA against the communist aggression to provide collective security of all member states, allowed to send troops to the Korean War. In the meeting on June 25, the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) **82**, the UN condemned the attack of North Korea and called for the cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of North Korean forces to the north of the 38th parallel. Two days later, on June 27, UNSCR **83** stated that North Korea's action was a breach of peace, and recommended UN members provide assistance to South Korea to repel the attack and restore peace on the Korean Peninsula. After that, on July 7, UNSCR **84** authorized the USA to establish and lead a unified command comprised of military forces from UN member states and authorized that command to operate under the UN flag (History of the Korean War). Within the sending troops, the American army was the majority, but there were also other countries that were not the members of NATO, such as; Turkey, Australia, Colombia, Ethiopia, Philippines, Thailand, and New Zealand. After all this pressure North Korea started to withdraw in September 1950 (United Nations Command)

Briefly, the USA wanted to intervene not to lose the whole peninsula to the communist camp, rather than thinking about the lives of Southern people, the USA sent troops there to be in the region as an important power that was balancing communist ideology there. The USA announced itself as the protector against communist ideology and legitimized NATO's intervention by the UNSCRs. Because none of the members used veto power as I mentioned above, the USA's offer was accepted, and to "maintain the peace" they allowed the first hot war in the years of the Cold War.

However, with China's entering into war, the balance of power changed a bit. At the end of 1949, the communist People's Republic of China took control of mainland China and drove out the nationalists from the continent, and they fled to Taiwan island. UN has acknowledged the government

on the island as China's representation, and they did not recognize communist mainland China till the 1970s<sup>19</sup>. However, mainland China declared that if UN forces pass the 38th parallel, they would allow the volunteer soldiers to go to the war by fighting along with North Korea. Therefore, after UN forces passed the 38th latitude China sent troops (or "volunteer soldiers" with its own words) to the Korean war on October 25. By the time of April 1951, China reached up until the 38th parallel, and passed the frontier, recaptured the capital of South Korea, Seoul. UN forces counterattacked, and eventually, the fight stalled around the 38th parallel. UN and communist forces fought sporadic battles for gaining control of the territory around the 38th Parallel. In the end, on July 27, 1953, the Armistice Agreement was signed at Panmunjom, temporarily ending all fighting. However, a permanent peace treaty has never been signed since then (Millet, A., 2022).

#### **IV. Conclusion**

In conclusion, both North and South Korea witnessed a horrible war even the only thing which divides them is the ideologies of the USA and the USSR, the Korean Peninsula witnessed the first hot conflict of the Cold War. Millions of civilians and soldiers died for the sake of capturing or defending their country. Both the USA and the USSR wanted to become the hegemonic power in the world and to shape the world order, so they fought not only against each other but also by using the small states they supported and they tried to establish their power in many parts of the world. Korean War was not an exception; in Vietnam, Cuba, Angola, or any other specific region in the years of the Cold War, the parties always supported the governments which close to their ideology, and they fought or made small states fight on behalf of their own.

Therefore, saying the USA and the USSR were the states which shaped the political geography is not wrong. The two of them were the main determining factors for the geography of Korea at that time, besides China and other UN countries, mostly the United Kingdom; they were pioneers in the decision-making about the political and geographical structures of today's Korea. The power conflict between the USA and the USSR affected the peoples' lives, states' formations, political cultures, and political geography of those states, not only in Korea but also in every region where their ideologies collided. This is an example that shows us the significance of the "ideological power conflict" of the Cold War on the Division of Korea.

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<sup>19</sup> Ping-Pong Diplomacy led to the recognition of mainland China by the USA in the years of Detente.

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## İBN-İ HALDUN DÜŞÜNCESİNDE KENT: GÜNÜMÜZ KENTLERİ KAPSAMINDA BİR DEĞERLENDİRME

Neşet KICIK<sup>20</sup>

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### Özet

Bu çalışmanın amacı, ilk aşamada İbn-i Haldun'un eserleri ve hakkında kaleme alınan ikincil kaynaklar incelenerek düşünür hakkında bilgi verilmesidir. İkinci aşamada ise İbn-i Haldun'un kentlerle ilgili görüşlerini inceleyerek düşünürün kentte ilgili saptamalarını belirlemektedir. Son olarak günümüz kentleri ile İbn-i Haldun'un düşüncesindeki kentler arasında bir karşılaştırma yapmaktır. Bu çalışmayı ortaya koyarken İbn-i Haldun hakkında kalem alınan eserler incelenerek bilgi toplanmıştır. Ayrıca İbn-i Haldun'un kentlerle ilgili saptamalarına ulaşmak için Mukaddime incelenmiştir. Toplanan veriler ve eserlerin incelenmesi sonucunda İbn-i Haldun ile ilgili bilgilere ve İbn-i Haldun'un kentlerle ilgili saptamalarına ulaşılmıştır. Bu ulaşılan bilgililer ve çalışmalar sonucunda İbn-i Haldun'un görüşlerindeki kent ile günümüz kentleri karşılaştırılmıştır. Sonuç olarak; İbn-i Haldun toplum yapısı, toplumsal bağlar, tarih gibi alanlarda önemli saptamalar ortaya koymuştur. Bu saptamalara ek olarak İbn-i Haldun, kentlerin sahip olduğu toplumsal, iktisadi, sosyolojik yapılara da değinmiştir. Ayrıca İbn-i Haldun kent yapısı ve kentlerle ilgili önemli uyarılarda bulunmuştur. Özellikle kentlerin inşa edilme aşamasında sağlık, yakacak beslenme, güvenlik, yönetim gibi değişkenlere dikkat edilmesi gerektiğini vurgulamıştır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** İbn-i Haldun, Ümran, Asabiyet, Kent, Kentleşme, Kentsel Gelişim, Kent Planlaması, Kent ve Çevre

### Abstract

The aim of this study, In the first step It is to give information about the thinker by examining the works of Ibn-i Khaldun and the secondary sources written about him. In the second step, It examines Ibn Khaldun's views on cities and determines the thinker's determinations about the city. Finally the aim of the study is make comparison between today's cities and the cities in Ibn Khaldun's thought. While presenting this study, information was gathered by examining the works written about Ibn Khaldun. Additionally, Mukaddime has been examined in order to reach the determinations of Ibn Khaldun about cities. As a result of the analysis of the collected data and works, information about Ibn-i Haldun and his determinations about cities were reached. As a result of this information and studies, the city in Ibn Khaldun's views and today's cities were compared. As a result; Ibn Khaldun

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made important determinations on issues such as social structure, social ties and history. In addition to these findings, Ibn Khaldun mentioned the social, economic and sociological structures of cities. Additionally, Ibn Khaldun made important warnings about urban structure and cities. Especially, Ibn Khaldun emphasized that during the construction of cities, variables such as health, fuel, nutrition, security and management should be considered.

**Keywords:** Ibn-i Khaldun, Umran, Asabiyya, City, Urbanization, Urban Development, Urban Planning, City and Environment

## I. Giriş

İnsanlar tarih boyunca yaşamlarının ve güvenliklerinin devamlılıkları için yerleşim alanlarına (kent oluşumlarına) ihtiyaç duymuşlardır. Bu ihtiyaç insanların özel mülk edinmeleriyle daha da artmıştır. Bu yerleşim yapıları devingen bir yapıya sahip olmaları nedeniyle gelişen emek ve insan popülasyonu sayesinde ilk kuruldukları andan itibaren gelişme içerisinde olmuşlardır. Özellikle bu gelişme Kapitalizmin güç kazanmasıyla daha da hızlanmıştır. Fakat kentlerin bu hızlı gelişmesi beraberinde karmaşıklık da getirmiştir. Bu karmaşıklık kentler içerisinde yer alan emek, sermaye, sosyolojik yapı, kent düzeni gibi unsurları hem etkilemiş hem de etkilenmiştir. Kentlerde meydana gelen bu gelişmeler ve karmaşıklık, birçok düşünürün ve bilim insanının dikkatini çekerek çeşitli çalışmalara konu edilmiştir. Bu doğrultuda kentler önemli bir düşünür olan İbn-i Haldun'un da çalışmalarında yer bulmuştur.

İbn-i Haldun, sadece bir düşünür değil aynı zamanda devlet işlerinde görev almış bir devlet görevlisidir. Bu görevinin neticesinde kentler ve kent işleyişini birçok açıdan görme ve değerlendirme fırsatı bulmuştur. Bu sayede İbn-i Haldun kent yapısını değerlendirirken kent oluşmadan önceki toplum yapısını, kentle birlikte ortaya çıkan veya değişen toplum yapısını, toplumları bir arada tutan bağı, kentteki emeği ve işgücünü, sermayeyi, kenti etkileyen çevresel faktörleri ele almıştır. İbn-i Haldun, yapmış olduğu gözlemlerine El-İber eserinin bir parçası olan Mukaddime'de yer vererek gelecek nesillerin bu gözlemlerden faydalanmasını sağlamıştır.

Çalışma doğrultusunda ilk olarak İbn-i Haldun kentlerle ilgili saptamalarını anlamlandırmak için öncelikle düşünürün hayatı ve gözlemlerinin nasıl geliştiği ele alınmıştır. Daha sonra birincil kaynak olan İbn-i Haldun'un Mukaddime eseri ve Mukaddime'nin bir parçası olduğu El-İber ile ilgili bilgi verilmiştir. Ayrıca İbn-i Haldun'un çalışma yaptığı tarih, toplum bilimi, yönetim gibi alanlara da değinilmiştir. İbn-i Haldun ile ilgili gerekli bilgilendirme yapılarak düşünürün tanıtılmasının ardından kentlerle ilgili görüşleri kapsamında kentlerin yapıları, kentlerin sahip olduğu toplumsal düzen, kent ve çevre ilişkisi, kentlerin kurulmasında dikkat edilmesi gereken insani ihtiyaç ve çevresel değişkenlerin neler olduğuna değinilerek günümüz kentleriyle İbn-i Haldun'un düşüncesindeki kentlerin bir karşılaştırılması yapılmıştır. Bu karşılaştırma neticesinde günümüz kentleriyle İbn-i

Haldun düşüncesindeki kentlerin ortak yönleri ve farklılıkları üzerinde durulmuştur.

## II. İbn-i Haldun

İbn-i Haldun; sosyoloji, tarih gibi alanlarda görüşlerine başvurulanan önemli düşünürlerdendir. Özellikle eserlerinin farklı dillere çevrilmesi ve Türkiye’de de üzerine çalışmalar yapılması düşünürün önemini arttırmaktadır.

Miladi 1332’de Tunus’ta doğan İbn-i Haldun’un yaşadığı toplum içerisinde siyasal sorunlardan hem etkilenmiş hem de edindiği görevler neticesinde bu sorunları gözlemleme fırsatı bulmuştur (Ateş ve Utkan, 2017: 218). Ayrıca İbn-i Haldun’un dönemi içerisinde doğuda bilim anlamında önemli bir yere sahip olan Endülüs ve Kuzey Afrika’da ilim faaliyetlerinin azalmaya başladığı görülmektedir. Bu azalan faaliyetlerin sebeplerinden bazıları yenilgiyle sonuçlanan savaşlar, Moğol kaynaklı sorunlar ve istilalardır (Şenol, 2009: 35-36). Bu koşullar içinde İbn-i Haldun, çağının sorunlarını gözlemlemiş ve bu gözlemleri eserlerine yansıtmıştır.

İbn-i Haldun’un kökeni, Peygamber sahabesine dayanmakla birlikte Hadramut’ta yer alan Yemen Araplarından “Vail bin Hucr”a uzanmaktadır ve Endülüs’te İslam Medeniyeti gerileme veya duraklama dönemi esnasında Benu İbn-i Haldun olarak bilinen bir aileye dayanmaktadır (Şenol, 2009: 40). “Zeyd’in babası”, “E’t Tunusi” ve “Veliyyuddin” olarak da bilinen İbn-i Haldun’un gerçek adı Abdurrahman’dır. Tam adı ise “Ebu Zeyd Veliyyuddin Abdurrahman Bin Muhammed Bin Haldun El-Harami”dir (Ateş ve Utkan, 2017: 218). İbn-i Haldun’un ailesi köklü ve birçok devlet görevinde bulunmuş insanlardır. Bundan dolayı İbn-i Haldun, eğitime ilk olarak babasıyla başlamıştır. İbn-i Haldun, edebiyat ve şiirle de ilgilendiği bilinmektedir (Şenol, 2009: 40-41).

İbn-i Haldun’un bazı devlet görevlerinde bulunmasına karşın birtakım cezalara maruz kaldığı görülmektedir. İbn-i Haldun, bu cezalardan çıkarımlar yaparak çalışmalarına yön vermiştir (Mohammad, 2017: 230). Özellikle Sultan Ebû İnân tarafından görevlendirilmesi ve sonrasında cezalandırılması gibi gelişmeler -Mukaddime eserine de yansıyan- İbn-i Haldun’un fikirlerinin, düşüncelerinin ve kalem aldığı eserlerinin olgunlaşmasına katkı sağlamıştır (Şenol, 2009: 42-43).

İbn-i Haldun’un siyasi hayattan çekilmeye karar vermesiyle birlikte Cezayir sınırlarında yer alan Selame kalesine yerleşerek en önemli eseri El-İber’i 1377 yılında kaleme almaya başlamış ve eserinin müsveddelerini 1377 yılında tamamlamıştır (Mutlu, 2021). Daha sonra gittiği Mısır’da eserini tekrar gözden geçirmiş ve düzenlemeler yapmıştır. Bu eserine son şeklini vermeden önceki “Tunus Nüshası” ile Mısırdan sonraki “Zahiriye Nüshası” ve “Farisiye Nüshası” arasında farklar görülmektedir. El-İber’in giriş kısmı ve ilk kitap olan Mukaddime; 2, 3, 4 ve 5. cildinde yer alan kısımda Türklerin, Yahudilerin tarihiyle ilgili bilgiler yer almaktadır; 6. ve 7. Kısımda ise Berberiler ve Mağriplerin tarihine değinilmektedir. Ayrıca 7. Cildin son kısmında yer alan El-Tarif ise İbn-i



Haldun'un hayatından kesitler sunmaktadır (Ateş ve Utkan, 2017: 219). İbn-i Haldun dünya tarihine, insanlığa, yönetime ve daha birçok yapıya ve düzene ilham kaynağı olacak eserler ortaya koyup verimli bir hayat geçirdikten sonra 16 Mart 1406 tarihinde vefat etmiştir.

#### A. İbn-i Haldun'a Göre Ümran İlmi ve Asabiyet

İbn-i Haldun, insanların yapısı gereği birlikte yaşamaları gerektiğini vurgulamaktadır. Gözlemlerinin sonucunda Ümran (toplum) ilmini iki aşama olarak ele almıştır. Bu aşamalardan ilki kırsal alanda yaşayan, göçebe ve geçimi temel ihtiyaçları doğrultusunda gideren Bedevi Toplumlardır. Diğer ise yerleşik hayata geçmiş, temel ihtiyaçlarını kolaylıkla karşılamasından dolayı daha lüks yaşam arayışında olan Hadari Toplumlardır. (Şenol, 2009: 102-103).

Bedevi ve Hadari Toplamlar, kendi beraberliklerini sağlamak için bir bağa ihtiyaç duyarlar. İbn-i Haldun'un Asabiyet kavramı bu baği açıklamaktadır. Asabiyet kavramı, insanlar arasında bir baği temsil etmektedir. Ayrıca İbn-i Haldun'un Asabiyet kavramını kullanması önemli bir seçim olarak görülebilir. Bunun sebebi asabiye kavramının "soylu ve üst" anlamına geldiğinden İslam'da hoş karşılanmamasıdır. Bu doğrultuda İbn-i Haldun'un Asabiyet kavramını seçerken planlı davrandığını söylemek mümkündür (Mohammad, 2017: 238). Bununla birlikte Asabiyet kavramı, insan ilişkilerini tanımlamada önemli bir yere sahiptir. Bu yüzden İbn-i Haldun, toplum özelliklerini de göz önünde bulundurarak Sebep ve Nesep olmak üzere iki Asabiyet türünden söz etmektedir. Nesep Asabiyeti daha çok Bedevi Toplumlarda görülen bir Asabiyettir. Aile veya soy gibi daha çok sıkı bağları ilgilendirir. Sebep Asabiyeti ise ortak yaşam sonucu insanların zorunlu olarak kurmaları gereken bir Asabiyet türüdür. Genel olarak şehirlerde görülmektedir. Nesep Asabiyetinde duygu ile hareket edilebildiği görülmekteyken Sebep Asabiyetinde mantığın ön planda olduğu görülmektedir. Bu doğrultuda Nesep Asabiyetinin daha doğal olduğunu söylemek mümkündür (Karagöl, 2016: 52-53).

Bununla birlikte toplumlarda Asabiyet oldukça önemlidir. Söz konusu Asabiyetin şehir ve kırsal alanlarda gücü farklıdır. Şehirlerde yer alan Asabiyet baği olarak gücü azdır. Fakat kırsal toplumlardaki Asabiyet oldukça güçlüdür. Örneğın belirli bir baği sonucunda oluşan Asabiyet çerçevesinde bakıldığında toplumun bozulmaması, düzenin devamlılığı gibi birçok sebepten dolayı evlilikler son bulabilir, farklı kabileler arası sorunlardan dolayı iki dost olan insan birbirine zarar verecek duruma gelebilir. Ayrıca Asabiyet insanlara da bazı sorumluluklar yüklemektedir. Şehirler de bu sorumluluk kısaca bireysellik çerçevesinde ele alınabilir fakat kabile veya kırsal yaşamda durum biraz farklıdır. İlk olarak kabile yaşamında Asabiyet insanlara yazılı bir kural olmaksızın sorumluluklar yükler ve bu sorumluluklara uyulması esastır. Kabilelere sonradan katılanlar da (evlilik gibi) bu kurallara zamanla uyar. Kabile içerisinde bulunan bir bireye herhangi bir zarar geldiğinde Asabiyet neticesinde herkesin yardım etmesi gerekir. (Apak, 2017: 86-88). Bu doğrultuda özellikle kabile içerisindeki Asabiyet bireysel değil tüm kabileyi ilgilendiren bir bağdır. Şehir hayatındaki Asabiyet ise kabile/kırsala göre daha bireysel özellikler taşımaktadır.

## **B. İbn-i Haldun'un Devlet Anlayışı**

İbn-i Haldun'a göre devlet, Bedevi toplumun Hadari topluma dönüşmesiyle Hadari toplumun mevcut varlıklarını koruması ve gerekli olan güvenliğin sağlanması için gereklidir. Bu gereklilikleri yerine getirmek için gerekli olan devlet yapısının oluşum sürecini İbn-i Haldun, aşamalara dayandırmıştır.

İlk aşama, Bedevi Toplum anlayışına benzer bir yapı karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Bu aşamada Asabiyet bağının güçlü olduğu ve hükümdarlık makamının yeni filizlenmeye başladığı söylenebilir. İkinci aşama, bu aşamada artık hükümdarlık veya yöneticilik makamının varlığı oluşmaya başlar. Din gibi insanları birbirine bağlayan bağın yerini artık daha maddiyata dayalı bir yapı almaktadır ve bu aşamada Asabiyetin değişme içerisinde olduğu görülür. Üçüncü aşama, artık Hadari toplumların özelliklerinin ortaya çıktığı görülür. Özellikle şehir yaşamı ve göçebe yaşam arasındaki çizgilerden biri olan lüks yaşam artık kendini göstermeye başlar. Ayrıca hükümdarın kendi kişisel çıkarları doğrultusunda hareket etmeye başladığı görülür. Söz konusu olan kişisel çıkar, hükümdarın kendi kazancını arttırarak halkın da bu kazançtan faydalanmasını sağlamak şeklindedir. Dördüncü aşama, üçüncü aşamada ortaya yavaş yavaş çıkmaya başlayan lüksün tam olarak varlığından söz etmek mümkündür. Lüks yaşam ve insanların isteklerinin devamlılığı ve bu isteklerin yerine gelmesi de belli bir süre sürmektedir fakat önemli olan şudur ki bu lüks sürecinin devamlılığı tamamen devlet yönetimine bağlıdır. Hükümdarın veya yöneticilerin başarısı bu sürenin uzunluğunu belirler. Son aşamada ise Asabiyetin zayıfladığı veya değişime uğradığı görülür. Bir önceki aşamada yer alan lüks yaşamın getirdiği olumsuzları gidermek için hükümdarın vergi koyduğu ve bu vergiler nedeniyle halkın ekonomik olarak küçülmesi tepkilere neden olur. Artık kent içerisinde aksaklıklar görülmeye başlanmış ve devlet duraklamaya girmiştir. Bu sürecin devam etmesi durumunda devlet yıkılma tehlikesi ile karşı karşıya kalır (Stowasser, 1984: 196-198). İbn-i Haldun, devleti bir organizmaya benzeterek bir organizma gibi doğar, büyür ve sonunda da ölür demiştir. Bu doğrultuda nasıl bir organizma veya canlının yaşamını idare etmesi için sağlığına dikkat etmesi ve sağlıklı beslenmesi gerekirse devletlerinde yaşamlarının devamlılığı için canlı gibi gereksinimlerini yerine getirmesi şarttır. Aksi takdirde nasıl bir canlının ihtiyaçları giderilmediğinde ölürse hükümdar da devlet gereklerini yerine getirmemezse veya halkın tepkisini çekerse devletin ömrü kısa olur.

## **C. İbn-i Haldun'un Tarih Anlayışı**

İbn-i Haldun; felsefe, sosyoloji, toplum ve ekonomi gibi birçok alanda adı duyulan bir düşündürdür. Bu doğrultuda İbn-i Haldun Mukaddime eserinde tarih ilmiyle ilgili bilgilere de yer vermiştir. İbn-i Haldun'un tarih anlayışındaki en önemli hususlardan birisi, tarihten önemli dersler çıkarılmasıdır. Dolayısıyla İbn-i Haldun; tarihi sadece insanların birbirine anlattığı bir hikâye olarak değil aksine geçmişte yapılan yanlışlardan veya doğrulardan ders çıkarılarak şimdiye değerlendirmek ve anlamlandırmak gerektiğini düşünmektedir. Dolayısıyla İbn-i Haldun, tarihi geçmiş olarak dar bir düzeye indirgemekten ziyade daha geniş anlamlar yüklemek gerektiğini savunur. Bu anlamıyla tarihin bir felsefe veya yol gösterici rehber olarak değerlendirilmesi yararlı olacaktır. Ayrıca İbn-i Haldun

tarihi sınıflara ayırmaktadır. Bunlar; Açık Tarih ve Kapalı Tarih şeklindedir. Açık Tarih, eski zamanlarda olan olayları bildirmekten başka işlevi olmayan tarih anlayışıdır. Kapalı Tarih ise tarih sürecinde meydana gelen olayları anlamak, bu olaylar hakkında yorumlarda bulunmak ve ders çıkarmaktır. İbn-i Haldun'a göre tarih anlayışında, tarihi olduğu gibi kabul etmekten ziyade nasıl, neden, kim, nerede gibi soruları sorarak tarihi sorgulamak oldukça önemlidir. (Durak ve Tortuk, 2016: 353-354).

İbn-i Haldun'un tarihle ilgili söylediği bir başka önemli husus ise geçmişin şimdiye çok benzediğidir. Şu an neler oluyor ise geçmişte de aynı şeylerin olması veya geçmişte ne olduysa şu anda da aynı şeylerin olma olasılığı oldukça yüksektir. Ayrıca toplumların tarihi bir süreç olarak ele alınması gerekmektedir. Bu tarih sürecinin farkına varmak için de toplumların veya kişilerin tarihi analiz etmeleri gerekmektedir. Ancak bu şekilde tarih ile ilgili bir fikir edinilebilir (Durak ve Tortuk, 2016: 361-362).

Dolayısıyla İbn-i Haldun'un tasvir ettiği tarih anlayışı, tarihten ders çıkarılması ve tarihin analiz edilmesini vurgular. Bu doğrultuda kent yapıları tasarlanırken çevresel faktörlerin dikkate alınması gerektiğinden kusursuza yakın bir kentleşme sürecinde tarihten ders çıkarılmalıdır. Kentleşme birçok değişkeni barındığından geçmiş dönemlerdeki sorunların dikkate alınması sağlıklı bir kentleşmeyi olanak verecektir. Bu aşamada İbn-i Haldun'un tarih anlayışının kent ve kentleşme kapsamında değerlendirilmesi oldukça önemlidir.

### III. İbn-i Haldun Çerçevesinde Kent

Kentten bahsetmek için her şeyden önce toplumlardan ve kentlerin doğayla ilişkisinden bahsetmek gerekmektedir. Kent oluşumuna bakıldığında ilk yerleşim yerlerinde veya oluşumlarda karşımıza doğa ve doğaya uygun olarak inşa edilen Akropol, Amfitiyatro gibi antik kent oluşumları çıkmaktadır. Ayrıca, bu kentlerin veya yerleşim yerlerinin oluşumunda etkili olan insan varlığı ile insanları beraberce yaşamalarını sağlayan sosyolojik bağların varlığı göz ardı edilemez (Şenel ve Ercoşkun, 2020: 71). Bu kapsamda insanlar arasındaki bu bağ ile İbn-i Haldun, 14. yüzyılda Bedevilik ve Hadarilik şeklindeki toplum tasviri ve bu toplumların kendi içlerinde sahip olduğu Asabiyetle benzerlik göstermektedir.

Kent oluşumundan önce karşımıza çıkan Bedevi Toplamlar, bireyler arasındaki bağların kuvvetli olmasında önemli bir belirleyici olmakla birlikte yaşadıkları göçebe hayat tarzları Bedevi Toplamların ihtiyaçlarını belirlemede bir etken olduğunu söylenebilir. Bedevi toplumlardaki insanların geçimlerini veya ihtiyaçlarını gidermek amacıyla imkanlar dahilinde ürün yetiştirmek, hayvancılık ile uğraşarak hem toplum düzenlerini hem de beslenmelerini aksatmamak için bu tür yöneliş içerisinde oldukları görülmektedir (Tekin, 2019: 62). Bu doğrultuda kent yapısının ortaya çıkışında Bedevi Toplamlar oldukça önemli rol üstlenmektedir. Kentler, bugünkü yapılarına ve hacimlerine ulaşmadan önce ufak yerleşim yerleri olmalarıyla birlikte zamanla gelişen bir yapıya dönüştükleri görülmektedir.

Bundan dolayı kent de bir gelişim veya dönüşüm içerisinde olan organik yapıya benzetmek mümkün olmaktadır. Bu doğrultuda İbn-i Haldun, Bedevilikten Hadariliğe geçiş olarak bir kentsel dönüşümden bahsetmektedir. Her toplumda Bedevi hayattan Hadari hayata geçiş yaşayacağını söyleyen İbn-i Haldun; Bedevi Toplumlarında sınırlı bir iktisat, ziraat ve hayvancılık söz konusu iken Hadari toplumlarında daha geniş bir iktisadi yapı, imalat, ticaret ve sanayi söz konusu olduğunu vurgulamaktadır (Ateş ve Utkan, 2017: 220).

Kent oluşumuna katkı sağlayan toplumların, kendi aralarındaki bağ oldukça önemlidir. Bir toplumda bağ kuvvetli olmaz ve çıkar üzerine kurulursa hem yardımlaşma hem de sağlıklı bir toplum düzeni oluşmaz. Dolayısıyla kent içindeki düzen bozulabilir ayrıca kentin geleceğini dahi etkileyebilir. Ayrıca kentler kurulma/oluşum ve yıkılma aşamalarına sahiptirler. Kentler toplumlardan veya insan gruplarından oluştuğundan dolayı bu oluşma ve yıkılma aşamasında kent ile toplumlar beraber düşünülebilir. Bu doğrultuda İbn-i Haldun'un gözlemleri ve tanıştığı topluluklar sonucunda Bedevi ve Hadari toplumların oluşum aşamasını, aksaklıkları ve yıkılma sürecini Asabiyet kavramıyla açıklamaya çalıştığı görülmektedir (Karagül, 2016: 51).

İbn-i Haldun'un kent kapsamında ele aldığı konulardan bir diğeri de kent yönetimi elinde bulunduran hanedanlıktır. İnsanlar Bedevi Toplumda iken kendine ait mülk edinimi olmadığı veya sınırlı olduğundan dolayı korunma ihtiyacı azdır. Hadari topluma geçildiğinde ise mülk edinimi ve lüks yaşam artmasından kaynaklı olarak insanların korunma ihtiyacı da artmaktadır (Ahmad vd., 2016: 306). Bu aşamada güvenlik ve yönetim ihtiyacını karşılamak için hanedanlık mekanizması ortaya çıkmaktadır. Fakat dikkat edilmesi gereken devletin de bir ömrü olduğu ve bu ömrün belirleyicisi hükümdarın veya devletin başındaki yöneticinin tutumudur. Devlet yönettiği insanların korunması ve huzur içinde yaşamaları için bir kuvvettir. Eğer bu kuvvet kötüye kullanılırsa ve insanlara kötü davranırsa kendi sonunu yaklaşıyor demektir. Devletin kendi insanlarına huzurlu ve iyi bir şekilde yaklaşması durumunda kendi ömrünü uzatmakla birlikte huzurlu bir ortam sağlar (Dalkılıç, 2011: 85-86). Ayrıca hükümdar toplumların, Bedevilikten Hadariliğe ve Hadarilikten Bedeviliğe geçebilme durumu olduğunu unutmayarak dikkatli kararlar vermelidir.

Şehirleri kurarken çevresel faktörlere de dikkat edilmesi oldukça önemlidir. İbn-i Haldun, özellikle şehrin havasının kaliteli olması gerektiğini ve şehrin, bataklık veya pis koku yayacak yerlerin yakınlarına kurulmaması gerektiğini savunur (Haldun, 2011). Ayrıca İbn-i Haldun, şehir içerisindeki insanlara yetecek kadar su kaynağının olması veya o kaynağa yakın yerlere şehir kurulması gerektiğini vurgular (Haldun, 2011). Şehirde yaşayanların yiyecek ve üretim ihtiyaçlarını gidermek için şehrin etrafına veya yakın yerlerinde verimli arazilerin olmasına dikkat edilmelidir. Şehir halkının yakıt ihtiyaçlarını karşılamak için ormanlık alana yakın olması gerekmektedir. Son olarak şehrin savunması ile ilgili olarak kalabalık ve araziye hâkim bir yere yerleşilmesi şehrin korunması açısından oldukça önemlidir (Ateş ve Utkan, 2017: 224).

İbn-i Haldun, kent yapılarının; emek, iktisadi yapı gibi unsurları barındırarak fırsatlar sunduğunu vurgulamaktadır. Bu doğrultuda ilk şehir oluşumlarında insanlar kentin olanaklarının kısıtlı olmasından dolayı temel ihtiyaçlarını gidermek için çabalamaktadırlar. Daha sonra kentler geliştikçe insanlar da aynı şekilde istekleri veya ihtiyaçları da gelişmektedir. İlk aşamada sadece temel ihtiyaçlarını karşılayan insanlar, daha sonraki aşamalarda ise ihtiyaçlarını kentin gelişmesi ile paralel olarak değiştirerek daha lüks bir hayat tarzına göre belirlemektedirler. Bu durumu ortaya çıkaran etmen ise kentteki emek artışı ile birlikte ürün fazlası üretimdir. Kısaca; kent gelişir, emek yani insan artar, üretim artar sonucunda ise ihtiyaç fazlası üretim ile kentler artık bir üretim merkezi haline gelmeye başlar bu da insanların yaşamlarını veya lüks anlayışın ortaya çıktığı bir güç/etmen olarak karşımıza çıkar (Tekin, 2019: 62-63).

#### **A. Günümüz Yerleşimlerine İbn Haldun'un Gözünden Bakmaya Çalışmak**

İnsanlar hayatlarını sürdürmek ve yaşamsal aktiviteleri yerine getirmek için topluluklar halinde yaşadıkları bilinmektedir. Bu topluluklar insanların veya insanların dahil oldukları grupların niteliklerine göre değişmektedir. Zamanla toplumun gelişmesi, insan nüfusunun ve ihtiyaçlarının artması sebebiyle daha geniş bir yaşam alanına ihtiyaç duyulmaya başlanmıştır. Bu ihtiyaçları karşılamak için şehir yapıları ortaya çıkmış ve ihtiyaca göre gelişme göstermiştir. Devamında ise savaşlar, salgınlar gibi olumsuz durumların meydana gelmesi kentlerin yıkılmalarına veya büyük sorunlarla karşılaşmalarına sebep olmuştur. Kentlerin bu şekilde doğup gelişip yok olmalarının nedeni organik yapıya benzeme özelliklerine dayandırılmaktadır (Doğan, 2020: 56). Bu doğrultuda günümüz kentlerinin gelişimi veya kentleşme; bir bölge içerisinde yerleşen insanların, kent düzeni içerisinde yer alan psikolojik ve yapısal düzenlere ayak uydurarak uzmanlaşma ve iş bölümü çerçevesinde üzerine düşen sorumlulukları yerine getirmesi ile oluşan ve sonsuz olmayan bir yapı veya süreç olarak bahsedilebilir (Yahyagil, 1998: 108).

Bu doğrultuda kentin bu gelişme sürecine ve organik yapısına atıfta bulunan İbn-i Haldun kent yapısıyla ilgili birçok saptamada bulunmuştur. Bu saptamalara kentin kurulmasında dikkat edilmesi gereken çevresel faktörler, yöneticilerin tutumu, toplumsal yapı, emek olmak üzere birçok örnek verilebilir. Ayrıca İbn-i Haldun'un yaptığı saptamaların kendi dönemi için oldukça tutarlı olmasının yanında günümüzde de bazı alanlarda tutarlılığını korumaktadır.

Bu kapsamda İbn-i Haldun'un yaptığı saptamalar ve günümüz kentleri arasındaki tutarlılığa bakıldığında emek ve mülk edinme (başka bir ifadeyle lüks yaşam isteği) isteği karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Kırsal alandan kente göç eden insanlar kentin olanaklarından ve iş gücünden faydalanma amacı içerisinde oldukları bilinmektedir. Bununla birlikte ülkemizde 1950 yıllarında meydana gelen kitlesel göçler bu amacı taşıyan insanların kırsaldan göçüyle yoğunluk kazanmıştır (Sağlam, 2016: 259-260). Bu durumun Haldun'un Mukaddemesinde yer aldığı görülmektedir. Örneğin Mukaddimede şehre inmede çekici bir güç olarak mülk edinme isteği yer almaktadır. Ayrıca Mukaddimede mülk

edinmenin beraberinde rahatlığı ve sükûnu sağladığı vurgulanmıştır (Haldun, 2011: 631). 1950 yılındaki kırdan kente göç temelde insanların kırdaki işsizlik oranının artması ve kentte iş olanaklarından faydalanma amacına sahip olmalarıyla birlikte mülk edinme ihtiyacı ve amacına da sahip oldukları söylenebilir (Sağlam, 2016: 264-266). Bu da İbn-i Haldun'un Mukaddimede bahsettiği mülk edinme konusuyla benzerlik göstermektedir.

İbn-i Haldun, yaşadığı dönem ile günümüz arasında birçok yönden farklılıklar mevcuttur. Özellikle teknolojinin gelişmesiyle birlikte 1300'lü yıllarda insanları kısıtlayan olanakların bazıları günümüzde tolere edilebilmektedir. Fakat bu kısıtlayıcı olanakların bir kısmı ise hâlâ insanların sorunu olmaya devam etmektedir. İbn-i Haldun'un eserinde ele aldığı ve dikkat edilmesi gereken hususların günümüzde güncelliğini koruması Haldun'un ileri görüşlülüğünün bir yansımasıdır. Kentin kurulma aşamasında planı yapılırken dikkat edilmesi gereken hususlar bu doğrultuda verilebilecek önemli bir örneklerdir.

İbn-i Haldun, şehirler konumunu belirlerken hava kalitesinin dikkat edilmesine vurgu yapmaktadır. Şehirlerin kurulmasında havaya dikkat edilmemesi ve bataklık, göl gibi koku ve hastalık kaynağı olan etkenlere ilaveten şehir kenarlarındaki havanın durağan olmasından dolayı yayılan koku ve hastalık şehrin içine kolayca yayılır. Özellikle söz konusu kaynaklara yakın olan şehirlerde hastalık daha çok görülür. Bu doğrultuda Haldun eserinde konuyla ilgili olumsuz şöhrete sahip olan Kabîs Beldesini örnek göstererek durumun ciddiyetine vurgu yapmıştır (Haldun, 2011: 635-636). Günümüzde de şehrin yakınında veya hastalık kaynağı olan yerlerde (bataklık gibi) yerleşim yeri bulunması insanlar tarafından tercih edilen bir durum değildir. Haldun'un eserinde bahsettiği Kabîs Beldesinin kötü havanın olduğu bir bölgede yer alması ve sıtma hastalığını beldede baş göstermesi günümüzde de insan yaşamını tehdit eden sıtma tehlikesi ile benzerlik göstermektedir. Sıtma hastalığının taşıyıcıları olan sivri sineklerin yaşam alanlarına bakıldığında İbn-i Haldun'un da belirttiği gibi kötü koku yayan ve hastalık kaynağı olan yerlerdir (McCarron, 2021) ve 2000 yılında 262 milyon insanın sıtmadan etkilendiği ve bu insanların 839 bini sıtma yüzünden hayatını kaybettiği kayıtlara geçmiştir (Sağlık Bakanlığı, 2021). Bu doğrultuda şehir sivri sinek gibi hastalık taşıyıcıların yaşam alanları olan ve Mukaddimede sözü geçen alanlarda kurulması durumunda şehirde sıtma hastalığı baş gösterecektir. Teknolojinin gelişmesi sebebiyle önlem alınabilir fakat temelde Haldun'un yıllar önce yapmış olduğu tespitler hâlâ geçerliliğini korumaktadır.

İbn-i Haldun, şehir kurulması aşamasında insanların beslenme gibi temel ihtiyaçlarına da dikkat çekmiş ve insanların temiz su ihtiyaçlarını karşılamak için temiz su kaynaklarına yakın veya bu kaynaklara ulaşımın kolay olduğu yerlere şehir kurulmasını tavsiye etmiştir. Ayrıca Haldun, insanların yeme ihtiyaçlarını karşılamak için verimli topraklara yakın yerlerde şehir kurulmasıyla birlikte bu alanlarda hayvanların otlanması sağlanarak insanların süt, et gibi ihtiyaçlarını karşılaması daha kolay hale geleceğini vurgulamıştır (Haldun, 2011: 636-637). Günümüzde şehir kurulmasında verimli

toprakların önemi hâlâ önemli iken hayvanların otlatılmasında farklılığa gidilerek şehir merkezine uzak yerlerde çiftlikler oluşturulmaya başlanmış ve endüstriyel yemle (Koyuncu, 2017: 99-100) hayvanların şehirlere yakın yerlerde otlatılma sorunu ortadan kaldırılmıştır fakat 1300'lü yılların koşulları göz önünde bulundurulduğunda şehrin verimli alanlara kurulması oldukça önemlidir.

Mukaddime eserinde şehir kurulmasında önemli olan konulardan biri de şehrin yakacak, inşaat ve yemek pişirmek için kullanılacak odunların elde edileceği ormanlara yakın yerde kurulmasıdır. 1300'lü yıllarda imkânlar dâhilinde insanların ısınma gibi ihtiyaçlarını karşılamak için oduna ihtiyaç duymalarını göz önünde bulunduran Haldun, ormanlara yakınlığı şehir alanını belirlerken dikkat edilmesi gereken koşul olarak ele almıştır (Haldun, 2011: 637). Bu durum günümüzde arazi şartları ve ekonomik imkânların yeterli olmadığı ülkelerde veya alanlarda söz konusu durumların karşılık bulmasına rağmen genelde teknolojinin gelişmesi bu durumu kolaylaştırmıştır. Örneğin, günümüzde teknoloji yardımıyla Rusya'dan Türkiye'ye gelen ve Avrupa devletlerine de gaz sağlama potansiyeli bulunan Mavi Akım adlı proje ile şehirler yakacak ihtiyacına değil yakacak şehirlere gelmektedir (Maabir, 2021). Bu kapsamda şehirlerin çeşitli ihtiyaçlardan dolayı ormanlık alanlara yakın yerlerde kurulması zorunluluğu günümüzde ortadan kalkmıştır.

Son olarak İbn-i Haldun Mukaddimede şehirlerin kurulmasında deniz ve sahil unsuruna da değinmiştir. Bu doğrultuda Mukaddimede şehrin deniz kenarında kurulması neticesinde saldırıya açık olacağına değinilmiştir. Ayrıca Hadari toplumlarda rahata alışmalarından ve savaşma özelliklerini kaybetmelerinden dolayı şehrin kuşatılma riski mevcuttur (Haldun, 2011: 637-638). Günümüzde ise daha çok ticaret ve turizm için kullanılan kıyı şehirlerinde güvenlik riski hâlâ önemliliğini korumaktadır.

#### **IV. Sonuç**

İbn-i Haldun, 14. yüzyılda yaşamış önemli bir düşündürdür. İbn-i Haldun'u önemli yapan hem yönetimde aldığı görevler hem de günümüze kadar ulaşan El-İber eserini gözlem yeteneği ile yazmasıdır. Kaleme aldığı eserde; toplum, toplumsal bağ, sosyoloji, tarih gibi alanlara değinmesi eserinin günümüzde de güncelliğini korumasını sağlamıştır.

İbn-i Haldun, eserinde kentlerle ilgili birçok hususa değinmiştir. Bu hususlara ek olarak tarih, sosyoloji gibi alanlarda yapmış olduğu çalışmaları da ayrıca kentlerle ilgili çok yönlü değerlendirmeleri ortaya koymasına yardımcı olmuştur. Bu doğrultuda İbn-i Haldun, kenti oluşturan toplum ve toplumu bir arada tutan bağı (Asabiyet) çözümlemiştir. Toplumu oluşturan bağa değinmesi aslında kentlerin temel yapıları olan toplumların nasıl bir arada yaşadığını ve kent düzenin nasıl meydana geldiğini anlamamamıza yardımcı olmaktadır. Ayrıca İbn-i Haldun'un ele aldığı kent düzeni ve toplumsal yapıyı bazı yönleriyle kendinden önce yaşamış olan Farabi'nin tasvirlerine benzetmek mümkündür. Örneğin iki düşünürde toplumsal yapıyı ikiye ayırarak toplumu ve toplumsal işleyişi anlamlandırmaya çalışmışlardır. Fakat İbn-i Haldun'un toplumsal tasvirinin nesnelliği daha ağır

basılmaktadır (Serter, 2019: 19; Demirel, 2014: 366-368).

İbn-i Haldun, kenti oluşturan toplumsal düzene değindikten sonra kent dinamiğine katkı sağlayan emek ve iş gücüne de değinmiştir. Kentin temelde iç dinamiklerini yansıtan bu hususlara ilaveten kentin çevreyle olan ilişkisini de ele almıştır ve gelecek nesillere önemli uyarılarda bulunmuştur. Bu doğrultuda bir kenti kurarken dikkat edilmesi gereken coğrafi özellikler, insanların yakıt ihtiyacı, beslenme ihtiyacı, hayvansal üretim için uygun alan gibi birçok değişkene dikkat edilmesini vurgulamıştır. Ayrıca bunu yaparken de Kabîs Beldesi gibi yerleri örnek göstererek hem durumun ciddiyetini göstermeye çalışmış hem de kenti kurarken sorunla karşılaşılması için çözüm yolları üretmiştir.

İbn-i Haldun, mukaddime eserinde değindiği kent yapısı ve kentlerin kurulması aşamasında dikkat edilmesi gereken hususlar temelde 14. yüzyıl kentlerinin koşullarını ilgilendirmektedir. Günümüzdeki kent yapıları, Mukaddimedeki sözü geçen kent yapılarına ve 14. yüzyıl koşullarına sahip değildir. Bu yüzden doğrudan doğruya İbn-i Haldun'un bahsettiği kentler ve bu kentleri inşa ederken dikkat etmemiz gereken hususlar tam olarak günümüzde karşılığını bulmamaktadır. Fakat bazı hususların da güncelliği devam etmektedir. İbn-i Haldun'un üzerinde durduğu kent yapılarının özellikleri arasında yer alan emek, sermaye ve iş gücü günümüzde de mevcuttur fakat 14. yüzyıldan daha yoğun şekilde yaşanmaktadır. Bununla birlikte kentte ve kırsal alanda gelişen olanaklar neticesinde sınırlar daha muğlaktır. Ayrıca günümüzdeki kentler daha karmaşık bir düzen sahip olmalarına rağmen İbn-i Haldun'un söz ettiği Sebep Asabiyetini ve bu asabiyetin sahip olduğu özellikler günümüzde görülmektedir. Kırsal alanda ise İbn-i Haldun'un bahsettiği Nesep Asabiyetini ve bu asabiyetin özelliklerini görmek mümkündür. Dolayısıyla 14. yüzyılda İbn-i Haldun'un kent, kırsal alanlar ve toplumlar kapsamında yaptığı ayrım, birebir aynısı olmasa da günümüz koşullarında karşılığını bulmak mümkündür. Son olarak İbn-i Haldun'un eserinde kentlerin kurulma aşamasında dikkat edilmesini öğütlediği hususların bir kısmı hâlâ güncelliğini korumaktadır. Bu doğrultuda İbn-i Haldun, özellikle pis havalardan kaynaklı yayılabilecek hastalıkların önüne geçmek için kentin havasının temiz olmasıyla ilgili öğüdü günümüzde karşılığını bulmaktadır. Çünkü insan sağlığını hâlâ sıtma gibi hastalıklar tehdit etmektedir ve ölümler mevcuttur. Ayrıca verimli arazilere yakın kent kurulması yine günümüz kentlerinin inşa edilme alanlarını belirleyen faktörlerdendir. Fakat teknoloji sayesinde günümüzde yakacak ihtiyacının kentin kurulmasında belirleyiciliği yok denecek kadar azdır.

Sonuç olarak 14.yüzyılda İbn-i Haldun'un gözlemleri ve görevleri sayesinde kentlerle ilgili yapmış olduğu saptamaların bir kısmı insanların temel arzu, istek, ihtiyaç ve biyolojik yapısının değişmemesi nedeniyle günümüzde güncelliğini korumaktadır. Fakat İbn-i Haldun'un saptamalarının bazıları gelişen teknoloji, kapitalizm, insanların farklılaşan lüks anlayışı ve gelişen imkânlar neticesinde güncelliğini yitirmiştir.



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## BREAKING THE BOND: EMANCIPATED NATIONS DURING THE COLD WAR

Merve YAZICI<sup>22</sup>

### Abstract

The literature of the Cold War is generally based on Western narratives. The scholars add an important social and cultural aspect to the international history of the period by using Western sources. To the literature review, the core of the Cold War is the struggle between American-dominated liberal-capitalism and Soviet-dominated communism structured relations between societies. However, the ‘third world’ concept as the new aspect gives extensive attention to this basis. While researching the independence movements of the old colonized nations, this shouldn’t be denied that the whole process was broadly conditioned by the Cold War. Competition with American and European liberal ideologies pushed the Soviet Union and China to present that they could build superior systems in the ‘backward’ lands. The concept of decolonization describes “the emancipation of Asia and Africa from European control” in political, economic, and cultural terms. The importance of this issue lies in this question: *How could the ‘Third World’ nations emancipated during the Cold War although the Western ‘masters’ were still powerful?* The answers of the question will be the main outline of my paper.

**Key words:** Algeria, Decolonization, Postcolonial Modernity, Independence Movements, Vietnam

### Öz

Soğuk Savaş literatürü genellikle Batı kaynaklı anlatılara dayanmaktadır. Alanın uzmanları, Batı kaynaklarını kullanarak dönemin tarihine sosyal ve kültürel yön vermektedir. Literatür taramasına göre, bu topluluklarda Amerikan egemenliğindeki Liberal kapitalizm ile Sovyet egemenliğindeki komünizm arasındaki mücadelenin yansıması yer almıştır. Bununla birlikte “üçüncü dünya” kavramı bu temele yeni bir yön vermiştir. Eski sömürgeleştirilmiş ulusların bağımsızlık hareketlerini araştırırken, tüm sürecin Soğuk Savaş koşullarına göre yapılandırıldığı göz ardı edilmemelidir. Amerikan ve Avrupa liberal ideolojileri ile rekabet, Sovyetler Birliği ve Çin’i bu “geri kalmış” bölgelerde daha üstün sistemler kurmaya zorlamıştır. Genel olarak *sömürgecilik* kavramı, “Asya ve Afrika’nın Avrupa’nın kontrolünden kurtuluşunu politik, ekonomik ve kültürel terimlerle tanımlamaktadır. Bu konunun önemi şu soruda yatmaktadır: Batılı *efendiler* hala güçlü olmasına rağmen *Üçüncü Dünya* ulusları Soğuk Savaş döneminde nasıl özgürleşebilirdi? Makale, bu sorular üzerinde ayakta duracaktır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Cezayir, Dekolonizasyon, Sömürgecilik Sonrası Modernite, Bağımsızlık Hareketleri, Vietnam

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## I. Introduction

The literature on the Cold War is generally based on Western narratives. The scholars add an important social and cultural aspect to the international history of the period by using Western sources. Besides these scholars, there are some others who are willing to analyze the issues by using all the actors' positions. There cannot be paid sufficient attention that the core of the Cold War is that the struggle between American-dominated liberal-capitalism and Soviet-dominated communism structured relations between societies. However, the 'third world' concept as the new aspect gives extensive attention to this basis. In the literature review, Jaraush states that the strategy of “*subaltern studies*’ rejects Eurocentrism by emphasizing the suffering of the suppressed, ignored in the narratives of the colonial masters” (2015: 482). While studying this issue, my main concern is fulfilling this aim without ignoring any suppressed nations’ local conditions.

While researching the independence movements of the old colonized nations, this should not be denied that the whole process was broadly conditioned by the Cold War. Competition with American and European liberal ideologies pushed the Soviet Union and China to present that they could build superior systems in ‘backward’ lands. The leaders of communist regimes were in the race of the ‘true’ communist. The Sino - Soviet hostility of the 1960s was at least in part a struggle over which regime would lead revolutionary forces in the Third World (Suri, 2006: 355). Thus, there was not only the struggle between the ‘East’ and the ‘West’, but also a conflict among the sub-actors during the Cold War.

The concept of decolonization describes “*the emancipation of Asia and Africa from European control*” in political, economic, and cultural terms. In some way, European dominance over the rest of the world was put to an end by pressure from below, as the suppressed peoples looked for the end of colonial rule. In other way, the imperialists lost their own determination to maintain their domination as a result of their conflicts and burdens during the world wars (Jarausch, 2015: 482). The importance of this issue lies in this question: *How could the ‘Third World’ nations emancipated during the Cold War although the Western ‘masters’ were still powerful?* The answers of the question will be the main outline of my paper.

## II. Literature Review

While Richards and Waibel (2014) were handling the issue of decolonization and the liberation of ‘Third World’ countries; they usually preferred to explain the developments from the point of view of the European side. They tried to make sense of European powers’ strategies in Africa and Southeast Asia during the Cold War on the basis of their gains and losses. There was an ignorance about the burden of the colonized people knowingly or unknowingly in their work. Beside these issues, the study

represented a whole picture chronologically.

In response this one sided-approach, Jarausch held the issue from the middle point: When he stated that the decolonization process was discussed with the ‘subaltern studies’ which rejects Eurocentrism by focusing on the suppressed ones and the exploiters at the same time without any judgment. The only flaw of his way of analyzing is that he considered the success of the old colonies/new states by comparing their modernity. He attributes much more importance to modernity from other specialists. The methods used by the anticolonial movements were precisely modern. Nevertheless, the relationship of decolonization to the process of modernization was ambivalent. This might create a one-sided analysis which can be seen as his words about the possible future of the decolonized nations: “*If this progress (decolonization) continues, this growing confidence (for example, rising of China) might finally lead to a more equal relationship*” (Jarausch, 2015: 505).

Another historian who preferred to explain the general analysis by the understanding of ‘from below’ was Eric Hobsbawm. In his ‘Age of Extremes (1995)’, it’s clear to distinguish the motivations and challenges of the ‘others’ while trying to achieve their independence. It was easy to catch the main points beside the details about the movements in his words.

Some other writers contributed the literature of the decolonization process by referring to all the variables. Merriman (2010), drew attention to the period from the end of the Second World War to the early 1970’s, then argued the reasons and results of independence movements according to the timeline.

### **III. The Background of Decolonization Movements**

#### **A. A Context of the European Powers After the World Wars**

As the colonial masters, European states (and some old empires) overcame two world wars that they more or less had to face the outcomes one by one. As a result of defeat, the grand land empires separated, dissolving into the smaller national states. The most outstanding outcome was that the empires collapsed and disappeared. The First World War not only destroyed continental imperialism but also damaged overseas colonialism by undermining the belief of European superiority. The Second World War was devastating for the European overseas colonies that they were never able to recover (Jarausch, 2015: 483). More than 40 million people were killed in the European part of the war. Civilian deaths were nearly three times the number of military deaths. Millions survived with disabilities. Millions were forced to migrate after the war (Richards & Waibel, 2014: 209).

Material losses were huge, too. The estimated cost of the Second World War was between \$2 and \$3 trillion. This included damage to farmland and the devastation of villages, towns, cities,

bridges, railroads, and highways (Richards & Waibel, 2014: 209). A war might have two sides which included at least a victor, but in this time any actor gained material or moral supremacy. Thus, not only Germany but every country that had been involved in the war faced the need to reorganize its economy. All the claims of cultural or moral superiority Europeans had ever made, now seemed wiped out by the war. A spiritual depression accompanied military impotence and economic devastation.

## **B. The Cold War and its Consequences**

In the very beginning of the after-war period, the victory powers setted a meeting in order to decide the destiny of Germany with the leadings of Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin. But after Roosevelt passed away, the newly elected Truman took a more aggressive stance than Roosevelt had in earlier meetings. Roosevelt had sometimes been as suspicious of British imperialism instead of Russian communism. However, Truman mainly distrusted the Russians. He most likely relied upon of emergence of devastatingly powerful ‘A-bomb’ which give him some leverage with Stalin (Richards & Waibel, 2014: 212).

The process of ‘Cold War’ started from 1946 with an American diplomat who was stationed in the Soviet Union, George F. Kennan sent *the Long Telegram*, detailing his thoughts of how Russians viewed the present moment by adding their history. Kennan believed that Russia’s historic sense of insecurity, exacerbated by communism’s idea of the inevitable war with capitalism (Richards & Waibel, 2014: 214).

In 1947, the Cold War began to take shape. The concerns were gathered around from Turkey and Greece firstly. Turkey had been under considerable pressure from the Soviet Union. Because they wanted to allow a Soviet military presence near the straits. Greece was still involved in a civil war between Greek communists and Greek monarchists. So, Britain informed the United States it could no longer afford to supply aid to the two countries. Truman, in the *Congress in March 1947*, asked for an open-ended commitment by the United States to help any government threatened by invasion (Richards & Waibel, 2014: 214). In the months after Truman’s speech, Secretary of State George C. Marshall and others in the State Department concerned the economic and social problems of Europe (Richards & Waibel, 2014: 215). George Kennan, put together a report on the European situation recommending American aid, *The Marshall Plan*<sup>23</sup>.

In 1949, West Europeans and Americans formed the *North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)*. NATO was a pact that the West European countries invited the United States to participate in an alliance that it would naturally dominate. Europeans agreed to the informal American empire in order to stabilize collective security. By way of contrast, the Soviet Union imposed its empire on

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<sup>23</sup> The Marshall Plan or the *European Recovery Program* as formally known

Eastern Europe in the interests of the national security of the Soviet Union (Richards & Waibel, 2014: 220).

Dramatic changes during the 1940s was not only the issue of Western powers. Three developments in Asia also contributed to the shaping of the emerging Cold War. These were the American occupation of Japan, the victory of the Chinese Communists over the Chinese Nationalists in 1949, and the Korean War. The victory of the Chinese Communist Party under Mao Zedong shaped the Cold War in two important ways: The People's Republic of China was an enormous addition to what Americans regarded as a monolithic world communist movement. Mao's ideas and the revolutionary romanticism linked with his past accomplishments raised a fear that every national liberation movement would end up as a victory of the supposedly monolithic world communist movement (Richards & Waibel, 2014: 221). However, Cold War bipolarity affected not only relations with foreign societies with the distinction of Communist-Capitalist. It was also the definition of identity for newly founding states on the question of which system they would adopt. Capitalist-Communist rivalries inspired revolutionary political shifts, and they sometimes assisted or supported the local figures/fractions (Suri, 2006: 355). The post-colonial structure was not only the constitutive determinant of the Cold War but also the creatures of the Cold War.

#### **IV. The Roots of the Independence Idea**

The idea of the colonial nations' emancipation lies on the Wilson principles. The peacemakers at *Versailles* (particularly President Wilson) in 1919 had espoused nationalism as a principle for the territorial organization of states. But France and Britain had been unwilling to provide freedom to their colonies. The circumstance after the war shows that the U.S. government presented its unwillingness to support the maintenance of the British and French colonial empires. However, the temporary loss of colonial control boosted indigenous movements for independence because it seemed like a goal that could actually be achieved (Jarausch, 2015: 484).

Nationalist movements, some supported or heavily dominated by communists, had existed throughout the colonial world before World War II (Richards & Waibel, 2014: 225). After the end of the Second World War, the process of decolonization gathered speed due to the creation of the *United Nations*. This international organization not only facilitated national independence by enshrining the principle of "*equal rights and self-determination of peoples*" in its charter but also provided a mechanism for recognizing new states and accepting them as members into the international community (Jarausch, 2015: 485).

#### **V. Decolonization Process**

Decolonization movements offer three insights into the international history of the post-1945 period.

First, intervention and resistance had complicated sources at the same time. In some cases, the colonial state actors invited the foreign powers, while some others resisted its sources. Second, post-colonial powers were remarkably multidimensional. The United States and the Soviet Union were the dominant military powers in the third world, but they also had critical limitations. In former colonial territories, politically mobilized citizens and local leaders frequently initiated movements for change that forced external actors to reevaluate their aims and strategies. Third, the decolonization process was the outcome of the undeniable flow of globalization. Most importantly, the Cold War connected states and societies together across the globe more than it divided them. Geographically and culturally diverse peoples saw themselves engaged in a singular struggle to define and realize the promise of freedom (Suri, 2006: 358-359).

The ideal of the decolonization movement reflected not just the rise of anticolonial aspirations but also the weakening of European resolve especially after the corrosive world wars. The decline of military and economic power inspired administrators in London and Paris to move from the practice of 'indirect rule' toward a more inclusive conception of empire (Jarausch, 2015: 486). Nevertheless, the imperial states were dropped behind with the changing nature of the after-war period. The shifting positions of the old-colonized states were explained below:

- The German-Italian desert war threatened French domination in the Maghreb, but the Allied landing restored their imperial domination and ended the Italian possession of Libya (Jarausch, 2015: 484).
- The successive withdrawals of the British, Dutch, and French from Southeast Asia facilitated the drive for independence in *North Africa* (Jarausch, 2015: 488).
- In the areas where the Japanese had smashed colonial regimes in the process of takeover, there emerged a power vacuum.
- One such place was the *Dutch East Indies*, where Indonesian nationalists under Ahmed Sukarno declared independence in 1945. The United States was not only unsympathetic to the Dutch cause but actually put them under pressure to grant the Indonesians independence. In 1949, the Dutch recognized the independence of Indonesia.
- Other attempts at national liberation were less successful. The British were able to withstand a challenge in *Malaya* primarily by Chinese inhabitants influenced by communism. Malaya, which became independent in 1957, merged with other nations in 1963 to form Malaysia (Richards & Waibel, 2014: 227).
- *Singapore*, inhabited mostly by Chinese, became an independent city-state in 1965.
- The United States granted the *Philippines* full independence in 1946. The Philippines under the charismatic leadership of Ramon Magsaysay instituted land reforms and successfully ended a guerrilla insurrection by 1951 (Richards & Waibel: 227).



- In North Africa, the French faced a major challenge in *Algeria* when the *National Liberation Front (FLN)* began a revolution in 1954 which was later explained in detail.
- Both *Tunisia* and *Morocco* gained independence in 1956.
- The British decided to end the condominium with *Egypt* over the vast Sudanese territory in order to avoid a military confrontation from which they expected little profit.
- *Libya* had already become independent in 1951, since resistance to the return of Italian control motivated the UN to push for the creation of a separate state (Jarausch, 2015: 488).
- Britain controlled *Palestine* as a mandate. In its first major international decision, the UN called for the division of Palestine into the Jewish state of Israel and an Arab state. Israeli forces took over much of the British Mandate in 1948, and achieved independence. The policy of partition led to turmoil. Fighting between Palestinian Arabs and Jews began after the *UN resolution* (Merriman, 2010: 1163).
- Several areas of the former colonies, however, contained large numbers of white settlers. In those places, there was resistance to independence and considerable violence. *The Union of South Africa* left the Commonwealth in 1961 and became the Republic of South Africa, a state characterized by an elaborate system of *apartheid* or state-mandated segregation (Jarausch, 2015: 489).
- In 1960, the French granted full independence to their African colonies, which had earlier been given autonomy within the French community of nations. The French dream of assimilation, of transforming the inhabitants of colonial areas into people whose culture and heritage were French, had not prepared the former colonies well for independence. The British did somewhat better in terms of training a large group of Africans to take over the task of governing themselves (Richards & Waibel, 2014: 230).

Besides these independence movements, there remained still one outstanding resistance, *India*. During the 1920s and 1930s, Indian nationalism developed among the Indian elite, some of whom had been educated in England. When World War II began, the British government asked the Congress Party which included Sikhs and Muslims, for its support against the Japanese. The Hindu leaders of the Congress Party, Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, refused to support during the war, and the British government imprisoned them. In 1942, the British government promised them self-government with full status inside of the British Commonwealth. Nehru and Gandhi wanted to finish independence for India (Richards & Waibel, 2014: 228).

Gandhi became a powerful symbol of Indian resolution to win independence by peaceful means. When he threatened a massive campaign of nonviolent resistance to British rule, the British government sent him to jail again. After a duration of political unrest, India became independent, but bitter fighting followed between Hindus and Muslims. The Muslim League, which represented

Muslim interests, insisted on the creation of a separate Muslim nation (Merriman, 2010: 1161).

Fight between Hindus and Muslims continued. Hindus drove millions of Muslims out of India. Many of them starved to death during the forced move to Pakistan. Likewise, about the same number of Hindus and Sikh were expelled from Pakistan. A Hindu extremists assassinated Gandhi in 1948 because he had accepted the establishment of Pakistan (Merriman, 2010: 1162). Not long after India and Pakistan gained independence, Ceylon (*now Sri Lanka*) and Burma (*now Myanmar*) gained independence as well (Richards & Waibel, 2014: 228).

#### A. Vietnam

Before starting the explanation of decolonization stages in Vietnam, there was a need to clarify the background details not long ago. In Indochina, French repression helped to maintain the elitist characteristics of the Vietnamese political situation. While the French remained in control, the Communists had a very disciplined structure and a front organization at the same time (Colbert, 1973: 610). In Vietnam, division of the territories at the 16th parallel enabled rapid restoration of French rule in the South and strengthened the Viet Minh<sup>24</sup> in the North.

The Vietnamese took advantage of the destruction of the colonial government during the war. In August of 1945, they declared their independence in words taken from the American Declaration of Independence (Richards & Waibel, 2014: 226). In September of 1945, the British commander General Gracey, expanded his mission throughout the southern zone. Under his protection, French forces rapidly took control from the weak and divided South. By the end of the year, the French were maintaining order South of the 16th parallel (Colbert, 1973: 611).

Viet Minh with the leadership of Ho Chi Minh, took control of the northern part of the peninsula after the Japanese surrender. The British tried to intercept the *Viet Minh* from controlling power in the southern part of the peninsula. Instead, they worked with the French to restore the colonial regime (Richards & Waibel, 2014: 226). On the other hand, Chiang Kai-shek expressed hopes for Vietnamese independence, meanwhile promising that the Chinese would remain neutral between the French and the nationalists. In the south the British had facilitated the restoration of French administration; in the north the Chinese disarmed the French and blocked any similar restoration. After the contentious struggle, a truce existed between the north and the south, but it broke down finally in 1946 after a French attack. Over the next several years, the Viet Minh defeated French efforts to reestablish control over all of Indochina (Colbert, 1973: 612).

While the *Viet Minh* headed the conflict, they used guerrilla tactics similar to Mao Zedong's

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<sup>24</sup> *Viet Minh* was an organization that led the struggle for Vietnamese independence from French rule, which was formed by Ho Chi Minh.

strategy in China. Later, they changed their move to conventional warfare. When we came to the early 1950s, the French were aided by the U.S. When the French attempted to defeat the Viet Minh at *the Battle of Dien Bien Phu* in 1954 and instead were shocked to suffer a major defeat, Americans refused to intervene directly in the conflict (Richards & Waibel, 2014: 226).

At *the Geneva Conference in 1954*, the Russians and the Chinese pressed the Viet Minh to accept a division of Vietnam at the 17th parallel. The northern part of the peninsula would remain under the control of the Viet Minh, and the southern part under a noncommunist Vietnamese government (Richards & Waibel, 2014: 226).

## B. Algeria

The end of French colonialism was even more wrenching in North Africa. There were 1.2 million French citizens in Algeria; 300.000 in Morocco; and 200.000 in Tunisia. They were called *pieds noirs* (black feet) because of the black boots worn by French soldiers (Jarausch, 2015: 489). Unlike Vietnam, most of Algerian territory was arid. Above all, virtually no other anti-colonial movement had had to deal with such a sizable and politically powerful settler population who exercised a virtual right of veto over French Algerian policy through their lobby in the National Assembly.

The origins of the grand strategy of the Algerian War can be chased up until the Second World War. Nationalists had linked themselves with American anti-colonialism and organized celebratory marches. These quickly turned into bloody clashes in which French forces massacred from 6,000 to 45,000 Algerians. After this bloodshed, Algeria's leading figure, Messali Hadj, attended electoral politics. He founded a new party named the *Mouvement pour la Triomphe des Liberte's De'mocratiques* (MTLD). In the following years, the MTLD would more often be divided, after six years, they finally broke away to *form the Front de Libération Nationale* (National Liberation Front; FLN) and launch the war for independence (Connelly, 2001: 223).

Morocco and Tunisia were French protectorates, although nominally ruled by a *sultan* and *bey*, respectively. But, Algeria, in contrast, was directly administered as a colony by French officials. During the interwar period, a small nationalist movement developed in Algeria. In 1945, French troops put down an uprising in Algeria at the cost of 40,000 Algerian lives. During the early 1950s, movements for national independence continued to develop in France's North African colonies (Merriman, 2010: 1163).

In 1954, the FLN called for Algerian independence. An uprising for independence began just four months after the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu. Fearing that the movement might spread to Tunisia and Morocco, the French government granted virtual independence to both states in 1956, despite the protests of French residents and the vigorous opposition of the French officer corps

(Merriman, 2010: 1168).

In February 1956, French residents in Algiers rioted against the government when French Premier Guy Mollet, who had at first been willing to negotiate with the FLN, came to introduce his newly appointed governor of Algeria. French troops undertook a brutal campaign that included torture against militants and civilians alike, culminating in “the battle of Algiers” fought in the Arab quarters of the Algerian capital (Merriman, 2010: 1169).

Negotiations between Algerian leaders and de Gaulle’s government began in the spring of 1961. Given the chance to vote on their future, the Algerians opted for independence; in France, the vote for Algerian independence in July 1961 was 15 million to 5 million. On March 19, 1962, the Algerian War officially ended, with the French people overwhelmingly ratifying the peace terms. In July 1962, Algeria became independent (Merriman, 2010: 1169).

Throughout the Algerian war of independence, the FLN successfully played off Cold War rivalries, using mass communication and building support in Algerian communities abroad, while winning international support. Their campaign helped isolate France internationally. Algerians presented that it was not enough to play off with the superpowers. Instead, they used every international rivalry: China against the USSR, the communist powers against the Western allies, and the United States against France itself. To that end, the Algerians encouraged outsiders to take a side in personal rivalries among Algerian leaders by their own geopolitical and ideological stances (Connelly, 2001: 239).

## **VI. Challenges**

National liberation movements that pursued the anti-imperial struggle cannot only be seen as a victory of the ex-colonized nations when we incorporate the domestic variables. Initially, they wanted to throw their old oppressors out, but at the same time, they also needed the masters’ technical expertise in order to tailor their independence precisely. This case may not be seen as an impediment to their independence, but makes certain that they were more or less codependent to their colonizers. In fact some other factors supported this idea. The value of the ‘Third World’ was essentially based on the supply of raw materials, energy, farming, and livestock. In return for this, these states’ public debts were rooted in the investments of transportation, communication, and other city infrastructures from the colonizers (Hobsbawm, 1995: 205). Without these investments, natural resources may not be exploited.

Another challenge is that the postcolonial networks developed between the new elites and the old masters. Escaping from the ‘underdevelopment’ country required abandoning the colonial structure of plantation agriculture and raw-material extraction, which benefited Europe by using cheap

labor. A demographical boom in the indigent territories in Africa and South Asia when compared with the developed European countries made these nations usable serving for the colonials' interests (Hobsbawm, 1995: 348). On the other hand, due to the fact that public revenues belonged to the production of a few goods such as coffee, cocoa, or banana, most of the native people could not make any profit. The lion's share always belonged to the clustered elites and the colonials. That was the reason they looked for the solution to the resistance instead of expecting to receive a share from their manufacturers in a future time. The rulers of the newly independent countries faced the challenge of nation-building, which was later shifted them as disparate territories (Jarausch, 2015: 492).

The last challenge was that the polarizing logic of the Cold War pushed decolonizing countries toward choosing one of those paths and thereby becoming a client state of one of the blocs. During the independence movements, Socialism was more appealing for the new states since they saw the Soviet Union as a model for the planned development model rather than the anti-imperial sentiments (Hobsbawm, 1995: 203). Only a few states, for instance Egypt, managed to switch sides, playing the Americans and the Soviets off against each other. Many developing countries therefore tried to escape this dilemma and join the bloc of nonaligned nations (Jarausch, 2015: 494).

## **VII. Conclusion**

In general, the performance of the newly independent states has been disappointing rather than being spectacular. The human-rights report of the ruling classes was horrible which was including civil wars, ethnic cleansing, and even full-scale genocide (Jarausch, 2015: 495).

By dependence on foreign aid and a parasitical bureaucracy, economic development has generally stagnated, enriching a new class of businessmen and functionaries but leaving the rest behind. As a result of bad governance, post independence economies have often stagnated, since they failed to overcome the colonial division of labor that extracted crops and raw materials for the benefit of Europe. The social upheaval has been dramatic with unchecked population growth pushing people into urban slums, seeking out a marginal living (Jarausch, 2015: 495).

Colonized states were turned into the 'namely' independent states from the beginning of the freedom flows. It must be understood that this consequence was not only the result of the old-imperial Western states' dissolving power but also the willingness of the colonized people. Nevertheless, these nations lacked a sense of precise nationalism, their common wisdom was based on the resilience against the oppressor. The boundaries were driven by the emperor states unnaturally. Thus, even in the regions which had the most binding national sentiments, they paved the way for everlasting conflicts. One recurring obstacle to progress has been political instability, with most countries oscillating between authoritarian regimes and civil strike.

Decolonization process dramatically changed the political map of the world. Many newly independent states were founded. Yet, the major point is not their number, instead, the pressure of their emergence with their growing population. Establishing variable forms of self-government might not be easily understood but many of the leaders of liberation turned into authoritarian patriarchs or dictators who stabilized its power by the help of foreign partners in the Cold War parameters.

Under a long pressure of the imperial powers, made them more or less affected by European modernity. The process of decolonization therefore involved a selective rejection and retention of the European legacy, which led to the creation of a new hybrid of postcolonial modernity. Thus, the freedom movements do not mean the idea of breaking the bond with the old colonial empires. Nevertheless, the Cold War, decolonization, and global social awakenings had truly devastating consequences, especially in the areas of conflict within the Third World.

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## INDIA'S SOFT POWER DIPLOMACY UNDER THE COVID-19 ERA

Quang Hong TRIEU<sup>25</sup>

### Abstract

The outbreak of the Covid-19 disease has led to a dramatic loss of human lives and an unanticipated challenge to public health, food systems, and jobs worldwide. Since 2020, cooperation has appeared among countries in many regions to promote sharing and accessing vaccines on a large scale. As one of the big powers in the world, India plays a tremendous role in helping an international community and reinforcing confidence in the future of post-pandemic recovery. Using soft power in its foreign policy, India aims to promote itself as a benign and benevolent actor in global and regional politics during the Covid-19 era. This article reviews the definitions of soft power from an international and an Indian perspective, attempts to analyze soft power in foreign policy through Indian relief activities during the crisis, and finally assesses its successes and drawbacks in the context of the pandemic.

**Keywords:** India, soft power, Covid-19, diplomacy

### I. Introduction

The COVID-19 pandemic began in China with critical pneumonia cases caused by severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) in December 2019. The World Health Organization (WHO) announced a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) on January 30, 2020, and a pandemic on March 11, 2020. A surge of variants has been spreading in many countries since 2021, with the Alpha, Beta, Gamma, Delta, and newly Omicron variants being the most virulent. After two years, about 539 million cases and nearly 6.32 million deaths have been confirmed globally (WHO, 2022), making it one of the worst catastrophes in history. To contain the pandemic, Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi decided on a nationwide lockdown in late March 2020, bringing the world's largest democracy and fifth-largest economy to a standstill. The Indian government faced a tremendous challenge in containing the pandemic due to its vast population and persistent socioeconomic disparities. Just a few anticipated India to rise as one of the global responses to the pandemic. Meanwhile, there is an emerging trend of utilizing soft power by global superpowers such as the US, China, or Russia, mainly through their vaccine diplomacy that not only facilitates global inoculation but also contributes to their respective geopolitical objectives (Arbër, 2021). Hence, it can be seen as a perfect time for India to take advantage of soft power in foreign policy by using vaccination diplomacy and humanitarian aid, like what they did in the Tsunami of 2004, Nepal's earthquake (2015), or Myanmar's floods (2017).

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## II. Methodology

The paper uses both historical and analytical approaches. A historical perspective helps display India's foundations regarding soft power and its connection to Indian diplomacy during the COVID-19 pandemic, which lays the foundation of my analysis. Regarding literature review, work on soft power was used from international and Indian perspectives, besides various documents from governments, books, manuscripts, journal articles, and information from online sources.

## III. Concept of Soft Power

The concept of power has become an important term in international relations. Many scholars developed a variety of definitions of power, especially Joseph Nye. He claimed that power was the ability to affect others to get the outcomes one prefers (Nye, 2017). Nye also argued that the nature of power has two forms: hard and soft power. Hard power can achieve objectives through coercive actions or threats, known as the "carrots and sticks" term in international politics. The fundamental elements of hard power include tangible assets, like military power, economic strength, science and technology, natural resources, or geography. In his book 'Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power' (1990), he officially coined 'soft power' to international relations. In contrast to hard power, the elements and tools of soft power encompass several specific fields, such as media, culture, art, science, sports, and education (Nye, 2004). Still, any country depends on its resources and appropriate soft power strategies.

The development of this concept among scholars and politicians took off after the 1990s. The foundation of soft power in any state is always an attraction instead of economic and military coercion (Cooper, 2004). According to Kurlantzick (2007), soft power encompasses everything outside the security and the army realm: shared culture, public diplomacy, economic and political aspects, and involvement in multilateral organizations considered 'soft power.' It is the capacity to persuade others to do what one wants (Wilson, 2008). Geun Lee (2010) argues that soft power best describes using ideational or symbolic resources to shape others' wishes and desires, ultimately resulting in behavioral changes (Lee, 2010).

Other intellectuals describe the mutually reinforcing combination of hard and soft power as smart power. For instance, if one country only depends on soft power without hard power, its weaknesses can be exposed. For example, India lost a border conflict with China in 1962, hence ruining India's hard-won soft power position in the world through the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)<sup>26</sup>. Meanwhile, if a nation uses only hard power, it cannot achieve its long-term objectives and instead diminishes its reputation, as happened to the United States under the Bush administration during the Iraq war of 2003.

Concerning India's stance on soft power – according to an Indian foreign policy analyst, C. Raja

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<sup>26</sup> The Non-Aligned Movement was a big forum of 120 countries aimed to promote Afro-Asian economic and cultural cooperation and oppose any state's colonialism.



Mohan – it can be said that India could be among a few nations that have strong cards in this particular aspect, especially considering its extensive diaspora (Raja Mohan, 2003). Itty Abraham believed that the future of India's foreign policy relied on non-military realms such as cultural production, including yoga, film, music, textiles, food, and recognizing the widespread cultural reach of Indian cinema. (Itty, 2007) The rising importance of soft power in foreign policy shows India's efforts to project its image of pluralist diversity and tolerant secularism (Mullen, 2015). Since taking his office in 2014, Prime Minister of India, Narendra Modi, emphasized the critical role of soft power as *Sanskriti evam Sabhyata* (cultural and civilizational linkages), which is among the five pillars of the 'Panchamrit'<sup>27</sup> principles of his foreign policy (Rajesh, 2017). This pillar corresponds to 'Cultural diplomacy,' a successful tool India has used since 1947. The Modi administration views this 'inheritance' as further development. As we can see, soft power became an indispensable part of the discussion on the concept of 'power' in international relations, which helps a state achieve its objectives through its influence instead of relying on force or payments.

Furthermore, using smart power as a combination of soft and hard powers has become necessary to secure its foreign policy goals. In Indian perception, soft power is still an ambiguous concept primarily associated with cultural diplomacy. In the context of the pandemic, soft power is a highly appropriate concept for Indian foreign policy to take advantage of its resources and past experiences.

#### IV. Foundation of Soft Power in India

Since its independence in 1947, soft power has been used in modern India's foreign policy. It can be seen as an effective instrument for India's policy-makers because the primary purpose of soft power is to cultivate and rely on national image rather than using it as a tool to gain influence. By relying on the advantages of its rich, soft power resources (history, culture, religion, politics, etc.), India attempted to transform its soft power resources into a national policy. According to David M. Malone, three factors can shape foreign policy: geography, history, and capabilities (Malone, 2011). India excels in these factors in order to build a democratic institution with a federal and secular state. It also has maintained diversity between people with different cultures, religions, social positions, and other demographic variations. As one of the great historical civilizations, India has profound potential for utilizing soft power, whether through Yoga philosophy, Buddhism, or Gandhi's ideology of 'Non-violence' (Ahimsa) recognized around the globe.

There are three main phases of India's foreign policy since 1947, such as Nehru's non-alignment, the Indira Doctrine, and the Gujral Doctrine<sup>28</sup>. Under the reigns of Nehru and Indira

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<sup>27</sup> Modi's the Panchamrit principle includes 5 things: *Samman* (dignity and honour); *Samvad* (greater engagement and dialogue); *Samriddhi* (shared prosperity); *Suraksha* (regional and global security); and *Sanskriti evam Sabhyata* (cultural and civilisational linkages).

<sup>28</sup> Like US's the Monroe Doctrine of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the Indira Doctrine transformed Indian foreign policy from idealism to hardcore realpolitik, which improved national security agencies and strategic diplomatic communities to keep foreign involvement in the Indian subcontinent. The Gujral Doctrine substantially changed India's bilateral relations with its

Gandhi, hard power deployed much more than soft power. Other leaders, including Sardar Vallabhai Patel, Bhímráo Rámdzsi Ámbédkar, Veer Savarkar, and Syama Prasad Mookerjee, supported hard power (Jagannathan, 2019). When the Gujral doctrine was released in 1996, India's stance on using soft power changed, as this doctrine focused on building peaceful economic relations with its South Asian nations. As a result, the Indian government has released many policies and projects to exploit soft power through its foreign policy.

After the 14<sup>th</sup> Prime Minister of India, Narendra Modi, took office in 2014, he applied soft power to his foreign policy. The Modi administration believes that soft power may not directly convince foreign actors to support India's various issues. However, in the long term, it will be easier for India to reach its foreign policy goals, including its security and economic interests. For instance, by using three soft power assets: Yoga, Buddhism, and the Indian diaspora, India aims to introduce more and more of its culture and tradition to audiences worldwide. One of the old Indian philosophies is '*Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam*' (English: the world is one family), linked to Modi's soft power strategy to support his foreign policies such as Neighborhood First, Act East, and Connect Central Asia towards particular regions. Also, this term is used in India's diplomacy due to the concept of civilizational value for India and its relevance to catastrophe and misery.

Moreover, this phrase has become a mantra in Modi's speech when he travels abroad or attends any meeting outside India. For example, he invoked this phrase in the United Nations General Assembly in 2014, (Narayan, 2016) or more recently in his opening remarks at the first Quadrilateral Leaders' Virtual Summit on March 12, 2021 (The Business Line, 2021). With these policies, India expects to reaffirm its historical connections with neighboring areas and increase international integration, trading, and cooperation. Various projects like *Make in India*, *Swachh Bharat Abhiyan* (English: Clean India Mission), and *Incredible India*, also highlighted for improving the Indian image globally. The Modi administration established a public diplomacy division under the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs to strengthen the connection with the diaspora outside India. The potential of the Indian diaspora is tremendous in the context of boosting the relationship between India and other nations. It can play an essential role in the expansion and growth of the pharmaceutical industry (Sharma, 2013). As a result, Modi spends time with Indian communities every time he goes on a business trip abroad. Recently he emphasized his thoughts on this subject by saying "Our diaspora is our strength" (The Economic Times, 2021) on his trip to the United States in September 2021.

Soft power facilitated India's transformation into a significant influencer, where culture is seen as the key for India to emerge as an influential leader in the 21<sup>st</sup> century (Tharoor, 2008). In his speech, Shashi Tharoor, Member of Parliament, explained the open nature of the Indian civilization when many religions such as Hindu, Jew, Christianity, Islam, and Sikhism, and diverse cultures like arts, cuisines, traditional from indigenous communities to geographical regions, could co-exist in

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immediate neighbors, especially the smaller nation.

harmony for more than thousand years. On the other hand, acceptance is a critical point of Indian society, which helps this nation inspire the world in the globalization era. Therefore, India played an active role globally when proving the importance of its intangible position to the other nations. It can be considered that the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic is an opportunity for India to use soft power and improve its national image as well as depict its reputation as a sincere, trustworthy, and neutral partner.

#### **V. Soft Power Diplomacy in the COVID-19 Period**

The COVID disease emerged in late December 2019, causing an unanticipated disaster. It has an influence on the lives of billions across five continents in all aspects: physically, psychologically, and socially. According to statistics from WHO (24 June 2022), more than 539 million cases were confirmed, resulting in more than 6.32 million deaths globally, and around 11.9 billion vaccine doses have been administered (WHO, 2022). Every nation has faced a severe crisis with its overwhelmed health systems and economies affected by lockdown. Furthermore, the unequal access to vaccines between developed and developing countries leaves more and more people vulnerable to the deadly virus. According to American journalist and political analyst Bradley Blankenship, if cures for COVID-19 are still out of the hands of poorer nations, then virus types could mutate into a potentially more dangerous variant that could evade immunity granted by vaccination (Blankenship, 2021). Therefore, emerging deadly variants will occur across the globe. Many international institutions and superpowers have started producing vaccines and providing humanitarian aid to developing countries to solve these issues. In addition, significant powers such as the United States, China, and Russia see this pandemic as a competition for geopolitical influence over the globe in the post-COVID era. For example, as the natural extension of its mask diplomacy, China's Belt & Road Initiative now encompasses 'Chinese Health Diplomacy' with the moniker 'Health Silk Road' to promote its health leadership and redeem its international image (Lee, 2021). Washington and its European alliance deployed 'Vaccine diplomacy' in response to Beijing's strategy, while Moscow also showed their ambition to join this competition by producing the 'Sputnik V' vaccine. Recognizing the use of soft power globally, India also implements COVID diplomacy as a responsible great power in international relations.

#### **VI. COVID Diplomacy**

Health diplomacy is at the heart of India's COVID diplomacy, as "a diplomatic goodwill connects with the humanitarian nature of international citizenship rather than basically medical assistance" (Lindsey & Phillip, 2020). Health diplomacy can serve as a proper channel to project soft power during the pandemic, in line with Joseph Nye's explanation of soft power as "the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes one wants through attraction rather than coercion or payment" (Nye, 2008). There are no specific instruments from the Indian government concerning its health diplomacy. However, the intent is outlined in speeches of political leaders or reports of governmental institutions.

According to the Ministry of External Affairs (2021), Indian health diplomacy has been fulfilling the geopolitical and geo-economic interests of the country (MEA, 2021). To improve this strategy, Prime Minister Modi keeps using the ancient philosophy '*Vasudhaiva Kutumba*' for propaganda when India engages in assistance activities in profoundly impacted nations. Despite difficulties stemming from the public health emergency caused by COVID-19, India has been considered successful in its pandemic diplomacy both within and beyond South Asia. The COVID diplomacy of India encompasses three goals: firstly, provide leadership to its region; secondly, provide medical supply; and finally, provide vaccines through its vaccine diplomacy.

Regarding regional leadership and medical aid, the Modi administration has engaged in 'COVID diplomacy' through a variety of activities: from mid-March till April 11, 2020, more than 28,000 foreigners were evacuated from 43 nations (Roy Chaudhury, 2020); response and medical teams were sent to Nepal, the Maldives, Kuwait, and Bahrain; and foods, medicines as well as supplies were sent to the world such as wheat and other essential food grains and drugs to Afghanistan, and 1.8 million N95 masks to Philadelphia, the largest city in the US state of Pennsylvania on October 10, 2020 (The Economic Times, 2020b). To bolster its 'Neighborhood First' Policy, Modi organized a virtual South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) conference to discuss a battle against the virus on March 15. Then he established a COVID-19 emergency fund for SAARC members with a \$10 million contribution from India (Nayanima, 2020). Beyond neighboring South Asian nations, India has shown support and solidarity actions to the international community. In May 2020, drugs, medical products, and equipment were sent to 13 developing African nations as India shifted its Covid aid focus to this continent. (Himani & Nayanima, 2020) During the virtual 17<sup>th</sup> ASEAN-India summit on November 13, 2020, India committed to provide \$1 million aid to the ASEAN COVID-19 response fund. Through numerous meetings at various international forums, Modi pushed for deeper cooperation with other world leaders on health issues, such as a creation of a joint team working on traditional medicine at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit (September 2020), a collaboration in digital health at the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) Forum (September 2021), and the vision of 'One Earth, One Health' for a collaborative approach in combating the pandemic at the G20 Summit (October 2021).

India's vaccine diplomacy relies on its advantage in medical equipment and pharmaceutical capabilities; India supplies 20% of global exports of low-cost "generic" drugs, vaccines, and affordable medicines. India has the most significant number of Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved plants outside the US and is estimated to supply 40% of the generic formulations in America (Roy, 2020). India was quick off the mark when the pandemic began, accounting for 20% of all generic medicines and 62% of global vaccine production. Before the vaccine development process succeeded, India brought hydroxychloroquine (HCQ) and paracetamol to 120 countries (The Economic Times, 2020a). It spent \$16 million on pharmaceuticals, test kits, and other medical supplies for approximately 90 countries (Pant & Tirkey, 2021). When COVID-19 vaccines were approved

globally, India began the ‘Vaccine Maitri’ (Vaccine Friendship) campaign on January 21, 2021, to provide vaccines in its neighborhood, first to Bhutan. Two Indian biotechnology and biopharmaceuticals companies, Bharat Biotech and Serum Institute, cooperated with their American and British counterparts to manufacture COVID-19 vaccines named Covaxin & Covishield. This cooperation and its results boosted India’s soft power within South Asia by reaffirming its role as the “Pharmacy of the World.” Despite a temporary halt in India’s COVID-19 vaccine export due to the second wave, India has already delivered over 65 million doses to nearly 100 nations by 2021 (Firstpost, 2021). At the G20 Summit in Rome on October 30, 2021, Prime Minister Modi promised to produce 5 billion COVID-19 vaccine doses by 2022 (Hindustan Times, 2021).

## **VII. Evaluations of India’s Soft Power Diplomacy**

After nearly two years of active diplomacy, we can witness India’s soft power achievements. Firstly, India’s contributions have been recognized by the international community. During the India-EU virtual summit in May 2021, French President Emmanuel Macron declared that “*India does not need to listen to lectures from anyone about vaccine supplies. India has exported a lot for humanity to many countries.*” (The Statesman, 2021) The Biden administration also attaches a vital role to India in halting the Covid-19 pandemic because India made long-term investments to expand its vaccine manufacturing capacity (The Times of India, 2021b). India has hosted many forums on containing the pandemic with global and regional organizations such as SAARC, G7, G20, and BRICS, showing its rising position on the world stage as a benign and trustworthy actor. Secondly, global health diplomacy helps India maintain and develop its role in servicing the demand for pharmaceuticals, diagnostic kits, and vaccines. Despite the overwhelming logistical challenges, India sent many vaccines, healthcare products, and medical supplies to over 150 countries during the first wave. The Vaccine Maitri Initiative is an ideal combination of soft and hard power, seamlessly converging into smart power. The program contains geopolitical elements for India. It reaffirms India’s integral role in the post-COVID world order by portraying itself as a constructive actor in international relations. India’s Covaxin vaccine has been sent to many countries, in this way India promotes a positive national image worldwide. Finally, India does not stay out of competition of using soft power through its COVID-19 diplomacy, especially against China.

Recently, New Delhi surpassed Beijing as a cheap medical supplier and sent accessible vaccines to the Global South, as it has been faster and more effective. For example, India sent 100,000 doses to Cambodia for free (Gilani, 2021). Similarly, China promised to deliver 300,000 doses to Myanmar in January 2021 (Aung, 2021), but has yet to deliver, while India has already provided one million doses in December 2021 (The Times of India, 2021a). After Brazil boycotted the Chinese vaccine Sinovac due to its low quality, the President of Brazil, Jair Bolsonaro, preferred India’s supply. He wrote on Twitter about his gratitude to India, with an image from the Ramayana epic depicting Lord Hanuman carrying an entire mountain to deliver the life-saving herb ‘Sanjeevani booti’ to Lanka. (The Times of

India, 2021a).

Furthermore, many developed countries like the UK or Canada ordered COVID-19-related pharmaceuticals from India. Prime Minister of Canada, Justin Trudeau, affirmed: “India’s tremendous pharmaceutical capacity and Prime Minister Modi’s leadership in sharing this capacity with the world” (Mint, 2021).

### **VIII. Negative Impacts on India’s Efforts**

India fell behind in the second wave after its successes in the early stages of the COVID-19 era. By June 2021, COVID cases and deaths in India were among the world’s highest, reducing India’s soft power and influence in the Indo-Pacific region. According to Brand Finance’s 2021 soft power rankings, India has dropped nine places to rank 36th on the chart (Brand Finance, 2021). A comprehensive crisis affecting the economy, democracy, and vaccine diplomacy undermined earlier Indian achievements. According to the World Bank, analysts have drastically cut India’s FY22 GDP growth to 8.3% due to the persisting impact of COVID-19 (Business Today, 2021). While its democracy continued to fall in international rankings, Freedom House downgraded India from ‘free’ to ‘partly free’ because of discriminatory policies against the Muslim people and suppression of civil society groups. The score of India fell from 71/100 in 2020 to 67/100 in 2021 (Freedom House, 2022). India’s soft power has declined and this decline in soft power affected the results of vaccine diplomacy. In April 2021, an order to suspend vaccine exports brought public criticism to the Modi administration, followed by the government’s attempts to suppress the opposition.

Moreover, the lack of vaccine supply to Africa and Asia created opportunities for Chinese and Russian vaccines to replace Indian solutions in these continents. Although India resumed vaccine exports in small quantities, between 5 million to 30 million, to 19 countries in October 2021, it will not gain significant momentum until 2022 (The Conversation, 2021). India is the heart of QUAD’s efforts to compete with China’s vaccine diplomacy and India’s setback has also affected this competition. At the first summit, the QUAD committed to send 1 billion doses to the Indo-Pacific region by the end of 2022 and all its members, the United States, Japan, and Australia, support India to produce and distribute its vaccines (Seema, 2021). This means that the QUAD is dependent on how quickly India can increase its capacity and resume its vaccine initiative for the organization’s vaccine solutions in the region.

### **IX. Conclusion**

As a famous nation for its soft power, India has effectively used its soft power in international relations since 1947. With the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, India found an appropriate approach to gain influence and attraction from nations hard-struck by COVID through its diplomatic outreach and assistance. Through health diplomacy, India presented its national image as a trustworthy and compassionate partner and received long-term geopolitical and geo-economic benefits in the recipient countries such as South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Africa. During the first wave of COVID-

19, India was among the nations that successfully contained the virus. This allowed India to play a significant role in supporting the rest of the world through giving economic aid and delivering healthcare equipment, vaccines, and medicines. Indeed, with these activities, India has received respectful and grateful responses from the international community. However, the second wave undermined Indian efforts and, subsequently, its soft power; downgraded its global soft power ranking amid domestic crises and geopolitical competition with China on the world stage. Thus, it can be seen that India's soft power and the utilization of soft power by the Modi administration through the country's pharmaceutical capabilities have shown mostly beneficial results presenting India as a responsible and benign actor during the COVID-19 crisis. Although pandemic-related difficulties and national issues have negatively impacted the results of its COVID-19 diplomacy, India continues to show tremendous potential and initiatives that can transform into a rising global soft power in the post-COVID-19 world.

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**THE ANGLO-PERSIAN OIL DISPUTE OF 1928-33: GEOPOLITICAL DISCOURSE,  
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES**

István Dávid VÁCZ<sup>29</sup>

**Abstract**

The 1933 Anglo-Persian oil dispute had long-term consequences. Moreover, it was a highly complex dispute in which the actors of British geopolitics acted very effectively to defend their interests. The topic has been the subject of several valuable studies, this research would like to make a modest contribution to the discourse from a geopolitical perspective. The main questions were how the geopolitical discourse developed and what were its causes and consequences. The study argues that the reasons behind the revision of the contract from both sides were very complex background and had steadily expanded in parallel with the expansion of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company's – APOC – policy and Persian modernisation. Firstly, the perception of the company as a threat to the integration of the state was strengthened in the Iranian government during the previous decades, and the regime also wanted to direct internal tensions towards it. On the other hand, a major aim of Iranian nationalism was the restoration of its sovereignty and imperial sphere, which clashed with British geopolitics in the Gulf region and the cancellation of the D'Arcy concession challenged the international system. The main objective of the British was to complement the concession, ensure the long-term functioning of APOC and preserve their hegemony over the Persian Gulf.

**Keywords:** Geopolitics, Oil, Iran, Anglo-Persian Oil Company, 1933 Oil Dispute

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## I. Introduction

By the 1920s, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company had become both the most important British interest in the Middle East and the most significant actor in the modern Iranian industrial sector. As one of the largest oil companies of the era, the firm actively shaped the British geopolitical discourse. Its operations were regulated by the D'Arcy Concession of 1901, but the document became outdated and both sides wanted to reformulate it.

The aim of this research is to examine and comprehensively analyse the revision of the contract, which became known as the 1933 Anglo-Persian oil dispute. The issue is particularly relevant and complex, as oil contracts influenced the development of many areas: strategic affairs, politics, economics, and law, and were also crucial from the social point of view (Sadeqian, 2011: 8-9). In analysing the debate, this article does not focus primarily on the course of the negotiations, but seeks to answer the discourse of the debate – especially the geopolitical ideas in it – and the system of arguments that developed, as well as the reasons, aims and consequences of the cancellation of the concession. The research will place special focus on exploring the relevant contexts and analysing the complex strategy of the British Empire. The theses of the research are: 1. The study argues that the reasons behind the revision of the treaty from both sides steadily expanded with the rise of APOC and its policies, and with the progress of Persian modernization. 2. Iran wanted to renew the concession not just because of economic reasons and geopolitical considerations. 3. The British developed their comprehensive strategy after the cancellation of the concession mainly because of geopolitical reasons. 4. This was the last time when the Persian oil issue could have been properly settled; if the Iranian government had been given shares in the company, the “Partnership Policy” would have succeeded, since it could have led to at least a partial harmonisation of interests. 5. The paper also seeks to raise the aspect that events can only be partially explained rationally. The individual actors, especially Reza Shah made a mistake in the management of the dispute and then acted in terms of the system of priorities which characterises authoritarian leaders. These factors essentially undermined Iran's ability to assert its interests.

The study is based primarily on British archive material, including the valuable collections “Coll 28/48 *Persia. Anglo-Persian Oil Company; Relations with Persian Govt.*” (Coll 28/48) and “Coll 28/55 *Persia. Anglo-Persian Oil Company. Relations with Persian Govt.*” (Coll 28/55). These contain documents from various actors of the British geopolitical discourse and their interactions with Persian diplomacy. In addition to the archives, the second pillar of the research is provided by studies by various experts of the contemporary period, for example, Millspaugh, “*The Persian-British Oil Dispute*” (Millspaugh, 1933). The third pillar of the article is the modern English-language literature, among them, the very complex book “*The History of the British Petroleum Company VOL I.*” by Ferrier (Ferrier, 1982). Here the author also used British archival material in order to explore the events precisely. Among the most important studies on the subject and the most influential literature in the current research were Beck: „*The History of the British Petroleum Company*” (Beck, 1974), and

Brew: „*In Search of “Equitability”: Sir John Cadman, Rezā Shah and the Cancellation of the D’Arcy Concession, 1928–33*” (Brew, 2016). The fourth pillar is composed of studies in Persian. From this group Soleimany and Rad’s works: “*Mozakerat-e Naft-e Iran va Englis va Tajdid-e Nazar dar Qarardad-e D’Arcy dar Dore-ye Reza Sah*” should be highlighted (Soleimany and Rad, 2010).

## II. The Main Historical Stages of the APOC

In this chapter, the article intends to briefly describe the most important stages of the APOC’s history until the oil dispute. The concession and the games over Persian oil started in 1901 when the D’Arcy concession was signed. It was granted to William Knox D’Arcy for 60 years to explore and extract oil. The concession covered most of the territory of Iran except the five northern provinces. For all this, 16% of the net profit was to be paid annually to the Persian state (Issawi, 1971: 317; Navabi, 1998: 41). The document only provided that the agreement would be null and void if a company was not formed within two years (Coll 28/55: 329r). This can certainly be explained by the circumstances of its origins since there was enormous scepticism about D’Arcy’s project, and no one would have believed that this business would finally be successful (Cadman, 1927: 431). Part of the context in which the D’Arcy Concession was created and the early period is that the Qajar regime was characterized by a very limited central government and the state structure was decentralized and feudal (Stebbins, 2012:155). This may be explained by the origin of the dynasty, which was tribal (Cronin, 2006: 17). The context of the creation of the concession was mentioned in the later political and scientific discussions and determined the early operation of APOC. After many challenges, D’Arcy’s employees could finally find oil at Masjed-e Soleimani in 1908 and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company was established in 1909 (Issawi, 1971: 319). During the next two decades, APOC’s management manoeuvred the company very skilfully between a myriad of internal and external challenges, and although it had links with both the Foreign Office and local British geopolitical actors from the time of the D’Arcy concession, these had been formalised by 1914 (Jones, 1981: 131; Issawi, 1971: 318). With this agreement, Greenway, the company’s chief executive successfully connected the company’s interests with the imperial ones (Jones, 1981: 131, 133, 150). According to the contract, the British government got the majority ownership of APOC, with two board members and veto power (Issawi, 1971: 322). Because of this, the supply of fuel to the fleet was secured, as the agreement required the capital raised to be used to build the necessary facilities (Rosenbaum, 1915: 196). During the World War APOC made huge acquisitions, created numerous subsidiaries and became a fully integrated global company. This generated conflict because of the royalty’s calculation. Furthermore, APOC did not respect the terms of the D’Arcy concession, and did not pay to the Persian government during the war (Paine and Schoenberger, 1975: 12; Millspaugh, 1933: 521; Coll 28/55: 331r). The dispute was theoretically settled by the Armitage-Smith agreement signed in 1921, in which APOC paid £1 million and the terms of 16% were defined. (Paine and Schoenberger, 1975: 12; Ferrier, 1982: 371).

### III. British Geopolitics and APOC

The British geopolitical discourse concerned with Persia since the early 19th century, and their interests had expanded over time. Although the country was strategically important for the defence of India at the beginning, its significance increased qualitatively after the discovery of oil (Axworthy, 2008: 212). The geopolitical actors within the discourse had different priorities, but the importance of Iran, and especially its oil-rich southern part was unanimously perceived (Lowe, 1972: 442; Committee of Imperial Defence, 1928: 11). After the First World War Britain embarked on an active policy to secure the oil fields (Toprani, 2017: 61). From the latter's perspective, the Middle East including Iran, Iraq and the Persian Gulf region played a key role as the archival documents continue to emphasise, and even state that the influence over the region had never been more decisive (Coll 28/55: 534r- 535r). The British power-network was very adaptive because it operated within the "commonwealth framework" (Byrappa, 2020: 43).

In the Iranian context, the rise of Reza Khan to power and the emergence of the modernist elite in support of him strengthened the central government and weakened the regional power centres. This meant a change in the status quo in the Persian power architecture which British geopolitical actors, including APOC, had to adapt to. While in the past the actors of British diplomacy and the oil company also built important relationships with local feudal lords – most notably Sheikh Khazal and the Bakhtiari tribes, who held important positions in the south – (Stebbins, 2012: 156). Stebbins argues that the British adapted their policy to this power fragmentation and did not intentionally undermine the power of the central government (Stebbins, 2012: 156). Another argument in favour of this necessity was that these areas were home to oil fields and APOC facilities – its refinery was in Khazal-dominated Abadan – (Stebbins, 2012: 159; Soleimany and Rad, 2010: 76; Issawi, 1971: 326). Contrary to Stebbins, the World Bank report took the view – as did the Persian elite of the 1920s – that APOC had in fact divided Persia with this policy and deliberately weakened the central government (World Bank, 1952: 3). Reza's centralization and the changing circumstances were well perceived by the insightful British minister in Persia: Loraine, who persuaded APOC to abandon its previous policy and to support and build partnership with the central government. The diplomat argued that the new regime in Iran is likely to get stronger and the company would benefit from a good relationship with it (Coll 28/48: 251r- 251v). So APOC adapted its strategy to the new situation as did the whole of British geopolitics. The actors supported Reza and Teymurtash's<sup>30</sup> work of stabilisation until they could act as a buffer against the Soviet Union and the British economic and geopolitical interests were safe (Coll 30/17(S): 317r).

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<sup>30</sup> Abdolhossein Teymurtash was Iran's second most prominent politician of the period, immediately behind the Shah as his Minister of Court (Mueller, 2015: 4).

#### IV. The Background of the Oil Dispute

##### A. Iran's Objectives and Motivations

The aim of this chapter is to illustrate the multiple objectives, motives, and real or perceived grievances formulated and used by the actors of Persian discourse against the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. Nevertheless, it is clear that, although the D'Arcy concession was intended to be changed, the modernist elite did not want to remove the company from the country (Coll 28/48: 234r; Brew, 2016: 2).

The rise of Reza and the reformist elite who supported him to power was possible because of the traumas of the previous decades, which made the intelligentsia realise that the country needed a strong central government to initiate economic development and guarantee territorial integrity (Dadkhah, 2003: 153; Ansari, 1998: 55; Taqizadeh, 1934: 969). This affected APOC because of its previous relationship with Khazal and the Bakhtiari. Although the company changed its strategy, its previous moves were not forgotten by the Iranian elite, who considered the firm as a major threat to the country's sovereignty and territorial integrity (Nia, 2013: 172).

The aim of the Persian leadership in the 1920s was to strengthen the sovereignty of the state, which also meant reducing foreign influence (Boroujerdi, 2006: 396). It was primarily embodied by the British Empire, which, according to Iranian perceptions, exploited the country's natural resources unfairly (Mueller, 2015: 3). For this reason, APOC became the symbol of this narrative, and Iranians compared the corporation to the East India Company. (World Bank, 1952: 6). Besides, the modernisation of Iran also included geopolitical elements, namely the restoration of the old imperial sphere. It meant that the country was claiming the Persian Gulf as its own sphere (Mueller, 2015: 1, 3), but it was also one of the most important regions for Britain, mainly because of oil, and by the 1930s APOC was widely active in all parts of the Gulf, not just in Iran. The conflict came to a head over the Sheikdoms of the Gulf, where the Persians refused to accept the British hegemony (Mueller, 2015: 7; Beck, 1974: 127- 128). So, on the one hand, APOC was a symbol in the geopolitical arena, and its extensive activities made it an emblem of British imperialism, born in an era when the once glorious Persian Empire was vulnerable to the European powers (Ferrier, 1982: 595; Mueller, 2015: 2). The United Kingdom's majority ownership of the company was a particular target of criticism (Coll 28/48: 12r- 15r). The regaining of sovereignty also had a tangible impact in the economic sphere, as the Iranian state began to revise – led by Teymurtash – the concessions and capitulations granted during the Qajar era (Ansari, 1998: 60). Among these contracts the D'Arcy concession which regulated APOC's operations was the most prominent in financial, geopolitical, economic and social terms. The revision of this document, in addition to the political considerations – a victory over the British would have given Reza enormous domestic legitimacy – also had crucial economic significance, since the royalties were one the most important pillar of the Persian state budget and Reza wanted to secure the finances in the long term (Brew, 2016: 2). Moreover, the amount of the royalty was a key issue for the modernisation program, which was essential for the restoration of the Persian great power status



(Brew, 2016: 2- 3). Therefore, the Iranian administration wanted to increase the royalty, acquire a stake in APOC, participate in economic decisions and reduce the concession area to allow other oil companies to invest (Soleimany and Rad, 2010: 72, 80; Coll 28/48: 9r- 11r). Among the economic reasons, the global size of APOC was mentioned before. The Persians complained that the corporation was not transparent and in fact diverted profits to its subsidiaries (World Bank, 1952: 6; Coll 28/55: 531r). As mentioned earlier, the first attempt to resolve this conflict was made by Armitage-Smith in 1920-1921 (Bharier, 1971: 155). But this agreement did not resolve the problems. The Iranians did not recognise its validity because the Majles did not sign it, and they argued that Armitage-Smith had exceeded his authority (Soleimany and Rad, 2010: 79-80). The situation was further complicated by the fact that, although APOC's largest fields were in Persia at Masjed-e Soleimani and Haft Kel, from 1927 the company's interests were no longer limited to these fields (Ferrier, 1982: 603; Cadman, 1934: 201). The Persian elite also resented the Anglo-Persian Oil Company from economic policy aspect, as they were not building their new refinery in Iran and had a number of investments and interests in many parts of the world, which they perceived as draining these from them (Coll 28/48: 9r- 11r). Their recurring demands in the dispute include that the firm should build refineries in Iran to increase oil production and supply domestic demand cheaply. (Ferrier, 1982: 614- 615). The Iranians also criticised the company for not employing adequate local labour and for treating their domestic workers very badly (Coll 28/48: 12r- 15r, 238r).

## **B. British Objectives and Motivations**

The significance of oil and the geopolitical implications of the empire have been discussed previously, therefore in this short chapter the paper aims to briefly outline the specific British objectives for the renewal of the concession. In fact, APOC also sought to reform the D'Arcy concession which provided legal background for its operations. The first attempt was in 1917, using the Khostaria concession as a pretext (File 1010/1917: 196r). This is relevant because the English draft, which already appeared here essentially reflects the later, ultimately victorious position – the quantitative calculation of royalties and the desire to allow only as much as was necessary – (File 1010/1917: 162r- 164r). This means that the oil dispute of 1933 started in 1916-1917, when the first concepts began to be formed, and not in the 1920s. However, at that time the renewal of the concession did not take place, although APOC was very keen to finalise it. Because the management thought that the later the negotiations started the worse their position would be, because the Persians would ask for more, due to the growth of the company (File 1010/1917: 179r – 180r). They were right, this is what happened. Overall, the ultimate goal of the Brits did not change in the 1920-30s, they wanted to reach a mutually acceptable concession which allows as much as necessary and ensures the legal operation of the corporation in the long term (Coll 28/55: 257r, 258r). Peaceful negotiations were seen as the biggest threat, as they were seen as a good chance to include Iranian interests in the management (File 4535/1928 Pt 11 'Persia 149r).

## V. Negotiations and the Cancellation of the D'Arcy Concession

### A. Negotiations, Concepts, Crisis

Although both sides wanted to renegotiate the concession it was the Iranians who finally took the initiative led by Teymurtash in 1928 (Paine and Schoenberger, 1975: 13; Axworthy, 2008: 227). The negotiations went well in 1929, and the fact that Cadman – the company's chairman – and Teymurtash finally agreed to abandon the Armitage-Smith contract was a major achievement (Ferrier, 1982: 612-613). The Minister of Court wanted Persia to have a 25% stake in the company, representation on the board of directors, a quantity-based calculation of the royalty – 2 shillings per tonne – and a lump sum of £500,000 to settle the existing disputes (Brew, 2016: 8; Badri: 2010, 36; Qasemian and Mollaii, 2021: 205). He also demanded the annual minimum royalty and the payment of taxes. He asked for a lot but promised to the company only a twenty-year extension and the support of the government (Ferrier, 1982: 608). Although APOC supported the Persian partnership, they did not mind Iranian involvement as long as they had the decision-making majority, which is why Cadman offered a maximum 20% share and a lower royalty (Brew, 2016: 8; Badri, 2010: 36). On the other hand, he agreed to reduce the area covered by the concession to 100,000 miles and to abolish the monopoly on pipeline construction, but wanted a thirty-year extension (Badri, 2010: 36). It can be seen that there was a significant divergence of concepts. Finally, the discourse between the parties was disrupted by the Great Depression of 1929, which had a serious impact on both Persia and the APOC, and the possibility of an agreement was eliminated (Ferrier, 1982: 609). The "Partnership Policy" had enormous significance; however, Ferrier did not consider it realistic. He argued that market and government actors behave differently and have different priorities (Ferrier, 1982: 628-629). The research, on the one hand, argues that it would have been possible to make the Policy work. The cooperation, even at the cost of many disputes, would have been the only reassuring long-term solution for the situation of the Iranian oil.

After 1929, the deadlock of negotiations and the global crisis swept away this historic opportunity and hit Iran hard, causing serious economic problems (Brew, 2016: 10- 11). At the same time, APOC's profits collapsed sharply due to oversupply, and the discovery of excellent oil fields in East Texas in 1930 did not help to stabilise the balance between supply and demand in the international oil market (Brew, 2016: 11). The company responded by cutting dividends, capital investments, and royalties (Bamberg, 1994: 25). Time passed with the crisis, but negotiations made no progress as Cadman believed that just after recovery would it be possible to renew the contract (Brew, 2016: 11). This was opposed by Teymurtash under whose leadership articles attacking APOC multiplied in the Persian press (Brew, 2016: 10). The minister's behaviour is not surprising, as the Iranian economy was in huge trouble and by intensifying the conflict and reaching an advantageous agreement with APOC the government would have been able to raise money, increase its popularity and divert attention from the difficulties.

Negotiations resumed in 1931, but the general pattern was that Teymurtash's demands were too much for Cadman and the involvement of the Iranian government in APOC was now removed from the agenda. Nevertheless, by late 1931 and early 1932, a draft agreement had been reached in which the oil company incorporated a number of Persian demands, albeit on points of little significance. The corporation's leaders agreed to increase the royalty to 20%, reduce the area of the concession and to give up the monopoly on the oil pipelines (Ferrier, 1982: 614-616; Coll 28/55: 333r; Brew, 2016: 11). In addition, the firm was also willing to pay £1 million to settle the dispute (Soleimany and Rad, 2010: 86). Although this draft was not nearly as favourable as the 1929 one, the Iranian government faced with economic problems and needed the money and a symbolic victory as soon as possible. In order to speed up the signing of the agreement and gain a better negotiating position Teymurtash went to Moscow to put pressure on the British (Soleimany and Rad, 2010: 86). However, the draft convention was signed by the parties the final version was not ratified, because in the meantime APOC published the royalty for 1931, which was only 306 thousand pounds – in comparison to the 1.288 million pounds the year before – (Coll 28/55: 334r- 335r). As the amount was extremely small and the government required a lot of resources the situation further increased the anger against the oil company. The Persian leadership protested and eventually refused to accept the royalty (Coll 28/55: 336r).

## **B. Cancellation of the D'Arcy Concession and Its Consequences**

Despite the ineffectiveness of the negotiations, everyone was surprised by Taqizadeh's letter of 27.11.1932 stating that the D'Arcy concession was cancelled (Coll 28/55: 288r). This radical and unprecedented measure, however, needed to be very thoroughly justified both domestically and internationally. In order to do so the Persians developed a very complex and multifaceted set of arguments, the main points of which were described in chapter IV/A. In addition of those they also argued that the people themselves were unhappy with the D'Arcy concession and APOC, so the withdrawal had social support (Coll 28/55: 277r). Moreover, the measure was confirmed by a law passed by Majles in December (Coll 28/55: 190r). The dispute between the two sides escalated in December with further attacks in the Iranian press. The previously mentioned list was extended with old-new aspects attacking the oil company – most of them were mentioned before – (Coll 28/55: 185r, 185v, 186r).

In this extremely tense situation, the Iranian government – including Foroughi, the foreign minister – also tried to show its willingness to compromise, emphasising in several telegrams and conversations that they were ready to negotiate (Coll 28/55: 287r; Lybyer, 1933: 633). They explained that they did not want APOC to be removed, but they could only get them to the negotiating table by withdrawing the concession (Coll 28/55: 135r, 379r). As Mueller has pointed out in his excellent study, nationalism and the Persian strategy also carried serious risks, as it narrowed the path to compromise (Mueller, 2015: 2). In other words the government positioned itself in a very rigid

situation, from which it became vulnerable to internal and external constraints. It could no longer withdraw the cancellation, which would have meant the fall of the regime as Taqizadeh wrote (Coll 28/55: 487r). Millspaugh also sensed this and explained that the shah's movements were uncertain, but he could not lose face (Millspaugh, 1933: 524- 525). It can be seen that the withdrawal of the D'Arcy concession had a very negative impact on the negotiating status of the Persians, but then the question arises as to what factors might have been behind the withdrawal. The archival sources confirmed that the Shah alone was behind this, and he did not consult with his ministers beforehand, while no one dared to oppose him openly (Coll 28/55: 272r, 511r; Qasemian and Mollaii, 2021: 216). The incident caused great international consternation, the US diplomacy expressed surprise that Iran had dared to interfere in Britain's most fundamental interests, but Iranian elite officials including Taqizadeh were also surprised by the Shah's action and disagreed with it (Brew, 2016: 12; Coll 28/55: 486r). Contemporary and academic writers have tried to explain Reza's action in a number of ways. The British minister in Iran, Hoare thought the explanation could be that the Shah had become fed up with four years of negotiations and made a sudden decision and did not realise the likely consequences of Britain's involvement in the conflict. He may have thought that the withdrawal would be followed quickly by an agreement (Coll 28/55: 272r). This is confirmed by the fact that during the negotiations with Cadman, Reza explained that his intention with the cancellation was to "*just clean the slate*" (Bamberg, 1994: 44). The ruler probably wanted to get the deal done as quickly as possible for financial reasons and desired a bigger share of APOC's profits. All the contemporary and modern literature agrees on this, from Cadman, Millspaugh, Hoare to Soleimany-Rad and Bamberg (Coll 28/55: 272r; Soleimany and Rad, 2010: 92; Bamberg, 1994: 44; Millspaugh, 1933: 524- 525). Sources and academic literature found that Reza needed the money to finance his investments – the Trans-Persian railway and military improvements – (Coll 28/55: 281r; Beck, 1974: 126; Soleimany and Rad, 2010: 94). Other explanations also appeared. One was that the Soviets were behind the cancellation (Coll 28/55: 290v). While it is likely that the withdrawal of the concession was in the interests of the Soviet Union, supported because of ideological reasons, but this explanation is unlikely. In agreement with Soleimany and Rad's study the conspiracy theory that the incident was the betrayal of Reza and Teymurtash and was staged to benefit the British is also not true (Soleimany and Rad, 2010: 93). Another theory is that APOC gave little money to provoke the cancellation of the concession (Soleimany and Rad, 2010: 94). On the basis of the archival sources, the research has not only found no evidence for this but claims the opposite. As we will see it was important for APOC to have a legal basis and to maintain the contract which ensured its operation.

### **C. The British Strategy and the Continuation of Negotiations**

The reaction to the withdrawal of the concession in the British geopolitical discourse was complex and effective. The British, although surprised also considered the incident as the maximum pressure applied by the Iranians and was seen as a serious mistake, because it allowed them to use the pressure

of the international community (Coll 28/55: 508r- 508v; File 4535/1928 Pt 11 'Persia 149r). First of all, they responded to the allegations and denied them (Bouillon, 1933: 667). The decline of the royalties was explained by the Great Depression, and it was maintained that the concession could not be unilaterally cancelled (Bouillon, 1933: 667; Coll 28/55: 508r- 508v). They demanded the abolition of the cancellation, although they were also aware that this would mean the end of Reza's rule (Coll 28/55: 211r, 411r). The Brits planned their strategy and perceived the stakes very cleverly. On the one hand, they followed an assertive diplomacy towards Iran saying that they would defend their interests at all costs (Coll 28/55: 485r, 502r). The second pillar was the involvement of the League of Nations (Coll 28/55: 502r; Bamberg, 1994: 37). The strong action was justified by the British perception that the global, rules-based international system was under attack (Coll 28/55: 462r). The second reason was that the conflict was being watched with a wary eye throughout the Muslim world, observing how Britain was behaving in order to protect its most important geopolitical interest (Coll 28/55: 292r, 469r). In other words, the way the situation was handled set a precedent, the most important interests had to be protected and the case could serve as a model for the international system. The rationale for the tough action was therefore geopolitical in many ways. British Minister Hoare outlined four scenarios to his colleagues: „(1) a bridge (2) protracted stalemate (3) surrender of the Shah resulting very possibly in serious reactions on internal situation which would be rendered precarious by any severe external shock (4) refusal of Shah to surrender except to force and therefore some demonstration by him which would necessitate occupation of oilfields.” (Coll 28/55: 492r.) Despite the fact that the British had ordered warships to the Gulf they did not expect an open confrontation, since, as Elkington rightly pointed out, this would only have justified the involvement of British troops and would probably have meant the end of the Reza's regime (Coll 28/55: 208v, 209r, 290v, 420r, 422r). British also wanted to avoid military intervention because their international prestige was much better served by the involvement of the League of Nations, which – as Beck also pointed out – was a way for a great power to seek a legal and legitimate solution rather than force (Beck, 1974: 147- 148). So the second element of the strategy was to settle the dispute before the League of Nations. The maintenance of the process started in the League was seen as cardinal to keep up the pressure until the new concession was concluded (Coll 28/55: 257r, 258r). The explanation for this was that on the one hand, the British had great influence in the League of Nations, which served as a fundamental institution of their world system, and on the other, Reza had indeed illegally withdrawn the concession and broke the international rules. So his reckless action was turned very sharply against the Shah, and his negotiating position became very weak. In particular, if he had lost in front of the League, it would have caused difficulties in terms of regime security and would have been extremely damaging to the international prestige of the state. British diplomacy was aware of the Persians' weak position, but they did not want to cause a loss of face here either. Brits believed that if negotiations went well they could adjourn the international body's meetings on the issue and save Reza's government from losing face (Coll 28/55: 240v, 241r). Britain's strategy was thus the result of its great power status, the many

geopolitical factors, and the legal development of Western civilisation. The Iranians questioned the League's competence, arguing that this was an internal and not an international dispute (Beck, 1974: 140; Coll 28/55: 405r). Although they were in a favourable position, the British really wanted to negotiate all along. A telegram from the Foreign Office to Hoare in January 1933 confirms this. In the letter, the Foreign Office explained that they had two objectives, one "ultimate" and one "immediate". The former meant the conclusion of a concession acceptable to both parties, in which APOC would allow only as much as was necessary, but in any case, they wanted to ensure the legal operation of the company (Coll 28/55: 257r, 258r). To achieve the "ultimate" goal, the "immediate" interest was identified as the continuation of negotiations (Coll 28/55: 257r, 258r). No wonder the British wanted to negotiate from the beginning of 1933, as they had been very effective in the period following the cancellation and had a very strong position with many pillars. Finally, on 31.01.1933, the parties agreed to suspend the investigation at the League while the company and the government negotiated. During this time, APOC's operations could not be disrupted, and the matter would only be referred to the organisation if an agreement could not be reached. (Coll 28/55: 121r, 175r).

#### **VI. The New Concession and Its Consequences**

The negotiations continued, but the Iranian negotiators attempted to implement as much of the 1929 draft as possible. The meetings failed to reach an agreement with Cadman. The breakthrough finally came with the direct negotiations between the chairman and the Shah at the end of April (Bamberg, 1994: 46). In the process, Reza essentially abandoned the previous Persian positions completely and accepted basically all points of APOC with bypassing his ministers (Qasemian and Mollaii, 021: 216). In the new concession, the wishes of APOC were accepted, but minimal discounts were made to ensure that the Shah could celebrate the new contract as a victory. That is what happened, that was how the Persian newspapers reported it, and although the British were a little annoyed, they knew they could not destroy the false image presented by the Iranian press (Coll 28/55: 54r, 57r).

Under the new terms of the agreement, APOC paid £1 million to settle the dispute, moved to a quantitative calculation of the royalty, and had to pay 20% of the dividend above £671,000. The minimum royalty must reach £750,000 per year. In addition, the area of the concession was reduced to 100,000 miles and had to be selected by APOC by 1938; the monopoly on pipeline construction was ended (Paine and Schoenberger, 1975: 13; Bamberg, 1994: 48). The oil corporation also needed to increase the employment of Iranians and provide better training for them (Paine and Schoenberger 1975: 13; World Bank, 1952: 15).

The new agreement is also seen in the literature as an absolute British victory and is considered to have been disadvantageous for Iran (Soleimany and Rad, 2010: 96; World Bank, 1952: 15). The company was able to operate with essentially very little extra expenditure. On the one hand, it was exempted from the Iranian tax system for thirty years, and on the other hand, the most important Persian points of the 1929 negotiations were not at all implemented; there was no longer any talk

about ownership or representation in the board (Bamberg, 1994: 48; Brew, 2016: 15). However, although APOC succeeded, Iranians were left with a bitter feeling (World Bank, 1952: 14) and the issue of oil remained on the political agenda causing further problems and conflicts in the 20th century.

The question arises, why did the Shah accept this disadvantageous contract? The literature offers many reasons and possible explanations. According to the World Bank report on the Iranian oil conflicts, he was afraid of the disintegration of his state and the loss of the southern territories (World Bank, 1952: 13). Others highlighted the causes of the potential negative international reputation (Qasemian and Mollaii, 2021: 215). In his study, Behravesch cites three possible scenarios by Mahdavi which could explain why Reza accepted the British points: „(1) *the British intimidation of Reza Shah that they could depose him as they had brought him to power; (2) threatening to separate the southern province of Khuzestan from Iran and to take it under their own control directly or by proxy; and (3) bribing the Shah into satisfying their demands and agreeing to the deal*” (Behravesch, 2012: 392). The present study is also unable to identify with complete certainty why there has been such a high level of acceptance of British demands. Overall, the causes mentioned above are important parts of the reasons, but the research would like to make other suggestions. Firstly, the Shah certainly made a mistake in withdrawing the concession. As a result, he manoeuvred himself into a narrow cage both from the perspective of domestic and foreign policy, from which the 1929 points were out of the question and since he himself was in danger, he was desperate to get out of this position. However nationalist Reza was, we are talking about an autocratic ruler. The first priority of this type of power structure is to maintain its position at all costs. The more the ruler is - or at least feels - threatened, the more subordinated other considerations, and the wider context become. Reza paid the price for this in front of the eyes of history. Badri wrote about the incident as his biggest mistake and from this point contemporaries themselves began to see the Shah as an agent of the West (Badri, 2010: 31; Brew, 2016: 2).

## VII. Conclusion

The oil dispute of 1933 is a pivotal event for Iran and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. This research has attempted to illustrate the causes, analyse the processes and highlight the consequences. Overall, it can be said that Iran's motivations were both economic and geopolitical. Similarly, both global and regional geopolitical interests defined the British geopolitical discourse, providing arguments following the cancellation of the D'Arcy concession. The complex British strategy rested on two pillars: assertive diplomacy and legitimacy and the involvement of the League of Nations. This article sought to analyse and present this strategy in a highlighted manner. They took advantage of Reza's mistake and rejected the Iranians' most important demands. Internal Iranian difficulties and successful external pressure ultimately brought absolute success to APOC, and the Shah essentially accepted anything to save his own position. In any case, it can be argued that the negotiations and disputes of

1928-1933 are of immense historical significance, as the Partnership Policy of 1929 was the last chance to bring geopolitical and economic interests between the parties into some form of alignment. The new agreement of 1933, however, was unable to do so and increased the gap between the parties.

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## ANTARKTİKA: TÜRKİYE’NİN YENİ AÇILIMI

Zeynep ÖZTÜRK<sup>31</sup>

### Öz

Bu çalışmada ülkemizin son yıllarda gündemine gelen ve karar vericilerin dikkatini çeken bir konu olan Antarktika kıtası incelenmiştir. Uluslararası İlişkiler literatüründe, bu konuyla ilgili yerli ve yabancı kaynaklarda yayınlanmış özellikle yerli çalışmaların çoğu 2017-2022 dönemini içermemektedir. Bu da Türkiye’nin bölgedeki güncel politikaları ve hedefleri konusunda bilgi eksikliğine yol açmaktadır. Bu çalışmada bu zaman dilimindeki boşluğu doldurmak amaçlandı. Bu amaçla yerli gazeteler, uluslararası antlaşmalar ve online kaynaklardan veri toplandı. Bu veriler göstermiştir ki söz konusu zaman aralığında Türkiye’nin politikaları yoğunlaşmış, Madrid Protokolü’ne taraf olunmuş ve bölgeye altı tane bilim seferi düzenlenmiştir.

Çalışmanın birinci bölümünde, Antarktika kıtasının önemi, barındırdığı doğal zenginlikleri, bunların kullanım kapasiteleri ve dünya gündemini son yıllarda meşgul eden iklim değişikliğini önlediği göz önünde bulundurularak buranın insan eli değmemiş yapısının korunmasının önemine değinilmiştir. Çalışmanın ikinci bölümünde, Antarktika’nın uluslararası hukuktaki yeri, 1959 Antarktika Antlaşmasıyla başlayan Antarktika Antlaşmalar Sistemi’nin içeriği, egemenlik iddiaları ve Türkiye’nin bölgeye karşı tutumu ele alınmıştır. Türkiye’nin başlarda bu kıtaya karşı ilgisiz kalmasının sebepleri ve aktif politikalar yürütmeye başlamasına yer verilmiştir. Bunun dışında, Antarktika Antlaşması ile oluşturulan statü ve mekanizmalara da yer verilmiştir. Antarktika kıtası insanlığın ortak mirası statüsündedir. Çalışmanın bu bölümünde bu kavrama da açıklık getirilmiştir. Çalışmanın üçüncü bölümünde ise Türkiye’nin politikaları, bölgeye yönelik gerçekleştirdiği bilim seferleri ve Antarktika Antlaşmasına göre tesis edilmiş olan “Danışman Devletler” arasına girmesi için yapması gerekenler dile getirilmiştir. Sonuç kısmında ise Çalışmanın ana konusu olan kıtanın başta Türkiye olmak üzere dünya politikasındaki konumu, ileride olabilecek çatışmaların önlenmesi için kalıcı çözüm önerileri ve Türkiye’nin bu konuda yapabilecekleri irdelenmiştir. Bölgenin iklim değişikliği ve küresel ısınmanın etkilerinden korunması, çıkar çatışmalarının konusu haline getirilmemesi için uluslararası toplumda alınacak tedbirler dile getirilmiştir.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Antarktika, AAS, Kutup politikaları, Antarktika Antlaşması, Kutup Araştırmaları

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## ANTARCTICA: TÜRKİYE'S NEW OPENING

### Abstract

In this study, the Antarctic continent, which has come to the agenda of our country in recent years and has attracted the attention of decision makers, has been examined. In the International Provincial Relations literature, in the domestic and foreign sources on this subject, or in particular, most of the domestic studies do not include the period 2017-202. This leads to a lack of information about Türkiye's current policies and goals in the region. In this study, it is aimed to fill the gap in this time frame. For this purpose, data were collected from domestic newspapers, international treaties and online sources. These data show that during this period of time, Türkiye's policies intensified, the Madrid Protocol was a party and six scientific expeditions were organized to the region.

In the first part of the study, considering the importance of the Antarctic continent, its natural riches, their usage capacities and the prevention of climate change that has occupied the world agenda in recent years, the importance of preserving the untouched structure of this continent is mentioned. In the second part of the study, Antarctica's place in international law, the content of the Antarctic Treaty System starting with the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, sovereignty claims and Türkiye's attitude towards the region were discussed. The reasons why Türkiye was initially indifferent to this continent and the fact that it started to carry out active policies were included. Apart from this, the status and mechanisms established by the Antarctic Treaty are also included. The continent of Antarctica has the status of the common heritage of humanity. In this part of the study, this concept is also clarified. In the third part of the study, Türkiye's policies, its scientific expeditions to the region and what it needs to do in order to be among the "Consultative States" established according to the Antarctic Treaty are expressed. In the conclusion part, the position of the continent, which is the main subject of the study, in world politics, especially in Türkiye, permanent solution proposals for the prevention of future conflicts and what Türkiye can do in this regard are examined. Measures to be taken in the international community to protect the region from the effects of climate change and global warming and not to make it the subject of conflicts of interest were expressed.

**Keywords:** Antarctica, ATS, Polar policies, Antarctic Treaty, Polar Research

### I. Giriş

Antarktika bağımsız sınırları, kalıcı nüfusu ve ekonomisi olmayan tek kıtadır (National Geographic Dünya Atlası: 160). 1959 Antarktika Antlaşması'na göre kıtaya hiçbir devlet hükmedemez. Bu antlaşmaya göre Antarktika, insanlığın ortak mirası sayılmış ve sadece barışçıl amaçlarla yararlanılması karara bağlanmıştır. Kıtada bilimsel araştırma dışında hiçbir faaliyete izin verilmemektedir (Coşkun, 2018: 113).

Kıtanın keşfi, iki yüz yıllık bir çabanın ardından olmuştur. 1840'ta yelkenlisiyle kıyılarda 2000 km yol alan Charles Wilkers tarafından keşfedilmiştir. Wilkers, denizlerden ve buz kütlelerinden

oluşan Kuzey Kutbu'nun aksine, Güney Kutbu'nda büyük bir kıta olduğuna inanmaktaydı. Bu seferiyle de bunu kanıtlamış bulundu. Antarktika'nın keşif sürecinin başlaması, 15.yy'da başlayan ve 17.yy'a kadar süren Coğrafi Keşiflere kadar dayanır. Fikri temelleri ise M.Ö. 600-700 yılları arasında Yunan düşünürlerin ortaya atmış olduğu "Simetri ve Denge" hipotezine dayanır. MS 2.yy'da Batlamyus, Dünya'nın bir simetri ve denge içinde olması gerektiği ve bu yüzden de güneyde büyük bir kara parçası olduğunu iddia etmesi üzerine "Terra Austrailis" adı verilen bu kıtayı bulma çabaları başlamıştır. Coğrafi Keşiflerin devam ettiği 17.yy'a gelindiğinde ise, ismini "Terra Austrailis'ten alan Avustralya kıtasının bulunmasıyla beraber, daha güneyde başka kara parçası olmadığı zannedilmiştir. Kaptan James Cook'un 1773-74 yıllarında gemileriyle kutup dairelerini geçmesiyle bu hipotez çürümüştür. Cook, 71 derece güney enlemini geçerek kıtaya 121 km yaklaşmış bulunmaktaydı. Cook'un 1774 yılındaki ikinci seferinde ise daha ileriye gidilmiş ancak Avustralya'nın ilerisinde önemli bir kara parçası olmadığı düşünülmüştür. Zira buradaki topraklar buzullarla kaplı olduğu ve yaşanılabilir olmadığı için önemli bulunmamıştır. Bundan sonra da daha ileri gidilmemiş ve Antarktika'nın aranması için herhangi bir girişim olmamıştır. Kıtanın 1840 yılındaki keşfinden önceki dönemlerde ilk kez kimin kıtaya ayak bastığı net olarak bilinmemektedir. Ancak uzmanlar bunun tarihinin 1820 olduğunu söylemektedirler. Rus İmparatorluk Donanması'ndan Fabian Gottlieb von Bellingshausen, Kraliyet Donanması'ndan Edward Bransfield ve Amerikalı denizci Nathaniel Palmer komutalarındaki mürettebatla birlikte kıtayı veya yakınlarındaki buz platformlarını ilk görenler olduğu düşünülüyor. Teyit edilmiş olan ilk ayak basma ise 1895 yılında Adare Burnu'na olmuştur (Kollektif, 2001: 96.).

1959 Antarktika Antlaşması'nda doğal kaynakların korunması düzenlenmektedir. Bu anlaşmanın devamı olarak bazı ek antlaşmalar imzalanmış ve Antarktika Antlaşmalar Sistemi (AAS) oluşturulmuştur. İleride bunlara detayla değinilecektir. Bunlar 1972 Antarktik Ayıbalıklarının Korunması Antlaşması, 1980 Deniz Canlılarının Korunması Sözleşmesi ve 1991 Çevre Koruma Protokolü (Madrid Protokolü)'dür (Coşkun, 2018: 114).

Kıta üzerimde ülkelerin çeşitli egemenlik iddiaları olmakla beraber 1959 Antlaşması ile bunlar dondurulmuştur. 2041 yılı sonuna kadar buradaki doğal kaynakların işlenmesine izin verilmemektedir (Öztürk, 2015: 2).

Egemenlik iddialarında bulunan devletler İngiltere (1908), Yeni Zelanda (1923), Fransa (1924), Avustralya (1933), Norveç (1939), Arjantin (1939) ve Şili (1939)'dir (Bermejo, 1989:5).

Antlaşma egemenlik haklarını askıya almış da olsa Antarktika'da Özellikle Korunun Bölgeler, Özel Yönetilen Bölgeler, tarihi alanlar ve abideler ile ilgili bazı egemenlik haklarıyla ilgili çatışmalar yaşanmıştır. Örneğin, Arjantin ve Şili, Birleşik Krallığın bir platoya "Kraliçe Elizabeth Platosu" adını vermesini protesto etmişlerdir. Danışman devletlerin söylediğine göre teknik ve bilimsel çalışmalar ilerledikçe siyasallaşma artacak ve kaynak potansiyeli, turizm ve biyoçeşitliliğin kullanımı konusunda ayrılıkların artabileceğini öngörmektedir (Bilgiç, 2022: 3).

Avustralya'nın hak iddiaları kıtanın %42'sini kapsamaktadır. Şili ise hak iddialarını

“Antarktika Pasaportu” vererek göstermektedir. Birleşik Krallık, kıtada üzerinde hak iddia ettiği bölgeyi “British Antarctic Territory” (Britanya Antarktik Bölgesi) olarak adlandırmaktadır. Birleşik Krallık, burada araştırma yapan İngiliz bilim insanlarından vergi almamaktadır. Arjantin, Şili ve Birleşik Krallığın egemenlik iddiaları çatışmaktadır. ABD ise kıtada üsleri bulunmasına rağmen açıkça egemenlik iddiasında bulunmamıştır. Rusya’nın da herhangi bir egemenlik iddiası bulunmamaktadır (Öztürk, 2015:2). Çin’in 2013 yılında Kunlun İstasyonu yakınlarında yeni bir özel yönetim bölgesi kurma isteği de bölgede tansiyonu yükselten bir etken olmuştur (Bilgiç, 2022:3). Bununla birlikte, herhangi bir hak iddiasında bulunulmamış, tamamen buzullarla kaplı yaşama koşulları elverişsiz bölgeler bulunmaktadır (Öztürk, 2015:2).

Türkiye, Antarktika’nın hukuki statüsünün belirlendiği dönemlerde bu konuyla ilgilenememiştir. Ülkedeki darbe, bölgesel ve küresel sorunlar, iç ve dış meselelerinden dolayı önceliklerinin farklı olması bunun üzerinde etkili olmuştur. Türkiye bu konuyla ancak 2010’lu yıllarda aktif olarak ilgilenmeye başlamıştır. Türkiye’nin uluslararası alanda daha etkin olabilmek ve bilimsel anlamda gelişebilmek için bölgede aktif politika izlemesi gerekmektedir. Antarktika’nın geleceği hakkında kararlara dahil olmak için bu konuda uzman bilim insanlarının yetiştirilmesi ve bölgede aktivitenin artırılması öneme haizdir.

Uluslararası İlişkiler literatürü açısından baktığımızda, bu konuyla ilgili yerli ve yabancı kaynaklarda yazılmış bazı çalışmalar ve bilimsel makaleler bulunmaktadır. Ancak bunların çoğu 2017-2021 dönemini içermemektedir. Bu zaman aralığında Türkiye’nin politikaları yoğunlaşmış ve bölgeye dört tane bilim seferi düzenlenmiştir. Ayrıca Madrid Protokolü’ne de taraf olunmuştur. Bu çalışmamızda bu zaman dilimindeki boşluğu doldurmak ve Türkiye’nin gelecekte neler yapması gerektiğini saptamak amaçlandı.

## **II. Antarktika’nın Önemi**

Kıtada petrol, doğalgaz ve çeşitli maden rezervleri bulunmaktadır. Bölgedeki uranyum ve mobilden rezervleri şu anki ihtiyacı karşılamaya yetecek seviyede olduğu tahmin edilmekle beraber, demir rezervinin de 200 yıl yetecek miktarda olduğu düşünülmekte.

Biyoçeşitlilik olarak da oldukça zengin olan Antarktika’da Krillerin avlanma kapasitesinin de yıllık 50 ila 100 milyon olduğu tahmin edilmekte. Ayrıca kıta sera gazlarını tutarak iklim değişikliğini önleyici özelliğe sahiptir (Butler, 1977: 35-39).

Ayrıca, bölgenin el değmemiş doğal yapısının korunması önemlidir. Zira bölgedeki buzullar, iklim değişikliğine ve küresel ısınmaya bağlı olarak hızla erimektedir. Bu durum da deniz seviyelerinde yükselmelere sebep olup ada devletlerini tamamen sular altında kalma tehdidiyle karşı karşıya bırakmaktadır. Bununla birlikte bu durum, sahil şeridinde yer alan birçok yerleşim bölgesini de tehdit etmektedir.

### III. Antarktika'nın Uluslararası Hukuktaki Yeri

Kıta üzerindeki egemenlik savaşının durdurulması için BM öncülüğünde 1959 yılına Antarktika Antlaşması yapılmıştır. Antlaşma 12 devlet tarafından imzalanmış ve 1961 yılında yürürlük kazanmıştır. Antlaşmanın temel amacı, antlaşmanın giriş kısmında Antarktika'nın barışçıl amaçlarla kullanılması ve çatışma konusu yapılmamasıdır (Coşkun, 2018:115).

Bunun üzerine bu antlaşmanın yetersiz kalması üzerine başkaca antlaşmalar yapılarak Antarktika Antlaşmalar Sistemi (AAS) oluşturulmuştur. Kıta bundan sonra insanlığın ortak mirası statüsüne konmuş ve kıta üzerinde var olan egemenlik iddiaları dondurulmuştur. Ancak bu antlaşma, ülkelerin bu iddialarından tümüyle vazgeçtikleri anlamına gelmemektedir. 2048 yılından sonra bunların tekrardan gündeme gelmesi muhtemeldir (Başlar, 2015: 13). Söz konusu madde (AA md.4) donmuş çatışma meydana getirdiği ileri sürülerek eleştirilmiştir.

Antarktika'da yapılacak olan bilimsel faaliyetlerde açıklık temel ilke olacak ve devletler yaptıklarıyla ilgili diğer tarafları bilgilendirecektir.

İş birliğinin temeli BM'nin 1 Temmuz 1957- 31 Aralık 1958 yılları arasında Dünya Jeofizik Yılı ilan etmesiyle atılmıştır. Antarktika ile ilgili çalışmalar da bu dönemde başlamıştır. Taraf devletler birbirlerini çalışma programlarıyla ilgili haberdar etmekle beraber, kıtada araştırma üsleri kurabileceklerdir. Üslerde görev yapan personelle ilgili değişimler ilgili devletler tarafından yapılacaktır. Gözlemlerden elde edilen verilerin gizli tutulması yasaktır ve diğer taraflar haberdar edilecektir (Antarktika Antlaşması md: 3/1).

Antlaşma yürürlüğe girdikten iki ay içinde, 1961 yılında Avustralya'nın başkenti Canberra'da ilk danışma toplantısı yapılmıştır. Toplantıda Antarktika'nın barışçıl amaçlar için kullanılması, bilimsel çalışmaların yapılmasının kolaylaştırılması, uluslararası iş birliğinin sağlanması gibi konular ele alınmıştır. Bu toplantılar 1994 yılına kadar iki yılda bir, sonra da yılda bir kez olmak üzere yapılmıştır (Coşkun, 2018: 117-118).

Son danışma toplantısı 2019 yılında, 1-11 Temmuz tarihleri arasında Çekya'nın başkenti Prag'da yapılmıştır (Dışişleri Bakanlığı, Antarktika Antlaşması, 2022).

Antlaşmaya taraf devletlerin hepsinin bu toplantılara katılmaya hakkı vardır. Ancak kararlar "Danışman Devlet" statüsündeki devletlerce alınır. Danışman Devlet olmanın şartları ise, Antlaşmaya taraf olmak ve kıtada bilimsel araştırmalar ve keşif faaliyetleri yapmaktır. Danışman olmayan devletler ise Danışman Devletlerce alınan kararlara uymakla yükümlüdür. Danışman olmayan devletlerin kararlar üzerinde söz hakkı bulunmamaktadır (Antarktika Antlaşması md: 9/2).

Antlaşmaya taraf olan 52 devletin 29 tanesi Danışman Devlet statüsündedir (Başlar, 2013: 13). Antarktika Antlaşmalar sisteminin 2. etabı ise 1972 tarihli Antarktik Ayıbalıklarının Korunması Sözleşmesi'dir. Bu sözleşmeye 16 devlet taraftır. 1972 yılında imzalanmış, 1978 yılında yürürlük kazanmıştır.

Antlaşma en genel anlamıyla Antarktika'da 60 derece Güney enleminde yaşayan ayıbalıklarının bazı türlerinin avlanmasını tamamen yasaklamış, bazılarını da sınırlandırmıştır.

Ayıbalıklarının izin verilen türleri avlandığı takdirde avlayan devlet, Antarktika Araştırmaları Bilimsel Komitesini ve diğer taraf devletleri haberdar edecektir (Ayı Balıklarını Koruma Sözleşmesi, md: 4.)

AAS'nin 3. aşaması olan Deniz Canlı Kaynaklarının Korunması Sözleşmesi (CCAMLR), 1980 yılında imzalanmıştır. 30 devlet taraftır (CCAMLR.org, 2022).

Sözleşmenin uygulanması için Avustralya'nın Tazmania eyaletinde Antarktik Deniz Canlılarını Koruma Komitesi kurulmuştur. Komite ilk kez sözleşme yürürlüğe girdikten üç ay içinde toplanmış, sonrasında da her yıl bir kez toplanmıştır.

Komitenin 2021 yılındaki toplantısı 21-22 Ekim tarihinde çevrimiçi olarak yapılmıştır. Komitenin son toplantısı ise 8-10 Şubat 2022 tarihleri arasında yine çevrimiçi olarak gerçekleştirilmiştir (CCAMLR, Meetings, Şubat 2022).

Komitenin başlıca görevleri, Antarktika'daki deniz ekosisteminin korunması için gerekli tedbirleri almak; avlanmaya izin verilen bölgeleri, canlı türlerini, bunların yaşını, cinsiyetini, büyüklüğünü belirtmektir (CCAMLR md: 9/2).

Sözleşme ile danışma organı mahiyetinde bir de bilimsel komite kurulmuştur. Deniz Canlılarını Koruma Komitesi'nin bütün üyeleri dahildir. Komitenin görevi gerektiğinde danışma görüşü vermek ve avlanma düzenlemeleriyle ilgili konularda inceleme yapmaktır.

1959 yılında imzalanan Antarktika Antlaşması'nın 12. Maddesinde belirtildiği üzere, antlaşma yürürlüğe girdikten 30 yıl sonra bir toplantı yapılması ve antlaşmanın işlerliğinin gözden geçirilmesi öngörülmüştür (Antarktika Antlaşması md:12). AA 1961'de yürürlük kazanmış ve 30 yıl sonra, 1991 yılında yapılan toplantıda, ek protokol olarak Çevre Koruma Protokolü, bilinen adıyla Madrid Protokolü kabul edilmiştir. Mevzubahis protokol, 1998 yılında yürürlük kazanmıştır (Coşkun, 2018:121).

Protokole yer alan hususlar, Antarktika'nın el değmemiş ekosisteminin korunması, kıtanın bilimsel amaçlar için kullanılması ve bu sırada çevreye zarar verilmemesidir. Madde 3'e göre, bilimsel faaliyetler esnasında çevreye olabildiğince zarar vermeden çalışılması ve olası zararların değerlendirilmeden eyleme geçilmemesi hükme bağlanmıştır. (Marks ve Barnes, 1993:107) Madrid Protokolü ile Kıtadaki bilim dışı faaliyetler 2048 yılı sonuna kadar askıya alınmıştır. Bu süre sonunda taraflar depozitere bildirerek protokolün gözden geçirilmesini isteyebileceklerdir (Madrid Protokolü md: 13/1).

Yukarıda, Antarktika'nın insanlığın ortak mirası statüsüne değinmiştik. Burada da bu statünün içeriği ayrıntılı olarak ele alınacaktır. İnsanlığın ortak mirası kavramı, geçmişten günümüze aktarılan, günümüzde varlığını sürdüren ve gelecek nesillere de aktarılması gereken doğal ve kültürel mirasın bütünü olarak tanımlanabilir. Kavram ilk defa 1907 Lahey Antlaşması'nda dile getirilmiş ve 1954 yılında Silahlı Çatışmalarda Kültür Varlıklarının Korunması Antlaşması'nda somut hale getirilmiştir. UNESCO tarafından da 1972 senesinde Dünya Mirası Antlaşması imzaya sunulmuştur. Bu kategoriye dahil değerler uluslararası örgütler ve uluslararası antlaşmalarla idare edilmelidir. Uluslararası hukuk çerçevesinde insanlığın ortak mirası olarak kabul edilen yerler; uzay boşluğu, deniz yatağı, okyanus



tabanı, ay varlıkları ve Antarktika'dır.

Bu alanlar ülkelerin egemenlik alanı dışında kalan ve devletlerin üzerinde hak iddia edemeyeceği yerlerdir. Bu yerler sadece insanlığın yararı için kullanılmalı ve barışçıl amaçlar gözetilmelidir.

İnsanlığın ortak mirası kavramı BM'nin 8028 sayılı kurallar bildirgesinde, 1979 Ay Antlaşması'nda, 1982 BM Deniz hukuku sözleşmesinde de kullanılmıştır. Antarktika Antlaşması'nda doğrudan böyle bir tanımlama geçmese de bu kıta da bu kavrama dahildir.

İnsanlığın Ortak Mirası kavramı tanımlanırken beş ana unsur öne çıkmaktadır. Bunlar; hiçbir gerçek veya tüzel kişiye ait olmaması, idaresinde uluslararası toplumun menfaatinin gözetilmesi, askeri olmayan, barışçıl amaçlarla kullanılması, elde edilen faydanın paylaşılması, gelecek nesillere de kalacak şekilde muhafaza edilmesi (Akıl, 2021:344).

Bu şartlar Antarktika için de geçerlidir. Ancak kıta üzerinde hak iddia eden devletler bu esasların Antarktika için geçerli olmadığını savunmuşlardır. Buna ek olarak, "Küresel Müşterek" kavramı da öne çıkmaktadır. Kavram ilk olarak, BM küresel Yönetişim ve Küresel Müştereklerin Yönetişimine dair raporunda (2015) zikredilmiştir. Buna göre Küresel Müşterek kavramı, devletlerin sınırları dışında kalan, herkesin erişim hakkı olan; deniz, uzay, atmosfer ve Antarktika'yı tanımlamaktadır (Piece, 2013:5).

Başka bir görüşe göre ise Antarktika, uzay ve atmosfer gibi yerlerle kıyaslanamaz ve bu kavrama dahil olmaz (Rudiger, 2017:142). Bir bölge ortak miras olarak belirlendiyse, bu anlaşılan tarafların hepsi için bağlayıcıdır. BM Deniz Hukuku sözleşmesi ve Ay Varlıkları Sözleşmesinde bu husus hükme bağlanmıştır. Ancak taraf olmayan devletler için de bağlayıcılığı bulunabilir. Ortak miras olarak kabul edilmiş yerlerin hukuki statüsünün açık ve net olması gerekmektedir. Ülke uygulamalarının da bunu destekler nitelikte olması önemlidir. Buna ek olarak bu durumu herkes kabul etmeli ve herkesin kabulüne açık olmalıdır (Akıl, 2021: 345).

#### IV. Türkiye'nin Politikaları

Türkiye, uzun bir süre boyunca ülkede yaşanan darbeler, terör olayları ve terörle mücadele, iç siyasi çekişmeler ve bölgesel ve küresel önceliklerinin farklı olması sebebiyle Antarktika ile ilgi kayıtsız ve politikasız kalmıştır. Türkiye, Antarktika Antlaşması'na 1995 yılında taraf olmuştur. Kemal Başlar'a göre bu hamle, Türkiye'nin bölgeye duyduğu ilgiden ziyade, 1990-2005 yılları arasında Avrupa Birliği'ne üyelik çerçevesinde hukuk sistemini Avrupa müktesebatına uygun hale getirmek için yapılmıştır (Başlar, 2015: 11).

AA'ya taraf olmayı izleyen yıllarda da Türkiye'nin antlaşmaya taraftarlığı kağıt üzerinde kalmıştır. Türkiye, toplantılara temsilci göndermemiş ve katılım göstertemeyerek pasif bir politika izlemiştir. Kanaatimce, bu durum da politikasızlığa yakın bir tutuma işaret eder.

2013 yılında Antarktika yeniden gündeme gelmiştir. Bu sürecin başlamasında iki STK'nın etkisi olmuştur. 2013 yılında Antarktika Kutup Bilimsel Araştırmalar Merkezi (TAKBAM) AA'ya

taraf olduğumuzu hatırlatmış ve bölgede bakanlıklara bağlı araştırma üsleri kurulması fikrini ortaya atmıştır. Dışişleri ve Çevre Bakanlıklarına Antarktika Antlaşması hatırlatılmış ve AA sekreteryasına akredite olunarak İstisari Devletler Toplantılarına Türkiye adına katılım hakkı elde edilmiştir. 2013 Aralık- 2014 Ocak- Şubat aylarını kapsayacak şekilde kıtaya Türk bilim insanlarının gönderilmesi finanse edilmiştir.

Bir diğer STK ise Türk Deniz Araştırma Vakfı (TÜDAV)'dır. 2013 yılında denizci Osman Atasoy'un bölgeye araştırma üssü kurulması fikrinin Ulaştırma Bakanlığına iletilmesinin sağlanmasına destek vermiştir. Ayrıca TÜDAV, bu konuda kamuoyu oluşumuna da katkı sağlamıştır (Başlar, 2015: 12).

#### **A. Antarktika'nın Türk Dış Politikası İçin Önemi**

Antarktika, Türk dış politikasında oldukça göz ardı edilmiş ancak bir o kadar da önemli bir konudur. Zira kıtanın küresel ısınmayı önemli derecede önlediği için korunması gerekmesi, (Coşkun, 2018: 114) Türkiye gibi sanayileşmekte olan bir ülke için öneme sahiptir. Ayrıca, Türkiye'nin bölgede yapılacak ulusal ve uluslararası araştırma ve projelere katılım göstermesi, 2041 yılından sonra bölgede yaşanabilecek gelişmelerde daha fazla söz sahibi olmasını sağlayacaktır. Bunun yanı sıra Türkiye'nin Danışman Devletler arasına girmesi ve bölgenin geleceği üzerinde söz sahibi olması önemlidir.

Bu durum 60 derece güney enlemi içerisinde kalan bölgede doğal kaynak ve rezervlerin işletilmesi konusunda alınacak kararlarda oy hakkına sahip olmak anlamına gelmektedir. AA'ya taraf olan 52 devletten 29 tanesi bu statüye sahiptir. Geri kalan 23 devlet ise alınan kararlara uymakla yükümlüdür. Türkiye de bu devletler arasındadır (Başlar, 2015:13).

Oy kullanma hakkına kavuşmak için AA'ya taraf olmanın yanı sıra, bölgede araştırmalar gerçekleştirmek gerekmektedir. Türkiye, ekonomisi bozuk olduğundan dolayı ve araştırma üssü kurmanın maliyetli olması hasebiyle, 2010'lu yıllara kadar bu konuyu gündeme alamamıştır. 2013 yılı itibarıyla Türkiye'nin bütçesi 2 milyar doları aşmıştır ve bu sayede araştırmaya fon ayırabilmiş ve Ar-Ge çalışmalarında birçok ülkeyi geride bırakmıştır. Yaptığı yatırımlardan sonuç almaya başlamıştır (Başlar, 2015:14).

Türkiye, 2017 yılında Madrid Protokolüne de taraf olmuştur. Şubat- Nisan 2017 ayları arasında I. Ulusal Antarktik Bilim Seferi için koordinasyon sağlanmış ve sefer başarıyla sonuçlanmıştır. Bu seferde, kıtada 4000 km'lik yok kat edilmiş ve 17 topografik kaya ölçümü ve 38 alanda gözlemler yapılmıştır. Ayrıca 45 noktadan numuneler toplanmış, toplam 2 milyon metrekarelik yerlerde incelemeler yapılmış, seferden sonra olası üs bölgeleriyle ilgili fizibilite çalışması yapılmıştır (BBC).

Sanayi ve Teknoloji Bakanı Mustafa Varank, 30 Eylül 2020'de kalıcı araştırma üssü kurulduğunu Twitter hesabından duyurmuş ve Antarktika: Gezeğin Kara Kutusu isimli belgesel yayınlanmıştır (Yeni Şafak, 2020).

Antarktik Bilim seferlerinin ikinci ayağının liderliğini kadın bilim insanı olan Doç. Dr. Burcu

Özsoy yapmıştır. 20 Şubat 2018’de başlayan seferde ağırlıklı olarak fizibilite çalışmaları yapılmıştır. Ayrıca söz konusu seferde İngiliz Bilim Üssü de ziyaret edilmiş ve incelemelerde bulunulmuştur (gtu.edu.tr, 2017).

Üçüncü Ulusal Antarktik Bilim Seferi, Cumhurbaşkanlığı, Sanayi ve Teknoloji Bakanlığı, İstanbul Teknik Üniversitesi Kutup Araştırmaları Merkezi (PolRec) koordinesinde gerçekleşmiştir. 17 Türk 8 yabancıdan oluşan heyet, 30 gün boyunca araştırmalar yapmış ve Meteoroloji Genel Müdürlüğü, Harita Genel Müdürlüğü, Türk Deniz Kuvvetleri Seyir Hidrografi ve Oşinografi Dairesi Başkanlığı ve Sahil Güvenlik Komutanlığından yetkililer de araştırma faaliyetlerine katılım göstermiştir. Ayrıca, Meteoroloji Genel Müdürlüğü bölgeye otomatik meteoroloji gözlem istasyonu kurmuştur. Bunlara ek olarak dünya serbest dalış rekortmeni, milli sporcu Şahika Ercümen, kıtada sembolik dalış gerçekleştirmiştir (Yeni Şafak, 2019).

4, 5 ve 6. Bilim Seferleri 2020 yılından sonra gerçekleşmiş olup, koordinatörlük görevini Doç. Dr. Burcu Özsoy üstlenmiştir. Dördüncü Bilim Seferi; Cumhurbaşkanlığı, Sanayi ve Teknoloji Bakanlığı ve Türkiye Bilimsel ve Teknolojik Araştırma Kurumu Marmara Araştırma Merkezi Kutup Araştırmaları Enstitüsü koordinesinde yapılmıştır. 9 Şubat 2020’de başlayan Sefer, 30 günde tamamlanmış ve sürenin uzaması sayesinde bilimsel araştırma yapma imkânı gelişmiştir. Geçici bilim üssü sayesinde araştırma yapma imkânı artmıştır. Saha çalışmalarında toplanan örnekler gruplara ayrılarak bozulma ihtimali olanlar soğuk zincire konularak, geri kalanlar ise kargo ile Türkiye’ye nakledilmiştir. Sefer kapsamında 15 proje sonuçlandırılmıştır. Sanayi ve Teknoloji Bakanı Varank, Antarktika Yarımadası Lojistik Özel Görev Grubunun, lojistik maliyetleri düşürmek için toplantının 2017 yılında Türkiye’de yapıldığını kaydetmiş ve Türkiye’nin bölgedeki aktif rolüne dikkat çekmiştir (Anadolu Ajansı, 2020).

Önceki seferde kurulan meteoroloji gözlem istasyonunun bakım ve onarımı yapılmış ve Küresel Konumlandırma Uydu Sistemi İstasyonu kurulması için Harita Genel Müdürlüğü, hidrografi çalışmaları için Seyir Hidrografi ve Oşinografi Dairesi Başkanlığı temsilcileri de seferde yer almıştır. Ayrıca Kutup Bölgeleri İçin Eğitimcileri Destekleme İş birliği Projesi (KEDİ) kapsamında iki öğretmen ve biri Belarus diğeri Bulgaristan uyruklu iki yabancı bilim insanı da misafir araştırmacı olarak seferde görev almıştır. Bu seferde üç adet GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite Systems- Küresel Navigasyon Uydu Sistemleri) kurulmuştur. Bu sistemlerden biri, Harita Genel Müdürlüğü tarafından araştırma üssünün bulunduğu Horseshoe Adasına 70 kilometre uzaklıktaki Dismal Adasına diğeri ikisi de Yıldız Teknik Üniversitesinin yürüttüğü TÜBİTAK projesi kapsamında Horseshoe Adasına kurulmuştur. Bu mekanizmalar doğru uydu konumlandırması yapmaya ve tektonik hareketleri izlemeye olanak sağlayacak. Buna ek olarak kalıcı bilim üssü kurulması planlanan bölgede hidrografik ölçümler yapılmıştır ve deniz ulaşımında kullanılması için haritalandırma yapılmıştır. Ayrıca deniz tabanı incelemeleri de yapılmış olup, ileride inşa edilmesi planlanan deniz yapıları için gerekli bir husustur (Türk Bilim İnsanları 4. Ulusal Antarktika Bilim Seferi’ni Gerçekleştirdi, 04.05.2020).

Dördüncü ulusal bilim seferinde, üç fiziki bilimler, üç canlı bilimler, dört sosyal bilimler ve 5

yer bilimleri projesi, toplamda 15 proje yer almıştır. İklim değişikliğinin izlenmesi için deniz ve göllerden su örnekleri ve kar örnekleri alınmıştır. Çeşitli canlı numuneleri de toplanmıştır. Bu numunelerin kullanılacağı projelerden bazıları; Horseshoe Adası’ndan Toplanan Çevresel Örneklerde Organik ve İnorganik Kirleticilerin Belirlenmesi ve Ön Konsantrasyon Stratejileri ile Birleştirilmiş Kromatografik ve Spektroskopik Yöntemlerle Analiz Edilmesi” projesi ve “Horseshoe Adası’nın Hidrobiyolojik Açıdan İzlenmesi” projesidir. Seferde katılan bir öğretmen ise tecrübeleriyle Türkiye’deki öğrenci ve öğretmenlerin kutuplar konusundaki bilgilerini artırmayı hedefliyor (TRT Haber, 2020).

Beşinci Antarktik Bilim Seferi, 2021 yılında Covid-19 salgınının gölgesinde kısıtlı katılımı gerçekleştirildi. Bu seferde sahadan veriler toplanarak önceden kurulmuş araçların bakım ve onarımına ağırlık verildi. Türkiye bu seferde Çevre Etki değerlendirme raporunu sundu. Araştırma istasyonu 12 ay boyunca 50 kişiye ev sahipliği yapacak şekilde planlandı. Bu sayede bilim insanları nitelikli araştırmalar yapabilecek. Projelerin kurumsal bir yapıda yürütülmesi için TÜBİTAK MAM Kutup Araştırmaları Enstitüsü (KARE) kuruldu. KARE, Türkiye’nin bölgedeki faaliyetlerini koordine etmekle görevlendirildi (İTO Haber, 2021).

Altıncı Ulusal Antarktik Bilim Seferi, 22 Ocak 2022 Cumartesi günü başladı. Çalışmalar 2020 yılından beri KARE koordinatörlüğünde gerçekleşmekte. Hala devam etmekte olan seferde 20 araştırmacı görev almakta ve 14 projenin gerçekleştirilmesi hedefleniyor. Portekiz ve Bulgaristan uyruklu 2 konuk araştırmacı da seferde görev alacak. Bu seferde “Milli teknoloji Hamlesi” kapsamında yerli ve milli imkanlarla geliştirilen ürünler test edilecek. Bunlardan bazıları TÜRKSAT uydu telefonu, TÜBİTAK SAGE ısıtıcı pil, HAVELSAN GNSS alıcısı, ASELSAN el telsizi ve TÜRKSAT BGAN uydu modemidir. Ekibin 3 Mart 2022’de yurda dönmesi öngörülmüyor (Bilimgeç-TÜBİTAK, 2022). Bunun yanı sıra iklim değişikliği ile ilgili de bazı çalışmalar yapılması planlanmakta. Fiziki bilimler, jeoloji, biyoloji gibi bilimler alanında 14 proje gerçekleştirilmesi kapsamında buzul gözlemleri, deniz seviyesi ve buzul değişiminin izlenmesi, kıyı çizgisinin belirlenmesi ve hassas konum verilerinin testi, zooplankton ve omurgasız canlıların incelenmesi ve astronomi alanında çalışmalar yürütülecektir. Kıtaya her sene seferler düzenlenmesi öngörülmüyor (Anadolu Ajansı, 2022).

Türkiye’nin 2018-2022 Kutup Programının özgün bilimsel araştırmalar yapma ve öncü ülkeler arasına girme vizyonu çerçevesindeki temel amaçları; Kıtaya ulusal bilim seferleri düzenlenmesini sağlamak, Ulusal Kutup Bilim Programını uygulamak, bölgede diğer ülkelerle ikili anlaşmalar sağlanarak bunların bilim üslerine Türk bilim insanlarının gönderilmesini sağlamak, kıtada Türk Bilim üssü kurulmasını sağlamaktır.

Uzun ve orta vadedeki hedefler ise; Türkiye’nin kutupların korunması konusunda söz sahibi olması, AAS bünyesinde kurulan, yukarıda ayrıntılı olarak yer verdiğimiz Danışman Devletler arasına girebilmek için kıtaya bilim seferleri düzenlenmesi, Arktik Konsey’e katılım sağlanması için altyapı oluşturulması, bilim insanlarımızı kutupları çalışmaya yönlendirecek bilimsel ve teknolojik

yeniliklerin artırılması, kutup alanında insan kaynağı oluşturmak için lisans, yüksek lisans, doktora, post-doktora programlarının yaygınlaştırılması, Kutuplarla ilgili uluslararası örgütlere üyeliğin sağlanarak etkinliğin artırılması ve İklim değişikliği konularında farkındalık oluşturulmasıdır (T.C Bilim, Sanayi ve Teknoloji Bakanlığı, Ulusal Kutup Bilim Programı Bülteni, 2018:10).

Türkiye şu anda Antarktika'da daha iyi bir statüye kavuşmak için yüksek statülü devletlerin yaptıklarını yapmakta. Eğer çabalarının karşılığını bulamazsa farklı bir stratejiye yönelmesi kuvvetle muhtemeldir. Bununla birlikte, Türkiye Antarktika'daki politikalarından geri adım atmak durumunda değildir. Çünkü bu misyon, Türkiye'nin askeri, ekonomik, siyasi ve askeri etkisinin dünya çapında geliştirilmesine hizmet etmektedir (Bilgiç, 2022:2).

Türkiye'nin statü sahibi olma politikası, Türkiye'nin Antarktika'da artan faaliyetlerini ve hedeflerini açıklamamıza yardımcı olmakta. Zira Türkiye, bağımsızlığını ilan ettiğinden beri muhasır medeniyetler seviyesine erişme ideali içinde olmuştur. Bu da Türk dış politika yapıcılarının dikkatli jeopolitik okumalarıyla sağlanmıştır.

1967 yılında Türk denizci Atok Karaali, Deepfreeze operasyonu kapsamında Antarktika'ya gitmiştir. Bu operasyon ABD Ulusal Standartlar Bürosu ve Stanford Üniversitesi tarafından organize edilmiştir. Karaali, ABD'de Antarktik Hizmet Ödülüyle ödüllendirilmiştir. Ancak bu başarı, Türk bilim programları tarafından desteklenmemiştir. Çünkü bu dönemlerde Türkiye bu kıtada herhangi bir statü peşinde değildi. Türkiye'nin Antarktika'daki faaliyetleri özellikle statü ile ilgilidir.

Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde iklim değişikliği konusu gündemde ağırlığını artırınca Türkiye de elini taşın altına koyarak 1995 yılında Akdeniz'in Kirleticilere karşı korunması için toplanan Barselona Konvansiyonuna katılmıştır. Aynı yıl Antarktik rejimine de katılmış olması, küresel ve bölgesel ekosistemin korunması çerçevesinde olumlu bir örnek olarak değerlendirilebilir (Alpan, 2013:3).

Yukarıda da ismi geçen Doç Dr. Burcu Özsoy, PolRec'in kurulmasının Türkiye'nin Danışman devletler arasına girmesi için büyük bir adım olarak nitelendirmiştir. Türkiye aynı zamanda bilim ve bilim uzmanlığının Antarktika'daki potansiyel statüsü için önemini kavramıştır. Var olan üyelerin faaliyetlerini örnek alarak hareket eden Türkiye'nin statüsünü güçlendirme stratejisi izlediği söylenebilir.

Türkiye'de 2017 yılından itibaren kutup çalışmalarında sert bir yükseliş yaşanmıştır. Bunlardan bazıları 2018 yılında Davos'ta düzenlenen Antarktik Bilimsel komitesi konferansları ve 2019-2020 yıllarında Kutup Araştırmaları Enstitüsü'nün hidroloji ve jeoloji alanında düzenledikleri eğitimler ve kamuoyu oluşturma çalışmalarıdır.

Ekonomik güç ise Türkiye'nin Antarktika'da statü sahibi olmasını teşvik eden bir diğer unsurdur. Türkiye üç tarafı denizlerle çevrili bir deniz ülkesi olmakla beraber 83 milyonluk bir nüfusu olan dünyanın en büyük 17. ekonomisidir. Doğal olarak Antarktika'da söz sahibi olmak isteyecektir. Ayrıca Türkiye, Antarktika'yı G20 ülkeleri arasında da gücünü artıracak bir fırsat olarak görmektedir.

Tarihi bağlar da etkili olmuştur. Türkiye kutuplardan uzak olmakla beraber bu bölgelerle Osmanlı döneminden beri ilgi gösterdi. Piri Reis'in 1513 tarihli meşhur haritası, Güney Amerika'nın en güneyindeki bölgeleri de içermekteydi. Bunlar, Antarktika'ya en yakın olan bölgelerdi. Ayrıca, II. Abdülhamit, ABD'ye Arktik gezilerinden dolayı tebrik göndermiştir. Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, kutuplarla ilgili gelişmeleri yakından takip etmiştir.

Türkiye'nin bölgeye ilgi göstermesinin en önemli sebeplerinden biri de küresel ısınmadır. Madrid Protokolüne üyeliği, iklim değişikliği konusunda bir şeyler yapmaya istekli olduğunu göstermiştir. Türkiye, 2020 yılında eğitimler, televizyon reklamları ve bilimsel projeler aracılığıyla kamuoyu oluşumunu desteklemiştir (Bilgiç, 2022: 7).

Türkiye, Antarktika'da iyi bir uluslararası aktör olmak istemekte. Sonuç olarak şu aşamada imitasyon stratejisi ağırlığını koymuş durumda. Bunun başlıca sebebi, kuruluşundan itibaren Batı Blokunda yer almak istemesi ve izlediği Batıcılık stratejisidir. Antarktika, Türkiye'nin bilim ve çevreye verdiği önemin gösterilmesi için iyi bir platforma dönüşmüştür. Buradaki temel sorun ise danışmanlar ligindeki Batılı ülkelerin Türkiye'yi aralarına almak isteyip istemeyecekleridir. Bir ihtimal de Collins ve Dodds tarafından dillendirilen "Kutup Oryantalizmi"dir. Böyle bir reaksiyon, Türkiye'nin elde etmeye çalıştığı katmanlı haklarının ve stratejilerinin uyumlaştırılmasını engelleyebilecek türdendir. Bu durum ortaya çıkarsa, Türkiye daha yaratıcı stratejiler geliştirmek durumunda kalacaktır (Collins ve Dodds, 2017:208). Ancak, bilim adamlarının Piri Reis'in haritalarına referans vermeleri ve Türkiye'nin araştırma üssü, Türkiye'nin kıtadaki varlığını olağanlaştırmaktadır (Australian Antarctic Program, 2021). Türkiye'nin yeni bir Afro-Avrasyalı devlet olması ve anti-kolonyal duruşu, ileride bölgedeki güç hiyerarşisiyle ilgili yaşayabileceği sorunlarla ilgili ipuçları vermektedir (Bilgiç, 2022: 10).

## V. Sonuç

Antarktika hem dünya hem de Türkiye için günümüzde çok büyük öneme haizdir. Uzun süre bu kıtanın önemi anlaşılamamıştır. Taşıdığı doğal kaynaklarla beraber önemi artmıştır. Bu kaynakların suistimal edilmemesi çok büyük öneme sahiptir. Bilakis bu kaynakların suistimali, neredeyse elimizdeki son el değmemiş kara parçasının da varlığını tehlikeye sokacaktır. Buzulların hızla erimesinin önüne şu durumda bile geçilememektedir. 2041 yılı sonrası yaşanacaklar çok önemlidir ve hem uluslararası toplum hem de Türkiye bu duruma hazırlıklı olmalı ve yaşanabilecek zararları engellemelidir. Kanımca burada savaş çıkma ihtimali oldukça uzak bir ihtimaldir. Zira bölgeye ikmal yapmanın zor olması ve zaten hukuki olarak da yasak olması, egemenlik hakkı öne süren elit "Batılı" devletlerin uluslararası hukukun hamiliğini yapma iddiası bu kuralı çiğnemelerini engelleyecektir. Ayrıca, bölgenin konumu ve iklim koşulları savaşı elverişsiz kılmaktadır. Ancak bölgede bir "soğuk çatışma" yaşanma ihtimali bulunmaktadır. Bu durumda son sözü yine danışman devletler söyleyecektir. Kıtada herhangi bir bölge paylaşımı olması durumunda Türkiye Danışman statüsü alamadığı takdirde kıtada hiçbir hak iddia edemeyecektir.

Yukarıda da belirttiğim gibi Türkiye'nin danışman statüsü kazanması için şu an imitasyon stratejisi izlenmekte. Bunun ne kadar işe yarayacağı ise uzun vadede soru işaretidir. Bu durumda Türkiye gibi diğer orta büyüklükteki güçlerin de hakkının yenmesi ihtimali vardır. Eğer danışman devletler bu devletlerin hakkını gasp edecek olurlarsa bu ülkeler bir araya gelerek alternatif bir rejim de kurulması için bazı adımlar atacaktır. Veya hukuki bir dayanak olmaksızın de facto bir yapılanmaya da gidilmesi muhtemeldir. Bu da maalesef tansiyonu artıracak bir tutuma işaret eder. Bu yüzden Türkiye bölgedeki görünürliğini artırmalı ve bölgede kendisini sözü geçen bir devlet olarak kabul ettirmelidir. Bu anlamda danışmanlarla iyi ilişkiler kurulması da önemlidir. Doğal kaynakların kullanımıyla ilgili de 2041 yılından sonra danışmanlar arasında olabilecek ayrılıklardan da üst düzeyde faydalanılması gerekmektedir. Belki arabuluculuk yapılarak hem kendi statüsünü güçlendirirken aynı zamanda danışman devletlerin saygısını da kazanabilecektir.

Bu kıtanın “insanlığın ortak mirası” sayılması da bir diğer önemli konudur. Zaten kıtanın iklim değişikliğini engellediğini önceden belirtmiştir. İnsanlığın ortak mirası kavramından anlaşılması gereken herkesin eşit fayda sağlamasıdır. Kökeni çok eski tarihlere dayanan egemenlik iddiaları ise kanımızca gerçeği yansıtmamaktadır ve her ne kadar hala var gibi görünse de düşüncemize göre hukuki ve pratik açıdan hayata geçirilebilir değildir. Zira, Avrupa’da küresel ısınma ve iklim değişikliği konuları giderek önem kazanırken, bu konuda birçok antlaşma ve protokol imzalanırken, pratik anlamda da dizel yakıtı kullanan araçlar giderek trafikten çıkartılırken, kıtadaki madenleri çıkartmak gibi çevreye ciddi zararlar verebilecek eylemlere girişilmesi olası görünmemektedir. Zaten bu durumda bu kıtadan hiçbir devlet eşit yararlanamayacak, kıtada geri dönüşü olmayan hasarlar meydana gelecek ve küresel ısınma, hedeflenenin tersine hızlanacaktır. Bu durumda ise deniz seviyeleri ciddi şekilde yükselecek, bazı ada devletleri- İngiltere’nin bazı eski sömürgeleri de dahil- haritadan silinebilecek, Avrupa’da sahil şeridinde bulunan yerleşim yerleri de tehlike altına girecektir. Düşüncemize göre burayı bir maden rezervi olarak görmek yerine iklim değişikliğini önleyen bir kıta olarak görmek ve zarar görmesini olabildiğince engelleme çabası içine girilmelidir. Zaten şu anda var olan Madrid Protokolü de bunu öngörmektedir. 2041 yılında revize edilme imkânı olan protokol, devletlerin kendi çıkarlarına alet edilecek ve çevreye zarar verecek şekilde değil, daha çok Antarktika’nın el değmemiş ekosisteminin korunmasına yönelik güncellenmelidir. Bazı kesimler ise kıtaya hiçbir şekilde insanların gitmemesi gerektiğini savunmaktadır. Eğer aksi yönde bir değiştirme çabası olursa bundan danışmanların kendileri zarar görecektir ve iklim değişikliği ile ilgili kendi devlet ülkelerinde yaptıkları faaliyet ve düzenlemelerle çelişkili bir durum açığa çıkacaktır.

İnsanlığın ortak mirası statüsünün bir diğer unsuru da bu statüdeki yerlerin gelecek nesillere aktarılmasıdır. Burada da çıkar çatışmaları olur ve çevre kirlenirse zaten elimizde gelecek nesillere aktarılacak bir şey kalmayacak ve dahası, kendi geleceğimiz de tehlikeye girecektir.

Diğer ihtimal gerçekleşirse, devletler egemenlik iddialarında ısrarcı olurlar ise de bunu sadece Özel Yönetilen Bölgeler kurmakla sınırlı kalması teşvik edilmelidir. Bu durumda orada söz sahibi olan devlet bölgeyi her istediği şekilde kullanmayacak, İnsanlığın Ortak Mirası statüsüne halel getirecek

eylemlerde bulunmayacaktır. Eğer doğal kaynakları kullanılması gündeme gelirse, bunun için bir antlaşma yapılmalı veya var olan antlaşmalar gözden geçirilerek ek maddeler eklenmelidir. Örneğin hangi doğal kaynağın nerede, ne kadar, hangi türleri ve hangi koşullar altında kullanılabileceğinin hükme bağlanması gerekecektir. Egemenlik iddiaları Özel Yönetilen Bölge ve Özel Korunan Alanlar olarak revize edilmeli, çatışan iddialar için ilgili devletler arasında konsensüse ya da kompromise varılarak çözüme kavuşturulması gerekmektedir. Özel Yönetilen Bölgeler ve Özel korunan bölgelerde devletler tam egemenlik kuramayacak ve buradaki birincil amaçları çevreyi korumak olacaktır. Eğer yukarıda bahsedildiği gibi doğal kaynaklarla ilgili düzenlemeler yapılırsa, bunlar kullanılırken çevreye en az zarar verilmesine özen gösterilmeli, AAS'ye taraf olan diğer devletler ve BM bilgilendirilmelidir.

Bu ihtimalin gerçekleşmesi durumunda Türkiye'nin danışman ligine girmesi daha da bir önem kazanacaktır. Aksi takdirde danışman devletlerin Türkiye'yi yok sayması ve Türkiye'nin elindekileri de kaybetme riski bulunmaktadır. Çünkü danışman ülkelerin kararlarına itiraz edebilecek hukuki konumda olmayacaktır. Türkiye, Antarktika'da sadece bilimsel amaçlarla bulunmakta ve herhangi bir egemenlik iddiası bulunmamaktadır. Madrid Protokolünde öngörülmüş olan statükonun devamını savunmaktadır. Paris İklim Antlaşmasına da taraf olan Türkiye, bölgenin korunmasından ve çatışma konusu yapılmamasından yanadır. Küresel ısınmanın artması Türkiye'nin de zararına olacaktır. Zira Türkiye'nin ihracatının büyük bölümünü tarım ürünleri oluşturmaktadır. İklim değişikliğinin de ilk zarar vereceği sektör tarım sektörüdür. Ayrıca iklim değişikliği Türkiye'nin ana gelir kalemlerinden olan turizm sektörünü de sekteye uğratabilecektir.

Bütün bu anlattıklarım, insanlığın bilinçlenmesi ve iklim değişikliği konusunda farkındalık oluşturmaya katkı sağlaması, Antarktika'nın önemini anlaşılması ve bu konuda yapılacak çalışmalarının devamının gelmesini sağlamak amacıyla yazılmıştır. Buna ek olarak bulmuş olduğumuz literatür boşluğunun dolması noktasında katkı sağlamış olmayı umuyorum. Umuyorum ki kıtanın geleceği hepimizin menfaatine olacak şekilde şekillenir ve herhangi bir çatışma yaşanmadan sorunlar çözüme kavuşur. Bu sorunların çözülmesi için bilinçli bilim insanları ve politikacıların yetişmesi önemlidir. İklim değişikliği ve küresel ısınmanın önlenmesiyle ilgili bölge, ülke ve dünya çapında adımların atılması da ayrıca çok önemlidir. Umuyorum ki herhangi bir çatışmaya mahal vermeden kıta olması gerektiği gibi korunacaktır.

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